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In this thesis I examine the ‘revival’ of Ker Kwaro Acholi – the widely recognised 
traditional cultural institution in Acholiland, northern Uganda. I illustrate the ways that 
its emergence over the past decade has been shaped by dominant discourses at local, 
national and international levels, concluding that Ker Kwaro Acholi is an ambiguous 
entity that functions as a new power base in the political landscape of Acholiland.  
The thesis challenges common perceptions that often reduce Ker Kwaro Acholi to a 
council of traditional chiefs and offers a more nuanced picture that reveals the 
complexities of Ker Kwaro Acholi. I argue that the process of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
‘revival’ has been a strategic project of crafting images of the institution that appeal to 
powerful discourses, and that these images have served to obscure inherently political 
agendas of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s central actors.  
As a result of my study not only is there evident need to reject pervasive uncritical 
understandings of Ker Kwaro Acholi and to recognise Ker Kwaro Acholi’s potential for 
fuelling further conflict and upholding a patriarchal and disciplinary regime in 
Acholiland, but also to further question the collaborative and facilitating role western 
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In this thesis I examine the ‘revival’ of Ker Kwaro Acholi1 – the widely understood 
traditional cultural institution in Acholiland, northern Uganda. I argue that Ker Kwaro 
Acholi is a new power base in the political landscape of Acholiland and illustrate that its 
emergence over the past decade has been constituted by multiple discourses, 
contingent events and strategic practices. In the thesis I identify how these discourses, 
events and practices have combined to produce three dominant images through which 
Ker Kwaro Acholi has become known. I also identify and examine less visible discourses 
that constitute Ker Kwaro and shed light on the disjunctures between these dominant 
images and less visible discourses of the institution. Through the analysis I reveal that 
Ker Kwaro Acholi has emerged and exists predominantly through negotiating a series of 
dominant images that, when held against the light of less visible discourses that are 
constituted by the everyday practices of the institution, are challenged and undermined 
in significant ways.  
The three dominant images that, I argue, have enabled Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival and 
that have significantly formed the institution, are images that cast Ker Kwaro as a 
traditional authority; a government-cultural institution; and an agent of sustainable 
development. The less visible discourses that undermine these ways of seeing Ker 
Kwaro Acholi render the institution far more amorphous than the relatively neat 
dominant images suggest and reveal how Ker Kwaro Acholi has become a site of 
renewed clan rivalry and struggles amongst traditional leadership, a platform for 
political aspirations, and a lucrative venture for some well-placed individuals.  
As a result, and in the light, of the more complex and multidimensional picture I offer of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, there is an evident need to reject one dimensional and uncritical 
understandings of the institution and for greater recognition of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
potential, not only for facilitating peace in northern Uganda, but also for fuelling further 
conflict, and recognising not only its potential as a cultural and political representative 
of Acholi on the national stage, but also its potential for upholding a patriarchal and 
disciplinary regime within Acholiland. And finally, although Ker Kwaro Acholi may have 
                                                          
1 Ker Kwaro Acholi is also referred to as Ker kal Kwaro Acholi or KKA. I will use Ker Kwaro 
Acholi or Ker Kwaro in this study. 
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the potential to be an effective agent of development, there is need for greater 
recognition of the alternative agendas, as well as the unintended effects, resulting from 
donor partnerships.  
In terms of the people who constitute Ker Kwaro Acholi today, the institution is 
composed of a Paramount Chief, a Prime Minister, Council of Chiefs, Executives of the 
Council of Chiefs, a cabinet of Ministers, a secretariat of development practitioners and a 
number of male and female elders. As mentioned above, and as I will further illustrate 
through my study, Ker Kwaro Acholi is constituted by more than its roles of office, 
appointed positions and employees – but while this is an important point of my thesis, 
the people who constitute Ker Kwaro and those who have encountered the institution at 
various stages of its revival are central characters and agents who have knowingly and 
unknowingly shaped Ker Kwaro Acholi.  
 
WHY STUDY KER KWARO ACHOLI? 
 
Ker Kwaro Acholi has been recognised by the Government of Uganda as one of the 
nation’s traditional, cultural institutions – a recognition marked by President Yoweri 
Museveni recently funding the building of new houses for the ‘chiefs’ of Ker Kwaro.2 As 
well as the Ugandan Government, Ker Kwaro Acholi is also recognised by numerous 
international and more locally based development organisations. For example, in 2009 
International Alert advised business investors in northern Uganda to recognise and 
include Ker Kwaro Acholi in consultation processes, as this was thought ‘enormously 
significant in gaining access to operating in the region’3, and USAID partnered with Ker 
Kwaro Acholi on a project to revive farmer groups across Acholiland.4 Other multilateral 
and bilateral donors such as The World Bank, United Nations Development Fund for 
                                                          
2 M. Olupot and C. Ocowan, "Museveni Gives Acholi Chiefs Houses," New Vision, 17 November 
2010. 
3 International Alert, Contributing to a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: A Guide for Investors 
(Kampala2009), 44. 
4 USAID, Spring Implementing Partners Information Pack (Stability, Peace and Reconciliation in 
Northern Uganda Project, 2009). 
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Women (UNIFEM)5 and the American Embassy have also recognised and partnered with 
Ker Kwaro Acholi on projects to booster conflict reconciliation and conflict management 
in northern Uganda, to promote women’s rights in Acholi and preserve Acholi cultural 
heritage, respectively. A host of other bilateral donors,6 as well as INGOs7 have, to 
greater and lesser degrees, recognised Ker Kwaro Acholi as the traditional cultural 
institution of Acholi and supported its empowerment. The Justice and Reconciliation 
Project (JRP), a local NGO formed in 2005 as a research initiative between the Gulu 
District NGO forum and the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British 
Columbia, has engaged with Ker Kwaro Acholi as a representative of the Acholi people 
and sought to bolster its own legitimacy by highlighting that the JRP was ‘formed with 
the support of Ker Kwaro Acholi’.8 However, despite the recognition and enthusiasm 
shown towards Ker Kwaro Acholi from such influential actors, few appear to 
understand the processes that have led to and shaped the establishment of Ker Kwaro. 
While International Alert has demonstrated some recognition of this,9 there remains a 
gap in knowledge that calls for redress.  
The second reason Ker Kwaro Acholi and its revival needs to be better understood is 
because, contrary to the enthusiasm shown towards Ker Kwaro Acholi from 
government actors and international development organisations, a number of 
academics have been critical of the project to revive and empower traditional leaders in 
Acholiland.10 These criticisms are based on concerns that the project has been externally 
                                                          
5 In 2011 UNIFEM merged with the International Research and Training Institute for the 
Advancement of Women, Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Division for the 
Advancement of Women, to form the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women (UN Women). I will however continue to use the acronym UNIFEM 
throughout the thesis as this was the entity engaging with Ker Kwaro Acholi during the period I 
cover in my study.  
6 Such as the U.Ks Department for International Development (DfID), the Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (DANIDA), the Belgium Government, Ireland’s Department for Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (Irish Aid). 
7 Such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, World Vision, Oxfam and Caritas. 
8 Liu Institute for Global Issues and Gulu District NGO Forum, Justice and Reconciliation Project 
Annual Report 2007 (Vancouver, BC: Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2007), 4.  
9 International Alert, Contributing to a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: A Guide for Investors 
(Kampala2009), 44. 
10 M. Bradbury, An Overview of Initiatives for Peace in Acholi, Northern Uganda (Cambridge: 
Collaborative for Development Action, 1999), ACORD, ed. Background Papers Presented to the 
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initiated and funded, aims to restore an authority structure that privileges male elders, 
and that there is a weak evidence base to suggest that people in Acholiland consider a 
restoration of a traditional structure a key priority. It has also been noted that a great 
deal of myth making has gone into creating an Acholi Paramount Chief, which is ‘a 
violation of traditional customs’ because ‘in the past there was no such thing as a 
paramount chief’.11 
Tim Allen, in 2006, was also critical of the way the ‘council of chiefs’, and the process of 
their revival, was contributing to the institutionalisation of the ritual mato oput, and 
that the subsequent activities of many chiefs had led to confusion over the meaning of 
mato oput and its potential use for reintegrating ex-LRA back into the communities.12 
Allen and Adam Branch have highlighted the convenient effect that promoting a 
particular view of traditional justice has for traditional authorities, and have been 
critical of traditional authorities who have strategically sought to reproduce a particular 
social order in which they have a privileged position.13 Branch has questioned the 
empowerment of traditional authorities and elders in Acholi, arguing that during the 
current period of post-conflict reconstruction in Acholiland, they may contribute, 
alongside international donors, NGOs and the state, less to opportunities for increased 
democratisation and political inclusion and more to a situation of further discipline and 
coercion.14 While critiques of traditional authorities in Acholiland are relevant and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Conference on 'Peace Research and the Reconciliation Agenda', Gulu, Northern Uganda, September 
1999 (London: ACORD,2000), T. Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the 
Lord's Resistance Army (London: Zed Books, 2006), T. Allen, "Bitter Roots: The Invention of 
Acholi Traditional Justice," in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T. Allen and K. 
Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), C. Dolan, Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 
1986-2006 (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), A. Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and 
Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
11 T. Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army 
(London: Zed Books, 2006), 149.  
12 Ibid., 165.  
13 Ibid, T. Allen, "Bitter Roots: The Invention of Acholi Traditional Justice," in The Lord's 
Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T. Allen and K. Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), A. 
Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).Allen, T, 2006 and 2011; Branch, A, Displacing Human Rights, 2011, see 
chapter five, Ethnojustice: The Turn to Culture.  
14 A. Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 178.  
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informative for a study of Ker Kwaro Acholi, and will be returned to later in the thesis, 
they do not in themselves amount to an examination of Ker Kwaro Acholi, which, as 
stated above, is constituted by more than its ‘traditional’ leaders.  
The little analysis and commentary that does refer explicitly to Ker Kwaro Acholi does 
not go beyond conceptualising the institution in terms of its traditional leaders. For 
example, while Allen quite rightly notes there is a lack of evidence to support claims 
that Ker Kwaro Acholi dates back to the fifteenth century, Allen is referring to Ker 
Kwaro as an ‘authority of Acholi grandfathers/elders’;15 and while Branch has been 
critical of the role of Ker Kwaro Acholi in the process of reviving traditional justice 
mechanisms, Ker Kwaro is being critiqued as the ‘body of Acholi chiefs and elders’.16 
Similarly, in a report written in 2005 and in conjunction with Ker Kwaro Acholi, Erin 
Baines defined Ker Kwaro Acholi as the revived ‘contemporary institution of the Acholi 
Paramount Chief, established in 2000 [and]...consisting of an Executive Council of 19 
Chiefs and Elders, as well as a youth representative and two women representatives’.17 
Although reference was given to the women and youth representatives of Ker Kwaro 
Acholi, the author, Erin Baines, further reported that despite these representatives Ker 
Kwaro Acholi ‘is an institution of men who hold traditional views on appropriate gender 
and age roles’.18  
One reason for offering a study of Ker Kwaro Acholi, therefore, is because there are no 
substantial critiques of the institution beyond its ‘traditional’ leaders. As Ker Kwaro 
Acholi’s revival has been anchored within the project to revive and empower 
‘traditional’ leaders, an examination of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival contributes to 
qualifying arguments and research that engages with Acholi ‘traditional’ authority. 
While such research provides important insights that are drawn upon in this thesis, it is 
largely based on a particular understanding of Ker Kwaro that engages with just one 
aspect of this multidimensional institution. This thesis seeks to understand Ker Kwaro 
                                                          
15 T. Allen, "Bitter Roots: The Invention of Acholi Traditional Justice," in The Lord's Resistance 
Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T. Allen and K. Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), 248.  
16 A. Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 164.  
17 E. Baines, Roco Wat I Acholi, Restoring Relationships in Acholi-Land: Traditional Approaches to 
Justice and Reintegration (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2005), 31, 141. 
18 Ibid., 32-33.  
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more broadly and to expand current conceptualisations that tend to reproduce 
restrictive views of Ker Kwaro as an institution of traditional leaders.  
In addition to addressing the lack of research on Ker Kwaro Acholi, and thus offering a 
contribution towards historical and contemporary analysis of Acholiland and northern 
Uganda, an examination of Ker Kwaro also contributes to the growing body of literature 
concerned with the recent revival of ‘traditional’ authorities across sub-Saharan Africa.19 
More specifically my study of Ker Kwaro Acholi contributes in three ways. First, my 
study contributes to redressing a bias towards analysing ‘traditional’ authorities who 
are associated with Kingdoms and more centralised structures and offers a case where 
traditional authority is being negotiated and re-imagined in the context of a 
traditionally polycephalous society. Second, my study of Ker Kwaro Acholi adds to other 
cases of traditional authority revival that are occurring in contexts of conflict and post-
conflict reconstruction, where variables, such as the dominant presence of international 
humanitarian and development organisations, are common20. Third, and related to the 
last point, my study of Ker Kwaro’s revival supports other studies that have moved 
away from a state-centric perspective, which have as a central driving question what 
roles traditional authorities can play in the process of democracy consolidation in 
                                                          
19 L. Buur and H.M. Kyed, eds., State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
New Dawn for Traditional Authorities? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,2007), O. Vaughan, ed. 
Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa (Trenton, NJ: Africa World 
Press,2005), E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Niewaal and R. van Dijk, "Introduction: The Domestication 
of Chieftaincy: The Imposed and the Imagined," in African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political 
Landscape, ed. E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Niewaal and R. van Dijk (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1999), T. 
Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa," in Legitimacy and 
the State in Twentieth Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, ed. T. Ranger and O. 
Vaughan (London: MacMillan, 1993). See also the Journal of Legal Pluralism special issues, no. 
37 and 38 (1996). 
20 H.G. West and S. Kloeck-Jensen, "Betwixt and Between: 'Traditional Authority' and Democratic 
Decentralization in Post-War Mozambique," African Affairs 98 (1999), R. Fanthorpe, "On the 
Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralisation in Post-War Sierra Leone," 
African Affairs 105, no. 418 (2005), L. Buur and H.M. Kyed, "Traditional Authority in 
Mozambique: The Legible Space between State and Community," in State Recognition and 
Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Traditional Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and 
H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).  
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Africa,21 to focus on the production of traditional authority through multiple exogenous 
factors, such as discourses of development.22  
An increasing number of studies are identifying how discourses of development are 
shaping traditional authority revival and empowerment, and there are some interesting 
examples of local actors, both claimants and advocates of traditional authority, 
strategically appropriating multiple discourses, including discourses of development, in 
order to craft public images and position themselves advantageously.23 As a 
contribution to these studies, my research on Ker Kwaro Acholi’s ‘revival’, which reveals 
the dominant role discourses of development have played in shaping the institution, 
also contributes as a study from which lessons can be drawn by development 
practitioners, especially as, despite the increased engagement with traditional 
authorities by donors, there is a lack of analysis informing such encounters. 
 
 
                                                          
21 P. Skalnik, "Authority Versus Power: Democracy in Africa Must Include Original African 
Institutions," Journal of Legal Pluralism, no. 37-38 (1996).  
22 P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of 
Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. 
Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), W. Zeller, ""Now We Are a Town": Chiefs, 
Investors and the State in Zambia's Western Province," in State Recognition and 
Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Traditional Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and 
H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Niewaal and R. 
van Dijk, "Introduction: The Domestication of Chieftaincy: The Imposed and the Imagined," in 
African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape, ed. E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Niewaal and 
R. van Dijk (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1999), J. Abbink, "The Elusive Chief: Authority and Leadership 
in Surma Society (Ethiopia)," in African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape, ed. E.A.B. 
van Rouveroy van Niewaal and R. van Dijk (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1999).  
23 J.M. Williams, Chieftancy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), W. Zeller, ""Now We Are a 
Town": Chiefs, Investors and the State in Zambia's Western Province," in State Recognition and 
Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Traditional Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and 
H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), A.L. Chiweza, "The Ambivalent Role of 
Chiefs: Rural Decentralization Initiatives in Malawi," in State Recognition and Democratization in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Traditional Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and H.M. Kyed 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), N. Kleist, "Modern Chiefs, Tradition, Development and 
Return among Traditional Authorities in Ghana," African Affairs 110, no. 441 (2011), C. Lentz, 
"The Chief, the Mine Captain and the Politician: Legitimating Power in Northern Ghana," Africa 
68, no. 1 (1998), J.M. Ubink, Traditional Authorities in Africa: Resurgence in an Era of 
Democratisation (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), H.G. West and S. Kloeck-
Jensen, "Betwixt and Between: 'Traditional Authority' and Democratic Decentralization in Post-





To understand the process of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival I consulted archival records in 
the United Kingdom and Uganda, conducted six months fieldwork in northern Uganda in 
2010, utilised newspaper reports predominantly from Uganda’s two national English 
language newspapers (New Vision and Daily Monitor), and drew on a wide range of 
secondary literature concerned with northern Uganda, traditional authority revivals in 
sub-Saharan Africa and critiques of development.   
The archival research I conducted in the UK, at the Bodleian Library of Commonwealth 
and African Studies at Rhodes House, and the research undertaken at the colonial 
archival records in Entebbe, were insightful for understanding the ideologies and 
practices that shaped protectorate governance of Uganda. Letters amongst colonial 
officials, and in particular, the monthly and annual district and provincial reports, shed 
light on the relationship between colonial officers and appointed ‘chiefs’. This archival 
research helped to inform and shape my fieldwork trip. 
The archives I consulted at Gulu’s local government District Headquarters were more 
contemporary, dating back to the 1970s. These sources have been invaluable in 
detailing important events that have contributed to constituting Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
revival and have indicated the relationship between Ker Kwaro and Gulu District 
authorities. My attempts to conduct similar research at Kitgum’s District office was cut 
short after being told that all archives had been lost or destroyed over the course of the 
recent insurgency. I was also unable to access the Acholi District archival records that 
Cheryl Gertzel had consulted in the early 1970s for her research on Acholi politics 
between 1945 and 1962, which were also said to be missing.  
During my fieldwork, between February and July 2010, I lived in Gulu and over the 
course of the months I conducted 61 semi-structured interviews. I wanted to gather a 
range of views of how people saw Ker Kwaro Acholi, and how they narrated the revival. 
I conducted interviews with Rwodi (chiefs of Ker Kwaro Acholi) from across the districts 
of Acholiland in order to harness a range of views and opinions. From the 54 Rwodi 
listed in Ker Kwaro Acholi’s Strategic Plan 2009, I was able to interview 20. I had been 
provided with mobile phone numbers for many of the Rwodi but it was still not possible 
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to reach all of them and arrange interviews. Most of my interviews with Rwodi were 
conducted in the towns of Gulu, Kitgum or Pader, because they either lived in town or 
were there for meetings. A handful of these interviews were conducted at the home of 
the Rwot. For many of my interviews with Rwodi I used a translator, and have been 
conscious in my use of these interviews of the potential for lost information or 
mistranslation. I have tried to overcome this limitation by cross referencing.  
Most of my time was spent at Ker Kwaro Acholi’s offices in Gulu, talking with the two 
project officers, Mike Ocaka and Sarah Achiro and the Programme Manager, Santo 
Okema. I also interviewed two Ministers of Ker Kwaro Acholi, Matthew Otto and 
Reverend Joseph Okumu, and two key elders, Janet Lakor and another who requested 
anonymity. 
I conducted two interviews with the Ker Kwaro Prime Minister, Kenneth Oketta, but 
was unable to interview Paramount Chief Acana until the following year when he was in 
the UK. The difficulty of arranging an interview with Paramount Chief Acana during 
fieldwork was frustrating and seemed to be part of a more general reluctance on the 
part of staff who were a relative of the Paramount Chief and responsible for arranging 
his appointments. The interview I was able to conduct with Paramount Chief Acana, 
while he was living in Birmingham undertaking a university course, has been a crucial 
contribution to the study.  
In addition to those closely associated with Ker Kwaro Acholi, I also interviewed 
Rosalba Oywa, Bishop Ochola and Esther Luk, who have been advocates of reviving 
tradition and traditional authorities in Northern Uganda; development practitioners 
who had engaged with Ker Kwaro; and three key local government figures, the Resident 
District Commissioners of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader and the deputy Local District 
Councillor V in Kitgum. 
Inevitably, my study and the analysis I offer of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival is limited by 
the time length of fieldwork, the number of interviews I was able to conduct, and the 
challenges of accessing interviewees. There is in 
As I am not offering the final word on the subject, but rather an initial investigation into 
a newly emerged institution in Acholiland, there is scope for further analysis. 
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A NOTE ON ‘TRADITION’ AND DISCOURSE 
 
I approach ‘tradition’ and thus ‘traditional’ authority in nonessentialist terms that need 
to be understood as specific constructions at a specific time and for specific purposes. I 
therefore, do not refer to ‘tradition’ as a predefined analytical concept, but rather I am 
more interested in how ‘tradition’ is employed in various contexts and by various 
actors. In processes of re-defining traditional authorities it is evident that particular 
conceptions of traditional authority have taken on particular significance in recent 
political reconfigurations in Africa.24 In my study I am interested in how Ker Kwaro 
Acholi presents itself as a traditional authority and how this image resonates with 
dominant discourses that reproduce Ker Kwaro Acholi as a traditional, legitimate and 
desirable authority in Acholiland. For aesthetics and ease of reading I will not continue 
to place traditional authorities in inverted commas and will use the terms traditional 
leaders and chiefs interchangeably. Where I am referring to lineage-based authorities as 
opposed to colonially appointed chiefs, and where this difference matters, I will indicate 




The chapters to follow are both a presentation of my findings and a reflection of the 
process and path my study has taken over the past four years. The three parts of the 
thesis form, firstly, an engagement with relevant bodies of literature and a historical 
contextualisation of my study. The latter two parts of the thesis are my in-depth study 
of Ker Kwaro Acholi and are informed primarily by empirical data. 
In chapter one I will explore literature that has responded to the recent emergence of a 
multiplicity of ‘traditional authorities’ across sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst I will give an 
overview of dominant debates and assess the ways in which scholars have approached 
the subject of ‘traditional authorities’ and traditional authority resurgence in sub-
Saharan Africa since the 1990s, it is also an examination of the encounter between 
                                                          
24 L. Buur and H.M. Kyed, eds., State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
New Dawn for Traditional Authorities? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,2007) 
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traditional authorities and various exogenous forces since the colonial period and with 
reference to countries across sub-Saharan Africa. As I will show, a number of studies in 
the recent literature point to discourses of development, particularly that of 
democratisation, as discourses that are shaping and redefining traditional authority 
revivals and, as a case in South Africa will illustrate, what it means to be a traditional 
authority. 
In chapter two I will focus on traditional authorities in Uganda, with particular attention 
given to Acholiland. The aim of this chapter is to historically situate the recent 
‘traditional’ authority revivals in Uganda that gained momentum after the Government 
lifted the ban on ‘traditional’ leaders in 1993. In the first section I will introduce the 
most relevant traditional leaders for a study of Ker Kwaro Acholi; the Rwodi (clan 
heads). I will give an account of how they are thought to have existed in the precolonial 
period and draw attention to the contestation over the supremacy of the Payira clan 
amongst other clans in Acholiland. I will then discuss late colonial rule in Uganda and 
highlight the superior status of the Buganda Kingdom over the other kingdom and non-
kingdoms areas of Uganda, highlighting the effect this had across the protectorate 
amongst aspirants who sought to occupy positions of a similar status to the Kabaka 
(King) of Buganda. For example, in non-kingdom areas, districts such as Acholi had the 
opportunity to establish a constitutional head that was taken as an opportunity to have 
a ceremonial representative who could occupy a position on par with the Kabaka. As I 
will show in chapter two, this matter became an arena in Acholi where ‘traditional 
authority’ was negotiated through discourses of party politics and religiously defined 
cleavages that also ran along a geographical split between east and west Acholiland.  
In the final section of chapter two I will move into the postcolonial period and trace the 
banning of traditional authority in Uganda by post-independence President Milton 
Obote in 1967, through to the lift of the ban by the current President Yoweri Museveni 
in 1993. A focus of this section, and a theme that will run throughout the thesis, is how 
discourses of traditional authorities in Uganda have been shaped by the Buganda 
Kingdom and its relationship with the state.  
In part one my overall aim is to offer a brief historical overview and examination of 
traditional authorities across sub-Saharan Africa with attention given to the discourses 
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that have shaped the forms they have taken and their relationship with state authorities 
and other ‘external’ actors, and with a particular focus on Uganda and Acholiland. This 
study will form a background for the analysis I offer on Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival, and 
which I present in parts two and three.  
Part two is divided into three chapters, where I will examine three different phases of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival. Each chapter looks at the emergence of a dominant image of 
Ker Kwaro that, as I will argue, has emerged through the combination of multiple 
discourses, contingent events and strategic practices. The first phase of Ker Kwaro 
Acholi’s revival and its image as the Acholi traditional authority, examined in chapter 
three, will be shown to have been predominately shaped by discourses regarding the 
recent conflict in northern Uganda and, in particular, the real and perceived effects of 
the conflict that have been understood in terms of a breakdown of moral and cultural 
norms. In relation to such dominant discourses I will identify the contingent events, 
such as the coronation of an Acholi Paramount Chief, and strategic practices, such as the 
production of a historical background for Ker Kwaro, that have together provided an 
enabling environment for the carving of a public image of Ker Kwaro Acholi as the 
legitimate traditional authority of a newly imagined Acholi ‘chiefdom’.  
In chapter four I will turn to examine when Ker Kwaro Acholi sought to be known as a 
cultural institution with the potential capacity for political governance. I will explore 
how Ker Kwaro Acholi’s strategy to present itself as a ‘government structure’ was in 
response to and shaped by government discourses on traditional authorities. I will focus 
on government proposals to create a regional tier of government as one of the formal 
means by which to incorporate traditional authorities into the state structure, and 
government rhetoric that casts traditional authorities as ‘cultural institutions’. In this 
chapter I aim to highlight the seemingly inherent tension of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s attempt 
to project itself as both a non-political cultural institution as well as a ‘government 
structure’ that reflects its state counterpart. One central point in this chapter is that the 
Buganda Kingdom does not only shape other traditional authorities in Uganda 
indirectly, by way of influencing government discourses on traditional authorities, but 
also more directly as traditional institutions such as Ker Kwaro Acholi seem to be 




Building directly on its image as a traditional authority, I will illustrate in chapter five 
how Ker Kwaro Acholi, in the third phase of its revival, appropriates discourses of 
international development to consolidate an image as an agent of sustainable 
development in Acholiland. In this chapter I will focus attention on the encounter 
between Ker Kwaro Acholi and the World Bank’s Northern Uganda Social Action Fund 
(NUSAF) and argue that preconceived ideas of traditional authorities held by NUSAF 
were bolstered by images being projected by Ker Kwaro Acholi. Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
strategic practices, such as creating a secretariat and producing a Ker Kwaro Acholi 
Strategic Plan stating its developmental vision and objectives, will be shown as crucial 
in enabling the institution to be not only recognisable as a traditional authority, but 
desirable as a partner of development.  
In part three, which contains chapter six, I turn to examine a more complex picture of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi. Examining how Ker Kwaro Acholi has emerged through an interplay 
of multiple discourses, contingent events and strategic practices, I  also shed light on the 
less visible discourses that constitute Ker Kwaro Acholi, but are often obscured or 
subjugated by the dominant images discussed in part two. A key aim of chapter six is to 
highlight the disjuncture between images of Ker Kwaro Acholi and how the institution 
works in practice. I divide the chapter into thematic critical reflections where I seek to 
identify and untangle complexities of Ker Kwaro Acholi, and in so doing point to some of 






TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY REVIVALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
To aid my study of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival it is helpful to turn to a broader body of 
literature than that focused on northern Uganda, which has explored similar questions 
in relation to the resurgence of ‘tradition’ and ‘traditional’ authorities across Sub-
Saharan Africa. An overview of this literature provides insights and potentially useful 
conceptual frameworks for my critique of the ‘traditional’ authority Ker Kwaro Acholi 
and whilst my study of Ker Kwaro Acholi contributes to filling a gap in knowledge on 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, I also seek to offer a contribution through my case study of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi to studies and debates of traditional authority revivals across Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
Before I continue, however, it is necessary to note that I approach ‘tradition’ and thus 
‘traditional’ authority in nonessentialist terms, that need to be understood as specific 
constructions at a specific time and for specific purposes. I therefore do not refer to 
‘tradition’ as a predefined analytical concept, but rather I am more interested in how 
‘tradition’ is employed in various contexts and by various actors. In processes of re-
defining traditional authorities it is evident that particular conceptions of traditional 
authority have taken on particular significance in recent political reconfigurations in 
Africa.1 In my study I am interested in how Ker Kwaro Acholi presents itself as a 
traditional authority and how this image resonates with dominant discourses that 
reproduce Ker Kwaro Acholi as a traditional, legitimate and desirable authority in 
Acholiland.  
 
                                                          
1 L. Buur and H.M. Kyed, "Introduction: Traditional Authority and Democratization in Africa," in 
State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Traditional 
Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 22-24.  
15 
 
For aesthetics and ease of reading I will not continue to place traditional authorities in 
inverted commas and will use the terms traditional leaders and chiefs interchangeably. 
Where I am referring to lineage-based authorities as opposed to colonially appointed 
chiefs, and where this difference matters, I will indicate the distinction.  
  
COLONIAL RULE AND THE DEMISE OF CHIEFS? 
 
As colonial officials sought to establish control and governance they found societies 
organised on a spectrum from hierarchical and centralised forms of authority to 
acephalous lineage systems. Whilst local vernaculars distinguished the nuances of 
power amongst various leaders, colonial officials adopted the term ‘chief’ and applied it 
broadly to denote the person who was recognised by the colonial government as the 
legitimate and official ruler of a particular polity or administrative area. Criteria for 
legitimacy, in the eyes of the colonial official, were often the result of a compromise 
between the influence a chief exerted amongst the population and his willingness to 
cooperate with colonial administration. Those appointed chief, therefore, ranged from 
previously existing hereditary rulers to non-hereditary impositions who welcomed the 
opportunity for advancement offered by colonial rule, as was the case in Acholiland as I 
shall touch upon in the following chapter. Wishing to work through familiar systems of 
governance, hierarchical relations between traditional authorities and between 
colonially invented ‘tribes’ were strengthened, or where hierarchies were not found 
they were also invented and imposed. Chiefs were integrated into the governing 
apparatus as intermediaries between the population and colonial government in often 
administrative roles such as collecting tax and recruiting and supervising forced labour. 
Chiefs were also expected to act as an extension of the colonial regime curbing 
organised resistance against colonial rule.2   
 
                                                          
2 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), A. Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001). 
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As the dawn of political independence across Africa was realised newly elected 
government leaders were sceptical of chiefs, regarding them as either outdated 
anachronistic throwbacks to a primitive age or hand maidens of the colonial state and 
thus corrupt collaborators with the old oppressors. African nationalists regarded 
colonial rule and chieftaincy as ‘unheavenly twins linked by mutual support’ and ‘an 
unholy alliance’ that was ‘jointly destined to enjoy the fate of all doomed anciens 
régimes’.3 There was also little room for chiefs in nationalist ideologies of material 
modernisation and economic transformation.  
Chiefs were widely regarded as barriers to the achievement of either of these 
goals; they stood for the past, for other-worldly values, and were opposed to 
both individualism and modernizing corporatism. The processes by which 
chiefs ruled, the rituals and ideas which maintain their authority, were, it was 
widely claimed, the enemies of rapid transformation. Africa’s and African’s 
besetting problems were broadly those of ‘underdevelopment’; chieftaincy 
was seen as a significant aspect of the problem rather than as part of the 
solution. 4 
With such widespread views across Africa, political independence in most countries 
saw the abolition of traditional authorities, as in Uganda under Milton Obote in 1967. 
Powers of traditional authorities were severely curtailed in Ghana, and in Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Burkina more repressive actions were taken.5 The exceptions to this trend 
were Botswana, Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia, whose governments conceded recognition 
of traditional authorities and sought their incorporation into state structures. Whether 
rejected or incorporated by governments, it was generally assumed by modernists that 
traditional authority would wither away and die as a new citizenry emerged embracing 
the benefits of democratically elected government and the wave of development 
promised to arrive. Just as aristocracies across the world had been rendered obsolete, 
the expectation was that chieftaincy would succumb to a similar fate.6  
 
                                                          
3 R. Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftancy in Ghana, 1951-1960 (Oxford: 
James Currey, 2000), 3.  
4 Ibid.  
5 P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of 
Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. 
Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 33.  
6 R. Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftancy in Ghana, 1951-1960 (Oxford: 
James Currey, 2000), 2. 
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However, whilst scholarly attention was directed to elite experiences of post-
independence state building a wave of retraditionalisation and traditional authority 
revival was rolling over the continent and being largely ignored.7 Given the certainty 
that traditional authorities, particularly chieftaincy, were in their final death throes only 
a few decades ago, recent traditional authority revivals have also taken many scholars 
by surprise. But not only has the fact of ‘revival’ been surprising, the multiplicity of 
forms ‘traditional’ authorities have taken has also interested scholars in the field. From 
Sierra Leone to Somaliland and Niger to South Africa traditional authorities currently 
appear in a multiplicity of forms. Some traditional authorities claim royal status and 
adorn dazzling regalia, as in Ghana, Zambia, South Africa, Cameroon and Uganda. Whilst 
in contrast others have invoked ‘traditional’ principles to mobilise as self-defence 
groups, as in Tanzania and Sierra Leone.8 Councils or Houses of Chiefs at local and 
national levels have formed in Ghana, Zambia, South Africa and Namibia, whereas in 
Ivory Coast, Togo, Niger and Chad, traditional authorities have emerged in the form of 
‘associations’.9 These diverse expressions of traditional authority are an integral feature 
of the political landscape in Africa and to varying degrees play significant roles in the 
ongoing reconfiguration of power on the continent.10  
 
TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES AND THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE 
 
The post-colonial state has become the focus of most studies on traditional authorities, 
where scholars have asked if weak or strong states are more likely to be home to 
                                                          
7 P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of 
Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. 
Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 34. 
8 J. Mwaikusa, "Maintaining Law and Order in Tanzania: The Role of Sungusungu Defense 
Groups," in Service Provision under Stress in East Africa, ed. J. Semboja and O. Therkildsen 
(Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1995), P. Muana, "The Kamajoi Militia: Civil 
War, International Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency," Africa Development 
22, no. 3/4 (1997), J. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy (Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001).  
9 P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of 
Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. 
Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 40. 
10 Ibid., 34.  
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traditional authority revivals and whether traditional authorities are compatible with 
and a desirable agent of effective state-building in Africa. The ‘failed state’ thesis has 
been popular in initial scholarship exploring the resurgence of tradition authorities.11 
This position holds that where states have been unsuccessful in nation building, failing 
to establish strong arms of the state in rural areas, a “hollowed out shell”12 is left, which 
has been filled with leaders exercising authority with reference to tradition. Amongst 
the rural populace both ‘modern informal governance’ and ‘old-new chiefdom type 
politics’ are contesting the monopoly of the state and places of internal armed conflicts 
are particularly vulnerable as the state struggles to exercise control. Baker has argued 
that the weakness of states, where there has been a collapse of public authority and 
service provision is lacking, people are able to take advantage of the lack of social 
control.13 In countries with challenging geographies, opportunities may also arise for 
relatively large outlying groups to mobilise around ethnic and cultural symbols that 
may compete with the state.14 Where states face a ‘crisis of legitimacy’, van Nieuwaal 
and van Dijk have argued, traditional authorities are often recognised and incorporated 
as a way to acquire some measure of legitimacy for implementing laws and policies.15 As 
Kyed and Buur put it, ‘capturing traditional authority under the ambit of the state is 
envisaged as a means of coming to terms with the problems of the failed state: the result 
becomes the solution!’16  
                                                          
11 P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 
1999), B. Baker, Escape from Domination in Africa: Political Disengagement and Its Consequences 
(Oxford: James Currey, 2000), J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in 
Authority and Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
12 P. Skalnik, Chiedfdom: A Universal Political Formation?, in Focaal European Journal of 
Anthropology 43,  (2004): 76-98.  
13 B. Baker, Escape from Domination in Africa: Political Disengagement and Its Consequences 
(Oxford: James Currey, 2000). 
14 J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 145-146. 
15 Kyed and Buur point to Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Somalia and Angola as examples of states 
formally recognising traditional authorities as a means to bolster state legitimacy when it has 
been threatened. See L. Buur and H.M. Kyed, "Introduction: Traditional Authority and 
Democratization in Africa," in State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
New Dawn for Traditional Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). 




However, Englebert has challenged the weak state hypothesis, pointing to evidence 
showing that the most far-reaching traditional authority revivals are occurring in strong 
states such as South Africa and Uganda, and there is a ‘relative lack of traditional 
resurgence in weak or failed states’.17 This could indicate, Englebert suggests, that 
societies have no real need for state-like structures, and although grassroots 
organisations may take over the provision of services attributed to states when the state 
fails to deliver, this does not necessarily mean local populations want to ‘revive’ 
structures of authority and indeed, the failure of the state might be welcomed where it 
has been regarded as an instrument of domination.18 Alternatively, the reason stronger 
states display more traditional authority revivals could be that they ‘are confident in 
their own institutions and stability, and are therefore more likely to tolerate the rise of 
alternative sources of identity.’19 The formal recognition of traditional authorities in 
South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana and Namibia may be all cases in 
point. Strong states also tend to be undergoing processes of democratisation through 
the adoption of multi-party democracy and decentralisation policies, which has stirred 
concern amongst scholars and post-colonial governments alike for how relevant and 
desirable traditional authorities are for these processes.  
Skalnik has argued for including traditional authorities in consolidating democracy in 
Africa on the grounds that ‘original’ and ‘authentic’ African institutions rest on 
democratic principles, contrary to misunderstandings produced by scholars 
documenting pre-colonial African institutions in the colonial period.20 Drawing 
primarily on research in northern Ghana and the Voltaic basin, Skalnik contends that 
incorporating ‘original African institutions’ is essential for successful democracy in 
Africa and does not undermine democratic efforts because ‘authentic’ African 
institutions were ‘subject to various rules and limitations imposed by the populations’ 
                                                          
17 P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of 
Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. 
Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 44.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid., 44-45. 
20 P. Skalnik, "Authority Versus Power: Democracy in Africa Must Include Original African 
Institutions," Journal of Legal Pluralism, no. 37-38 (1996): 111. 
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and the ‘plurality of authority...ensured that the whole population of a particular area 
shared ideas and practices related to public arrangements, and recognised the leaders 
who in turn respected the rules and accepted the influence of the population on public 
affairs’.21 On this premise traditional authorities today could act as ‘correctives to the 
power of the modern imported state’ and be ‘elements of direct democracy 
complementing representative democracy.’22 Such ideas of chiefs exercising an 
‘authentic’ African form of democratic governance is prevalent within the political 
imaginary of democratisation and is bolstered as it resonates with other powerful 
mobilising discourses on cultural diversity, pluralism and participation. 23 
However, although mechanisms of discrediting chiefs exist, judgements of what makes a 
dubious and undesirable traditional authority, who decides what is an ‘authentic’ and 
‘original’ traditional authority, are contingent upon relations of power that are not 
necessarily democratic. The patriarchal structure of the chieftaincy often was and still is 
a reflection of a broader patriarchal structure within society. Kessel and Oomen have 
argued that chieftaincy in South Africa is ‘not in accord with the precepts of democracy 
in its late twentieth century version’ as 
chiefs are not elected, but hereditary. Secondly, chiefs are mostly men, which 
goes against the principles of non-sexism, Thirdly, only Africans can become 
chiefs, which goes against the grain of having a non-racial society. Fourthly, 
chieftaincy serves to accentuate the forces of ethnicity, which had become 
thoroughly discredited in the apartheid years when it was used as the 
organising principle in the divide and rule strategy of ethnic homelands.24 
Ntsebeza has also been critical of traditional authority revival in South Africa, seeing the 
processes as nothing short of a return to apartheid-era tribal authorities.25 Equally 
critical of traditional authority revivals, Mamdani regards the continued presence of 
                                                          
21 Ibid.  
22 Skalnik points to the naam (chieftaincy) in north-eastern Ghana as an example. See Ibid.: 119.  
23 J.M. Ubink, Traditional Authorities in Africa: Resurgence in an Era of Democratisation 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 29.  
24 I.v. Kessel and B. Oomen, "'One Chief, One Vote’: The Revival of Traditional Authorities in Post-
Apartheid South Africa," African Affairs 96, no. 385 (1997): 572.  
25 L. Ntsebeza, "The Resurgence of Chiefs, Retribalization and Modernity in Post-1994 South 
Africa," in Readings in Modernity in Africa, ed. P. Geschiere, B. Meyer, and P. Pels (London: 
International Africa Institute, 2008), cf. L. Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the 
Politics of Land in South Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2005).  
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traditional authorities either as evidence of state failure or an unwise empowerment of 
“decentralised despots” who perpetuate a bifurcated state of citizens and subjects.26 In a 
bifurcated state where there is an unequal division of power between ‘modern’ and 
‘traditional’ sectors, traditional authorises may reinforce bifurcation where their 
jurisdiction remains limited to customary fields, such as land allocation, dispute 
settlement and ceremonial duties. Houses of chiefs are often examples.27 A handful of 
studies also show that the incorporation of traditional authorities by the state risks 
undermining any downward accountability and popular legitimacy traditional 
authorities often rely upon.28 This may be acute in former war zones and along fragile 
borderlands where state policies are particularly unpopular and the legitimacy of the 
state is contested due to militarised governance. With reference to Mozambique and 
Namibia state recognition has been seen to create ‘an ambiguity between upward 
(state) and downward (community) accountability, where the former is not viewed per 
se as the source of democratic, legitimate governance by rural populations’.29  
 
                                                          
26 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
27 P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of 
Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. 
Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 53. 
28 M.V. Höhne, "From Pastoral to State Politics: Traditional Authorities in Northern Somalia," in 
State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Traditional 
Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), S. Hagberg, 
"Traditional Chieftancy, Party Politics, and Political Violence in Burkina Faso," in State 
Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Traditional 
Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).  
29 L. Buur and H.M. Kyed, "Introduction: Traditional Authority and Democratization in Africa," in 
State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Traditional 
Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 16. See also L. 
Buur and H.M. Kyed, "Traditional Authority in Mozambique: The Legible Space between State 
and Community," in State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn 
for Traditional Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
W. Zeller, ""Now We Are a Town": Chiefs, Investors and the State in Zambia's Western 
Province," in State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for 
Traditional Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
and T. Zack-Williams, "Introduction: Africa at the Millenium," in Africa in Crisis: New Challenges 
and Opportunities, ed. T. Zack-Williams, D. Frost, and A. Thomson (London: Pluto Press, 2002).  
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Although challenging the idea that traditional authorities are in some way inherently 
good and democratic, there is the view that traditional authorities should be 
incorporated into the democratisation process because ‘for better or worse, they are 
there, and are clearly important exercisers of ‘public authority’ on the ground in much 
of Africa’.30 Logon argues that mixed systems of traditional authorities and electoral 
politics are inevitable and desirable, and thus need to be better understood. Contrary to 
common perceptions, she argues, ‘chiefs and councillors, sultans and MP’s, kings and 
presidents all inhabit the single, integrated political universe...[and] in the perceptions 
of ordinary Africans, it seems that democracy and the chieftaincy can indeed coexist’.31 
On the premise that traditional authorities are both expected to exist and are subject to 
local mechanisms that prevent ‘so-called pretenders and dubious kings’ holding office,32 
a moral argument is constructed for recognising and incorporating traditional 
authorities in state building enterprises in Africa.  
Englebert is also keen for democratisation processes to build upon traditional 
institutions as a way to ‘reduce the illegitimacy of the African state’, but he also 
recognises that this view presumes a ‘rare degree of effective existence of the former’, 
when in many instances ‘rather than existing sui generis, resurgent traditional 
institutions have become contingent structures with their salience dependent on the 
strategies of local vis-a-vis exogenous forces’.33 To explore this idea further, of the 
contingent nature of traditional authorities with regards to local and exogenous ‘forces’ 
I will turn to literature that offers critiques of the effect various discourses at local, 
national and international levels have on traditional authorities in their recent guises. I 
                                                          
30 C. Logon, "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors and Hybrid Democrats: Popular Perspectives 
on the Coexistence of Democracy and Traditional Authority," Journal of Modern African Studies 
47, no. 1 (2009): 102, C. Lund, "Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in 
Africa," Development and Change 37, no. 4 (2006).  
31 C. Logon, "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors and Hybrid Democrats: Popular Perspectives 
on the Coexistence of Democracy and Traditional Authority," Journal of Modern African Studies 
47, no. 1 (2009): 103-104.  
32 R. Sklar, "The Premise of Mixed Government in African Political Studies," in Tradition and 
Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 
2005), 19-20.  
33 P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of 
Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. 
Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 54.  
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am also interested in the practices and strategies employed in processes of traditional 
authority revival by claimants to traditional authorities and others implicated in the 
process.  
 
ENABLING DISCOURSES FOR TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY REVIVAL 
 
Democratisation is part of a wider process of liberalisation politics reconfiguring power 
relations across Africa, acting as a normative backdrop and a political imaginary 
enacted in social and political spheres yet never made fully permanent.34 Shifts from 
one-party to multi-party states, policies of decentralisation and the devolution of power, 
as well as a resurgence of identity recognition are examples of developments that have 
occurred in the name of, and been animated by, democratisation. Within these 
reconfigurations of power, spaces have opened up for mediators or interlocutors 
between the state and the people, as well as for leaders associated with groups who are 
mobilising on traditional or ethnic grounds.35 Even where groups and associations are 
not recognised on the basis of ethnicity officially, such as in Burkina Faso, in practice 
‘ethnic identification remains a major basis for solidarity and collective action in many 
associations’.36 The failure of many post-colonial African states to consolidate national 
identities creates an environment where democracy provides opportunities for those 
                                                          
34 L. Buur and H.M. Kyed, "Introduction: Traditional Authority and Democratization in Africa," in 
State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for Traditional 
Authorities?, ed. L. Buur and H.M. Kyed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).  
35 J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, "Introduction," in Civil Society and the Political Imagination in 
Africa: Critical Perspectives, ed. J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999), P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the 
Reconfiguration of Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in 
Africa, ed. O. Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 46, L. Laakso, "Changing Notions 
of the Nation State and the African Experience: Montesquieu Revisited," in Challenges to the 
Nation-State in Africa, ed. L. Laakso and A.O. Olukoshi (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1996), 
10-11.  
36 S. Hagberg, "Ethnic Identification in Voluntary Associations: The Politics of Development and 
Culture in Burkina Faso," in Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa, ed. H. Englund and 
F.B. Nyamnjoh (London: Zed Books, 2004), 195.  
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seeking ‘to return to traditional communities or to imagine new ones’.37 Local elections, 
for example, can incite the mobilisation of political loyalties around kin and ethnicity,38 
whilst the devolution of power to “we, the people” provokes the question of who “we” 
the people are.39  
Williams has challenged the idea of democratisation as an enabling environment for 
traditional authority revival, pointing to cases in South Africa where traditional 
authorities have increased their functions despite democratisation, which has posed 
challenges through the construction of new government institutions at the local level. 
Chiefs responded and adjusted to what was seen as a threat in the new circumstances 
by demanding representation on the councils.40 In Botswana too, where structures of 
power have been based on tradition, democratisation has led to a relative decline in the 
influence of chiefs.41 Members of the House of Chiefs, for example, have felt ignored as 
power has shifted towards government through the loss of control over land.42 Ubink 
has also pointed to cases in Ghana where elected local government has posed a threat to 
traditional authorities.43  
                                                          
37 P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of 
Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. 
Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 47, P. Chabal, Power in Africa: An Essay in 
Political Interpretation (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1994), 47.  
38 S. Hagberg, "'It Was Satan That Took the People': The Making of Public Authority in Burkina 
Faso," Development and Change 37, no. 4 (2006): 779.   
39 M. Ottaway, Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction? (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).  
40 J.M. Williams, Chieftancy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
41 P. Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of 
Power in Africa," in Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, ed. O. 
Vaughan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 48. 
42 Ibid. with reference to D.I. Ray, "Report on the Symposium on Traditional Leadership and 
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Besides the State, donors and financial institutions have shown increasing interest in 
traditional authorities. The interest in engaging with traditional authorities corresponds 
with donors’ increased emphasis on working through grass-roots processes and in 
partnership with local ‘stakeholders’. When donors and financial institutions were faced 
with a ‘development gridlock’ at the end of the 1980s, dubbed ‘the lost decade’,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
blame was directed at poor domestic politics and inefficient state institutions in 
developing countries. Blame was directed back towards the same development 
institutions for imposing economic models and state institutional models based on 
Weberian bureaucratic principles that were alien to the host country. The World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund were criticised for lacking a ‘human face’, especially in 
their engagement with Africa.44 The 1990s saw a ‘new’ development strategy emerge 
and with the growing scepticism towards either the state or the market having sole 
responsibility for development the new development economics and anti-development 
paradigm were, for the first time beginning to ‘speak in the same register’.45 Local 
actors, local knowledge, and locally embedded interventions were now seen by both 
neoliberals and post-Marxists, those on the ‘new’ left and ‘new’ right, as key to 
development. ‘The local’ was being reconceptualised as a potentially progressive space 
from which could emerge ‘progressive civic organisations that could bring about 
democracy and development if only the state would get out of the way’.46  
Since the 1990s traditional authorities have featured high on the agenda of 
international organisations as worthwhile agents or partners of development, in part 
because ‘they appear to outside aid agencies as readily available local counterparts with 
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a substantial measure of authority and capacity to mobilise’.47 This shift in international 
development practice has provided a new avenue of recognition and access to material 
power for traditional authorities. Donors have actively promoted and facilitated the rise 
of traditional institutions, not least through sponsoring conferences such as the Africa 
Development Forum. Since 1999 the Economic Commission for Africa has collaborated 
with the African Union Commission (AUC) and African Development Bank (AfDB) to 
organise the biennial African Development Forums with the aim to establish an ‘African-
driven development agenda that reflects consensus and leads to specific programmes 
for implementation’.48 Traditional authorities from across Africa, such as the Asantehene 
Osei Tutu Li from Ghana and Kgosi Leruo Tshekedi Molotlegi, King of Bafonkeng in 
South Africa, participate alongside Heads of State and Government, African Member 
State policymakers, development partners, other UN agencies, International 
Government Organisations/Non-Government Organisations, academics, practitioners, 
Civil Society Organisation’s, the private sector, policy and opinion leaders. In 2008 the 
Queen of Buganda gave a statement advocating for the role of traditional leaders in 
promoting development in Africa, and made a number of recommendations to the 
Forum, including ‘a proposal that governments and NGOs should partner more with 
traditional leaders when promoting programmes in reproductive health’.49 
In 2007 the ECA produced a substantial concept paper entitled Relevance of African 
Traditional Institutions of Governance, which sought to define and advocate for the role 
of traditional systems of governance in achieving good governance and provide a 
‘theoretical framework for the dynamics that enable traditional governance institutions 
to play a more “developmentalist” role in modern governance systems’.50 The paper 
based its assessment and recommendations on the premise that the ‘essence’ of 
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customary laws and political values of African societies and traditional institutions has 
not been fundamentally altered and continues to enjoy a level of loyalty by rural 
populations. African political values, the report argues, converge with the essential 
characteristics of modern democracy, even if the mechanisms by which African 
democratic values are exercised vary significantly from those of the modern democratic 
system of liberal democracy, for example they operate on the basis of direct 
participation rather than on a representative basis and decisions are made on a 
consensual rather than on a majority basis. African traditional values are essential to 
the transformation of Africa, the report claims, and as such traditional authorities are 
important because they practice and maintain these values.51 Three categories of roles 
are identified for traditional authorities to play in the process of ‘good governance’. The 
first is an advisory capacity to government, as well as participating in the 
administration of regions and districts. Secondly, traditional authorities are thought 
well placed to play a developmental role through mobilising communities to implement 
development projects, sensitise on health issues, promote education, encourage 
economic enterprises, inspire respect for law and encourage participation in the 
electoral process. And finally, traditional authorities are thought able to play a role in 
conflict resolution.52  
A result of donors engaging with traditional authorities to strengthen them in these 
various roles is part of a broader change in the African material environment that is 
‘promoting or facilitating the rise of traditional institutions’.53 The reallocation of foreign 
aid to strengthen civil society and the informal sector is thought to be creating a shift in 
material power and redefining rules of authority.54 Although there is nothing necessarily 
new about chiefs being involved in the welfare of communities, as Williams points out in 
relation to Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa, people there do conceive that there is 
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something new about contemporary development, and that the implementation of 
development projects has become a critical issue. 
CRAFTING IMAGES AND APPROPRIATING DISCOURSES 
 
As I have just touched upon, the ability to attract and procure development projects is 
becoming a defining characteristic of a traditional authority in the Kwazulu Natal 
Province of South Africa.55 Ones hereditary line, where one is from, used to be the key 
legitimating factor of a traditional authority, whereas more recently we are seeing what 
one does in relation to development as a crucial determiner for being recognised and 
accepted as a traditional authority.56 ‘In post apartheid South-Africa, numerous chiefs 
have become adept in combining the resource of tradition with appeals to western 
models and the discourse of liberation politics. Thus, chiefs project themselves as 
guardians of African custom, but simultaneously as pioneers of rural development’.57 
There is ‘pressure for the qualifications for being a traditional leader to change, because 
of the desire’ from the younger and more educated ‘to acquire development projects’.58 
In this way development is redefining what it means to be a traditional authority, but as 
Williams also shows, most traditional authorities are successfully appropriating the 
development process in creative and unexpected ways, for example, being actively 
involved in accessing and implementing development resources and projects, or at least 
being seen to be doing this. Involvement in development can also, however, bring 
potential challenges. The failure of a development initiative could, for example, 
undermine the legitimacy of the traditional authority associated with bringing the 
project to the area. This is heightened by the extent traditional authorities have gone to 
go beyond being merely ‘gatekeepers’ who give permission for a development project to 
take place. Contrary to assumptions and expectations within South African Government, 
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it was thought traditional authorities would play a predominately ceremonial role after 
being initially recognised by the state in the early 1990s. However, in tune with 
expectations and desires of the rural communities, traditional authorities have been 
active and influential participants in decision making processes within the development 
committees. These committees became prevalent in the rural areas in the mid-1990s 
and designed to link rural communities with the ANC government. Traditional 
authorities, such as chief Biyela, were proactive in establishing development 
committees in their areas, facilitating meetings for the election of members and 
granting permission to others involved in setting them up. In the case of the Nzimakwe 
Development Committee the chief was the leader and responsible for making all the 
decisions on development in the area. The elected councillors were also expected to 
report to this committee before finalising decisions concerning development.59 The 
decision-making skills and knowledge about development issues, demonstrated by 
women, has also resulted in chiefs encouraging women to be on the committees, which 
women have found invaluable experiences to show that ‘they should be more involved 
in local matters’.60 
Williams shows that whether chiefs actually have the capability to access resources, 
which often they do not, is less important than the way they appropriate the 
development process. Although the state-created development committees were 
superimposed onto pre-existing boundaries, leading to the community associating 
development activity with chieftaincy, at the same time, chieftaincy has selectively 
altered development institutions and processes to enhance their own authority and go 
beyond their roles as gatekeeper. As local populations attached importance to whether 
a traditional authority could deliver resources, traditional authorities needed to 
negotiate the dilemma of their lack of capacity to do so. One way they did this in 
Kwazulu-Natal was by insulating themselves  
from any criticism of not delivering resources by simultaneously telling the 
community that they are in favour of development and that it is up to the 
development committees and the local government to provide the necessary 
funds. In this way, traditional leaders have been able to deflect blame and 
earn praise no matter what actually transpires...traditional leaders have 
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demonstrated the extraordinary ability to make strategic decisions that will 
not threaten their status as the community leaders and as the symbol of 
unity.61 
The images traditional authorities project of themselves and the expectations the 
community holds of traditional authorities seem to converge and mutually shape one 
another, producing a situation where politics seems as much about perceptions as 
anything else.62 Giving the impression one is working towards development, for 
example by facilitating meetings, seems as important as whether development 
resources materialise. For a traditional authority to be seen as putting his own interests 
first and not working in the community’s interest significantly undermines his standing. 
Chief Mtembu became a particularly unpopular figure as people felt he was 
uninterested in improving their conditions and noticed that his large home was well 
serviced by access to water, electricity and telephone service, whilst his community 
went without these basic commodities. Chief Biyela and Chief Mlaba, on the other hand, 
actively encouraged the formation of development committees and instructed their 
traditional authority assistants, izinduna, to assist their communities with development 
matters.63 In the Western Province of Zambia, Senior Chief Yeta was successful in 
securing the construction of a tarmac road in his area which, Zeller writes, ‘achieved 
something of high symbolic and material value’, and which became a demonstration to 
‘his subjects that the institution he represents, criticised by some as archaic, self-
indulgent, and essentially useless in present-day Zambia, can deliver tangible benefits 
for ordinary people’.64 These days Senior Chief Yeta has become more prominent on the 
national political scene and is rarely seen performing his “traditional” duties, but this is 
less of a concern for the Mwandi people because the chief is an effective direct link to 
state authorities and in dealing with entrepreneurs who wish to acquire communal land 
and resources.65 Chiefs elsewhere in Zambia also play a central role in managing NGO 
and government development projects, as well as seeing it as their ‘responsibility to 
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make people participate in development projects in the area, e.g. to contribute labour to 
construction work on communal buildings’.66 Although mobilising communities to 
contribute labour is a more ‘traditional’ role for a chief it has been noted that traditional 
leaders also present themselves as key actors for effecting broader changes in the 
community such as women’s rights. Women for Change and the Law and Development 
Association in Zambia have carried out sensitisation workshops with traditional leaders 
on human rights on the grounds that, once sensitised, traditional leaders are 
appropriate ‘drivers of change’ for such work.67  
In a similar case to Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa, the Government of Malawi expected 
traditional authorities to play a minimal role in development and for a gradual shift of 
power towards locally elected councillors to occur or that chieftaincy would transform 
and become more democratic. However, chiefs have been at the ‘forefront of organising 
community meetings and acting as a link between local communities and the area and 
village development committees’.68 Many chiefs have brought community residents into 
the process of projecting an image to donors of being ready for development and ‘fit for 
funding’ by mobilising communities to mould bricks. ‘Bricks are very important’, 
Chiweza quotes one village headman as saying, ‘and that is where our participation is 
evident. Without bricks, there is no development that we want...This project that you 
see in this community, we had to mould bricks first and then ask government to help us 
with the rest. That is how we got it.’69 Chiefs believed that decisions on granting projects 
were related to having some material object on show as a token of preparedness to 
participate and it seems chiefs have been successful in using this method of projecting a 
public image of themselves as effective mobilisers of communities and representatives 
of their needs. However, although it appeared as if communities were participating in 
identifying projects, in practice chiefs presented ideas to communities rather than 
discussed needs and focused ‘on inculcating in community residents the importance of 
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doing development work’ as a way to obtain their support ‘to provide labour and other 
resources’.70  
In Ghana the Asantehene and Okyenhene have positioned themselves in the line of donor 
vision and emphasised that their ‘traditional authority can ensure local ownership, 
accountability, transparency and hence results’.71 Following the enstoolment of Osei 
Tutu as Asantehene in 1999 he made it publically clear that his vision for his people and 
also his vision for how he was going to perform his role was by breaking with the 
tradition of fighting political wars for territorial expansion and becoming a leader of 
socioeconomic development.72 Asantehene Osei-Tutu subsequently went on to seek 
funding from The World Bank to realise his vision. He was successful and The World 
Bank granted the Ghanaian Government US$4.5 million for a Promoting Partnership 
with Traditional Authorities Project (PPTAP), and initiated a partnership with the 
Asanteman Council to implement its activities. 
Chiefs such as the Asantehene and Okyenhene are part of a broader movement of well-
educated migrants returning to their home countries because they have been elected or 
are seeking recognition as chiefs.73 Kleist writes how “return chiefs” in Ghana have 
strategically positioned themselves and presented public selves through practices of 
imagining, articulating and performing in particular contexts. As ways of engaging with 
transnational resources from Ghanaian migrants and potential donors, chiefs 
‘emphasise their foundation in tradition’ and perform their chieftaincy through displays 
of dress and conduct, ‘as well as articulating their position in terms of moral 
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obligation’.74 Building on this foundation, ‘chiefs also describe themselves as agents of 
development with international experience’.75 Although in some cases chieftaincy has 
experienced more continuity than discontinuity, the revival of traditional authorities 
and institutions is a process of aspiring chiefs becoming ‘traditional’ and becoming 
‘modern’ in specific ways according to and in response to how discourses of tradition 
and modernity have been produced at the various levels to which they appeal and seek 
legitimacy. Chiefs are therefore often caught up in ambivalent tension as they seek to 
draw upon what Lentz describes as ‘registers of legitimacy’.76 Lentz’s study of three ‘big 
men’ in Ghana, including a chief, further illustrates how public images or ‘public selves’ 
are skilfully crafted in order for each to become a chief, a mine captain and a politician, 
and to become truly ‘big’ in these roles. 77 The ambivalence produced through chiefs 
mediating between the past and present by ‘propagating the image of itself as a “symbol 
of tradition” while, at the same time, striving to serve as an agency for “modern 
projects”’ has also been understood as chiefs operating on ‘two distinct fields, with 
different languages’.78  
While recent traditional authority revivals occur within a particular locality and are 
thus shaped by historical specificity at the local level, at the same time revived 
traditional authorities are the product of and are shaped by exogenous factors and 
discourses ‘beyond’ the local. However, as the cases discussed so far indicate, traditional 
authorities are not shaped and invented by dominant forces through a process of 
imposition. Rather, local actors, including claimants to traditional authority, are 
engaged in a strategic appropriation of discourses in local, national and international 
spheres as they craft public images in ways that relates their authority ‘to differently 
conceptualised worlds...and to what people imagine about these worlds’.79 Examples 
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discussed here illustrate how traditional authorities have sought to project images and 
position themselves in order to appeal to local, government and donor discourses and 
garner recognition, legitimacy and access material resources.  
Terrance Ranger returned to the idea of ‘the invention of tradition’ he had pioneered 
with Eric Hobsbawm in the early 1980s,80 and through a discussion of the subsequent 
literature81 concluded that he preferred to speak in terms of ‘imagined traditions’, to 
indicate the desire and role of local actors in the construction of new models of 
authority.82 West and Kloeck-Jenson also found through their study of traditional 
authorities in post-war Mozambique that ‘all authority, along with the community over 
which it is exercised, is ‘imagined’, which carries the implication that ‘in each 
generation, in each historical epoch, ‘traditional authority’s’ past versions are subject to 
erasure even as they are rewritten, and new forces are brought to bear on the 
fabrication of political legitimacy’.83 As a result of their study West and Kloeck-Jenson 
wanted to encourage further research on traditional authorities to have as their 
essential question, ‘not, then, whether or not traditional authority, or a particular 
claimant, is legitimate,’ but to pay attention to the ‘larger questions that frame these, 
such as ‘who claims ‘legitimacy’, by what argument, who is persuaded, and why?’ 
Traditional authority, they asserted, is ‘the product of multiple and sometimes 
conflicting ‘imaginings’’.84  
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‘SETTING UP SHOP’ 
 
A trend that deserves further scrutiny is the mushrooming of administrative bodies 
established on the premise of supporting traditional authorities in their traditional 
roles, and in particular in their roles as agents of development.  To return to Ghana, the 
Promoting Partnership with Traditional Authorities Project, funded by the World Bank, 
found the institutions of the Asantehene and Okyenhene ‘decayed’ and management 
systems lacking. As a result the capacity building of the traditional institutions was a 
component of the project, with the intention not only to strengthen partnerships 
between government and traditional communities, but also between traditional 
authorities and other development practitioners. The capacity building component was 
intended to strengthen and modernise aspects of traditional authority structures ‘in 
order for the institution to contribute in meaningful and substantive ways to the social 
and economic development of their communities’.85 A secretariat for the Okyenhene was 
created and ‘equipped with computers and accessories, other office equipment and 
furniture... [a] 4x4 Nissan pickup and accounting software’.86 Sensitisation workshops, 
training programs and ICT training, were also part of The World Bank programme to 
modernise the chieftaincy. The example of the Asantehene partnering with The World 
Bank is an illustration that he, and the institution he heads, has been recognised as a 
legitimate traditional authority that warrants being strengthened in order for it to play 
a positive role in decentralisation and democracy building in Ghana. Evidently an 
administrative body for the chieftaincy was seen by The World Bank as a necessary 
requirement if it was going to contribute in any substantive way to socio-economic 
development.  
Traditional authorities are also taking advantage of the legal status and increased 
attention donors are giving to strengthening civil society by creating NGOs. In Uganda, 
for example, the Buganda Kingdom has established two development NGOs, the 
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Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation (BUCADEF) and the Kabaka 
Foundation, which ‘raise funds internationally and are actively involved in project 
administration and management’.87 The Kabaka Foundation directs funds that more 
directly strengthen the traditional institution, for example it attracted funds for the 
restoration of the highly symbolic Kasubi Tombs destroyed in March 2010. It was 
reported the foundation made a donation of $50,000 towards the rehabilitation of the 
Wamala Tombs.88 BUCADEF on the other hand is focused on the socio-economic 
development of Buganda. One of its projects is hosting a radio programme on the 
Central Broadcasting Service aimed at ‘sensitising, mobilizing, informing and educating 
listeners about the projects BUCADEF is engaged in and encouraging them to participate 
in the development of the programmes’.89 The radio and other media, such as the 
Internet, is an increasing method traditional authorities are using to raise their profile 
and promote their image and message.90 The Otumfuo Osei Tutu Charity Foundation, for 
example, has an attractive website setting out its mission statement, vision, future 
programmes and an impressive list of its current achievements. The Foundation has 
been recently established to serve as an umbrella encompassing the Education Fund, a 
Health Fund and the Serwah Ampem Aids Foundation that have been created since 
Otumfuo Osei Tutu II’s enstoolment in 1999. In addition to these funds the foundation 
includes ‘programmes on capacity building to empower traditional authorities and their 
secretariats [so they can] play effective and efficient role[s] in Ghana’s decentralisation 
agenda and community development within the context of a modern Ghana’.91 
Olofin II, Olofindji Akandé, the Vizir of the King of Ketou in Benin and head of the Benin 
Association of Traditional Leaders, also heads the Africa-Cultures International 
Institute, an NGO with a focus on the promotion of traditional systems and authorities. 
The UN recognised the organisation and its 1999 World Conference of Kings, Queens, 
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Traditional Chiefs and Religious Leaders on Conflict Prevention in the Twenty-First 
Century.92 The NGO claims to have an ‘emphatic orientation towards Pan-Africanism’ 
and is ‘in line with Vizir Olofin's self-perception as a national leader...and as a world 
leader’,93 with members including university lecturers, entrepreneurs, civil servants and 
traditional healers.  The central focal point of Africa-Cultures, unlike the Buganda and 
Asante NGOs, is to implement a set of initiatives that revolve around laying to rest those 
who died as victims of the transatlantic slave trade. With this goal in mind the NGO is 
initiating the creation of ‘a monument, university, craft centre, and centre of pilgrimage 
and renewal’ at Igbale Aiye, a small town bordering with Nigeria. After coming into 
contact with Africa-Cultures in 2002 the American academic and self-identified diviner-
priest-healer in the sangoma tradition, Wim van Binsbergen, seems to be taking a 




An exploratory overview of current literature on traditional authority revivals in Sub-
Saharan Africa provides a number of interesting insights and ways of approaching the 
subject. Although there is a bias of state-centric analysis, it is evident that the 
relationship between post-colonial governments and traditional authorities cannot be 
ignored as discourses observed at a ‘national’ level of analysis play an important part in 
producing traditional authorities. However, the attention of scholars has been 
increasingly captured by the relationship between discourses of development and 
traditional leaders and the resultant effects of interest shown by international agencies 
towards authorities perceived as locally embedded and thus locally legitimate. 
Traditional authorities have harnessed the local/non-local tension to position 
themselves as desirable to local communities and outside agencies looking to anchor 
and legitimate their programmes and projects. I will now turn, in chapter two, to the 
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ACHOLILAND AND TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY REVIVALS IN UGANDA 
 
In this chapter I first of all introduce political governance in Acholiland over the long 
durée. I seek only to paint a general picture of Acholiland in the pre-colonial period 
before focusing primarily on chiefdom heads, the consolidation of an ‘Acholi’ ethnicity 
and the creation of a ceremonial head for this new polity in the colonial period. In the 
second section I map other traditional authority revivals across Uganda and finally 
introduce the context within which calls were heard to revive Acholi traditional 
authorities in the 1990s.  
 
GOVERNANCE IN ACHOLILAND  
 
The Luo-speaking Acholi of today are composed from waves of migrations into northern 
Uganda from around 1600 onwards. Those living in the same village shared a kaka, a 
lineage segment, and were usually related through patrilineal descent, although 
relatives from the maternal line or those considered simply as ‘close relatives’ 
sometimes also constituted kaka.1 Each village was composed of clusters of households 
within a hamlet where the adult males were the authority figures. A kaka could be 
identified and differed from those around through their common ancestor, praise name 
and repertoire of ceremonies. Village elders were known as ladit (pl. ludito) and 
mediated internal disputes and represented the village to outside groups. A number of 
kaka were recognised as ker (royal) kaka and had villages of lobong (commoner) kaka 
attached to them. The cluster of numerous lobong villages, the ker kaka, and the land for 
hunting and cultivating, constituted the widest polity and as such did not have an Acholi 
term of reference. This domain came to be commonly called chiefdom by colonial 
authorities. In the late nineteenth century it is thought there were about thirty 
chiefdoms in Acholiland, constituted by thousands of lobong villages. The ruling 
                                                          
1 T. Allen, "Review of Ronald R. Atkinson, the Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of 
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authority over the chiefdom was the head of the ker kaka, known as the Rwot (pl. 
Rwodi) and his household was considered a village and known as kal.  
The authority of Rwodi came primarily from the conceptualisation of his role as the won 
piny (father of land).2 His ritual duty of rainmaking together with the provision of food 
and security, made possible through the paying of tributes, ensured his authority and 
attracted other kaka to commit allegiance. The paying of tribute symbolised one’s 
recognition of a Rwot and was paid in kind or in service, with a primary purpose being 
to redistribute the tribute and forge social and political relationships.3 Certain lobong 
kaka heads paid tribute to the Rwot through forms of personal service such as anointing 
the Rwot at his installation ceremony, maintaining the ancestral shrine or providing 
beer at sacrificial rituals. These practices incorporated the lobong kaka heads into the 
ancestor ceremonies of the Rwot and thus strengthened their ties to the chiefdom.4 An 
early anthropologist researching in Acholiland in the late 1940s early 1950s, Frank 
Girling, wrote that some of his informants who wanted to claim that their clan had been 
independent did so by saying “Pe wa tyero tyer bot ngadi”, “we did not take tribute to 
anyone”.5 Royal regalia were also important symbols of Rwodi authority, particularly the 
bul ker (royal drum), where it has even been said that ‘chiefdoms and royal drums 
became so linked in Acholi that it became virtually impossible for people there to 
conceive of one without the other’.6 Two early colonial officials, Frank Bere, an 
administrator, and Captain Ernest Grove, saw that other regalia such as the spear, 
shield, ‘other valuables and heirlooms from the past’ played central roles in Rwodi 
succession ceremonies7, whilst Grove wrote how the ton ker (hereditary spear) seemed 
to embody the power of the Rwot, particularly as it was used in oath making.8 
 
                                                          
2 R.M. Bere, "An Outline of Acholi History," Uganda Journal 11, no. 1 (1947): 4.  
3 R.R. Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda before 1800 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 92-93.  
4 F.K. Girling, The Acholi of Uganda (London: HMSO, 1960), 96.  
5 Ibid., 94.  
6 R.R. Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda before 1800 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 95. Atkinson was involved in the History 
of Uganda Project facilitated by Makerere University in the 1970s, which informs to a large 
degree the information presented in his 1994 book The Roots of Ethnicity. 
7 R.M. Bere, "An Outline of Acholi History," Uganda Journal 11, no. 1 (1947): 5.  
8 E.T.N. Grove, "Customs of the Acholi," Sudan Notes and Records 2, no. 3 (1918): 173.  
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The role of the Rwot as the ritual head of a political group did not mean he was the apex 
of a single-structure of a descending hierarchy9; rather, the clan heads in the chiefdom 
played key political roles as advisors to the Rwot and representatives or spokesmen of 
their respective kaka lineages. In this role an elder was known as ladit-pa-rwot (elder of 
the Rwot), lakwena (messenger) or ladit kaka (elder of the lineage). Members of a 
chiefdom who disagreed with the Rwot, could leave the chiefdom through appealing to 
their kin in another chiefdom, which thus limited the coercive powers of the Rwot. 10 The 
most significant woman able to exercise a degree of authority over other women in the 
chiefdom was the dak ker. She was the woman who married the Rwot on the occasion of 
his succession and provided the heir to succeed him. As the sons of a Rwot had no 
special position, they did not have the means to attach to themselves land or people, 
unlike the sons of Rwodi in Bunyoro-Kitara and did not, therefore, pose a significant 
threat to the ruling Rwot.11 Also, in contrast to the Alur, the sons of the Rwot who were 
not chosen as heir did not usually have the means to move away and become new rulers 
of ‘chieflets’.12 
Rwodi also derived power from the chiefdom jogi (sing. jok), spirits that determined the 
moral order of society, claiming to use the power of the jok to ‘heal’ society or to kill.13 
Jogi were distinct from ancestors and tended to be associated with the oldest lineages in 
the respective areas and lived in nearby geographical features such as a rock outcrop, 
cave or waterfall. To maintain good relations with the ancestors, the ajwaki of the 
village maintain the hut-like construction, called abila, and offered explanations and 
cures for when ‘evil befalls a village or when someone becomes ill’14. The ajwaka was 
thus a very powerful figure within the village, attaining great respect and gifts for his 
direction and guidance. The chiefdom and its abila was thus associated with a 
geographical feature and a named jok, which, 
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(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 91.  
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the Acholi," Sudan Notes and Records 2, no. 3 (1918): 174.  
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underlined the position of the chief [Rwot] as a mediator with, and a 
propitiator of, the realm beyond moral relations...Chiefs were thus connected 
with the bush ‘outside’, while at the same time embodying the values of the 
‘inside’, and at moments of general crisis, such as failed rains, their 
intermediary quality rendered them invaluable.15 
Complex patterns of marriage and military alliances formed the backbone of relations 
between kaka and chiefdoms, with events such as drought instigating military alliances 
and confederacies 16 as did the later invasions from slave and ivory traders, as well as 
colonial rulers. Despite these groupings, however, Atkinson claims there is no evidence 
to suggest there was ever Acholi-wide organisation and cooperation prior to 
colonialism. The Payira chiefdom did manage, however, a significant degree of extra-
polity functioning over nominally independent chiefdoms, due to the chiefdom’s 
central location in a particularly fertile part of Acholiland, which was also an area 
difficult to access. Payira attracted numerous lobong villages fleeing the effects of 
drought or warfare, and became the largest chiefdom by the late eighteenth century.17 
Payira seemed to assign to themselves a superior status above other chiefdoms 
because of the recognition the Rwot of Payira received from the Bakama (king) of 
Bunyoro-Kitara, the kingdom to the south-west of Acholiland from where one of the 
migrations into Acholiland came. In addition, Girling observed a tendency of Acholi 
rulers to look to the ‘feudal kings of Bunyoro, with whom many claimed agnatic 
kinship’, and attempts ‘to establish in Acholiland the same forms of authority’, and saw 
this no more so than within Payira. 18 It is impossible, however, to deduce from 
historical accounts the extent that other Rwodi recognised the Payira Rwot as a leading 
Rwot because firstly, the accounts available do not give details on how power was 
effectively exercised, whether it was voluntary or coercive ‘recognition’; secondly, 
there is an over representation of the histories of chiefdoms and kaka in the west of 
Acholiland, such as Payira; and finally assertions that Payira Rwodi had considerable 
authority over ‘Acholi’ is more likely to be a reference to the central and western areas 
of what constitutes today’s Acholiland. As the following sub-section illustrates, as well 
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as the thesis more broadly, the Payira Rwot has not been able to claim a paramount 
position in Acholiland without contest from others who also invoked ‘tradition’ in their 
challenges. Indeed, the introductory picture here painted should not be taken as an 
account of a static reality frozen in time. Rather, authority was in constant contestation 
and relations amongst people far more fluid than is often portrayed of pre-colonial 
societies. Tensions were no doubt endemic as many different people, sometimes over a 
long time, sought to imbue multiple imaginings, such as kaka, the Luo language and 
customary laws,  with meaning and thus to imagine it further.19  
 
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION, ACHOLI ‘ETHNICITY’ AND A CONSTITUTIONAL HEAD 
 
According to Acholi historian and colonial administrator, R.M Bere, 1898 is ‘the year 
from which modern administration may be traced’ in northern Uganda.20 It was at this 
time that the British sought to connect Acholiland with the emerging Uganda 
protectorate instead of with Egypt and Sudan. Treaties were signed with several Rwodi 
and military posts were established. Three prominent Rwodi caught the attention of the 
first British explorers. These were Rwot Ochama of Payira, Rwot Ogwok of Padibe and 
Rwot Olia of Atiak. Rwot Ochama collaborated with Samuel Baker who was appointed 
under the Khedive of Egypt, carrying out violent raids in the pursuit of establishing 
authority. Ochama obtained guns through his coalitions with Baker and through 
encounters with slave and ivory traders. His son Rwot Awich continued to assert 
coercive authority across much of today’s Acholiland, carrying out raids against 
neighbours and trying to establish authority as head of the large and scattered Payira 
clan. Guns were used to reward Rwodi who collaborated with British administrators, 
providing new coercive means to assert not only their authority but the authority of 
those who they were mediating on behalf of.21 Rwot Awich resisted cooperation with 
British administration, refusing to agree to the treaty proposals and instead providing 
                                                          
19 T. Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa," in Legitimacy 
and the State in Twentieth Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, ed. T. Ranger 
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20 R.M. Bere, "An Outline of Acholi History," Uganda Journal 11, no. 1 (1947). 
21 T. Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army 
(London: Zed Books, 2006), 149.  
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refuge for the fleeing Kabarega of Bunyoro from Colonel Coleville and allying with the 
remaining Nubi soldiers in attempts to capture Rwot Ogwok of Padibe whose clan had 
chopped off the head of his father Rwot Ochama in 1877, placing it inside the captured 
royal drum. While Rwot Ogwok sought protection from Rwot Awich with recourse to the 
1898 treaty, Rwot Awich continued to evade capture until he was finally arrested and 
imprisoned in Nimule in 1901.22 Only one year later, however, Awich was reinstalled as 
Rwot of Payira and in 1904, contrary to expectations, requested the Church Missionary 
Society to send missionaries. His continued resentment towards British colonial rule 
and his support behind the Lamogi uprising in 1912 led to a second arrest and an eight 
year imprisonment in Kampala. Payira ‘country’ was divided into two and Awich’s two 
sons, Eria Alikair and Yona Odida, were appointed chiefs. Writing in 1947 the first 
District Commissioner of Acholi District wrote that Awich, although successful at raids 
and defending himself with cunning, ‘must be counted a failure’ and be seen as ‘a thorn 
in the side of peaceful administration’.23 Rwot Ogwok, in contrast, found favour with the 
last of the Egyptian Government officials, Emin Pasha, who established his military 
station at Padibe, and also formed alliances with British officials as external attempts to 
govern Acholiland shifted from Egypt to Uganda.  
In 1910 British colonial offices were opened in the newly established Gulu district, 
followed by the creation of Chua district to the east in 1914, with its headquarters in 
Kitgum (see map of Uganda, page vii). Local men who could exercise influence over the 
rural population and were sympathetic to colonialism were appointed ‘chiefs’ by the 
Colonial Administration and made part of the government organisation. By 1914 the 
Provincial Commissioner of the northern Province informed the General Governor in his 
annual report that 
All chiefs have been encouraged to engage their own clerks, who are Acholi 
educated at the local missions; practically every chief has his clerk now, and 
latterly a considerable number have commenced to tackle Tax Registers. 
Houses of a more substantial and civilized type are being built by the chiefs, 
many of them own bicycles, they all possess chief’s robes, and their police are 
now organized. All these improved introductions tend to make the chiefs 
realize their responsibilities and show it by a more dignified bearing, which it 
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may be said is not a natural characteristic of these people. Several promising 
young chiefs have replaced men whose influence was found to be 
detrimental to the local administration. Five chiefs have been deposed: 
Andrea Olal (Okellomwaka’s son) succeeded Ugwal of Paranga and he is 
reported on by the District Commissioner as probably the best chief in the 
District. Owor of Palaro, very old and useless, has been succeeded by Lupir 
who as regent to Anderea Lugarra/Logarra did excellent work in Patiko 
during his minority. It is reported that Lapir has now evolved order out of 
chaos in Palaro.24 
Achieving order, efficiency and economic productivity drove colonial policy and on 
these ground Acholiland underwent a ‘routine pacification’ that included collecting the 
thousands of guns that had amassed, clearing land affected by sleeping sickness and 
moving large portions of the population in Western Acholiland to inhabit areas beside 
the main road.  
Impressed by the political organisation found in Buganda,25 which reflected a 
constitutional monarchy, colonial authorities exported this model across the rest of the 
protectorate. Characteristic of the Buganda system exported across the Ugandan 
Protectorate in the early colonial period was a three-tiered hierarchy of appointed, non 
hereditary, territorial chiefs, with both administrative and judicial functions, topped by 
a three man group of senior chiefs called ‘Ministers’ in Buganda and ‘Senior Officials’ 
elsewhere. One was the chief executive (Katikiro or Nganzi in the kingdoms and 
Secretary-General elsewhere), another was the Chief Justice, and the third the 
Treasurer. Together these formed part of the Government and were linked to the Native 
Council.26 This hierarchical structure, known as The Ganda model, altered the position of 
chiefs in the western kingdoms (Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole) and Busoga, and made 
further reaching adjustments in areas with less centralised political organisation, such 
as Acholi. Chiefs outside Buganda were more directly under the control of the provincial 
administration.  
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Lukiko (a Bantu word for a council or parliament) were also created across Uganda for 
chiefs to meet regularly, in Gulu it was the first Monday of each month, and ensure the 
effective dissemination of information from colonial authorities.27 The Lukiko had no 
legislative power and could only amend native law and custom subject to the approval 
from the Governor, thus their power and authority was limited.28 The Lukiko in Gulu met 
at the baraza, which perhaps ironically was built by the people from Puranga accused of 
murdering or complying with the murder of their non-hereditary appointed chief, 
Okello Mwaka. Mwaka had been appointed Chief of Puranga and was Major Delm-
Radcliffe’s interpreter and ‘right hand man’.29 A colonial report spoke of Chief Mwaka as 
‘the most loyal and hardworking Chief of the Nile Districts’ who had been ‘murdered by 
some discontented followers.’30 The Puranga were not the only Acholi who resented 
being ruled by an appointed chief. For example the Labongo resisted rule by Chief Eliya 
Aliker, resenting it as an attempt of Payira paramountcy.31 
Further attempts to increase efficiency and reduce costs saw Acholiland divided into six 
counties and twenty-two sub-counties in the late 1930s. Counties were named 
according to local geographical features to avoid political repercussions from adopting 
any of the clan names. The sub-counties, however, were named by the largest 
traditional domain/chiefdom in the area. Those appointed as County Chiefs were 
officially known as Rwot, but this did not indicate he had any authority over ‘traditional’ 
domains. To differentiate between hereditary Rwodi and those appointed as chiefs, the 
latter were known locally as Rwodi Kalam (of the pen) and the former as Rwodi mo (of 
the oil). Appointed over the sub-counties were Jagi (singl. Jago). Within each sub-county 
there were three to five Parishes under a Mukungu (pl. Bakungu), and in each Parish 
two or three villages, each under a won Paco (pl. wegi Paco). None of these posts were 
hereditary and all were salaried officials of the Native Administration.32 The heads of 
                                                          
27 Provincial Commissioner, "Northern Province Monthly Report," ed. B.P.o. Uganda (Entebbe: 
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commoner lineages, ludito kaka, were not recognised by the Administration, although 
were unofficially recognised by the chiefs and were responsible to the wegi Paco for the 
people in their village. They formally participated in governance only through a few of 
them being selected by the other ludito kaka to sit on the sub-county council.33 Although 
the ludito kaka was usually a local elderly man, as a result of administrative 
requirements young men could also be found in this role. Similarly to the distinctions 
made between Rwodi Mo and Rwodi Kalam, distinctions were also made between those 
appointed because they could interact and perform governmental tasks and those 
elders who were there according to Acholi custom. The former were known as atekere 
and the latter as ladit kaka me cik.34 The District Commissioner was at the apex of this 
structure of chiefs and was responsible to the Provincial Commissioner. Appointments 
tended to be made from the emerging educated class, leaving only three kal lineage 
Rwodi filling three of the six County Chief posts of Aswa, Lamwo and Agago. They were 
the sons of Rwot Ochama of Payira, Rwot Ogwok of Padibe and Rwot Odieng Abar of 
Adilang respectively. In the other counties the chiefs were ‘either strangers in their 
areas or the descendants of commoners there’.35 
The Districts of Gulu and Chua were amalgamated in 1938 as part of the ‘urgent trend in 
modern administration...to bring the clans together and to make the Acholi conscious of 
their unity as a single people’.36 However, with the new Headquarters based in Gulu, the 
creation of an Acholi District provoked resentment from the east at the loss of district 
status. 37 Despite the attempt to unite the clans, the Aswa River acted as a border that 
naturalised a division between east and west or upper and lower Acholiland. Today 
amongst the Acholi this division has come to separate the more ‘traditional’ (positive 
statement) or ‘backward’ (negative statement) Acholi of the upper/eastern areas, from 
those in the west.38  
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The creation of an Acholi District caused a significant change in administration. 
Attempts to revert to a traditional system of government were thought too difficult, 
particularly as it was thought that the checks previously used to arbitrate the power of 
rulers and which ensured the response of the ruler to the demands of their subjects had 
been eroded.  Thus, a system of councils was introduced based on the British Local 
Government Authorities and ‘they were to ignore such facts as kinship, traditional 
political allegiance, and ritual authority’.39 Power was fiercely fought over at the district 
level and although the councils were meant to act as checks and replace the direct rule 
of the county chiefs, instead the two authorities functioned more in a parallel system.40 
Leys observed that sentiment for the thirty or so ‘old chiefdoms’, which the British tried 
to undermine by imposing an administrative structure of six counties, was kept alive 
through competition for ‘status in the modern political system’.41 Girling on the other 
hand wrote that ‘the polycephalous system of mutually opposing domains...where 
power, influence and status were widely distributed’42 had all gone. But Gertzel’s 
account of emerging party politics and the establishment of an Acholi paramount chief 
or Constitutional Head supports Leys’ view that allegiance and rivalry amongst clans 
was still strong.  
County chiefs, or Jago as they were also called because they held authority within a 
government drawn jurisdiction, were the most politically vocal group in the immediate 
post-war years.43 They were keen to secure greater powers for the Acholi African Local 
Government and in 1944 began to campaign for an appointment of a secretary general 
to represent the Acholi at a higher level. After the Uganda African Local Government 
Ordinance of 1949, the District Commissioner withdrew from his post as chairman of 
the district council, which opened up the chairmanship to one of the county chiefs, to be 
elected by the district council. Although legally the district councils enjoyed only 
deliberative and advisory functions, the recognition they received was considerably 
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higher.44 As three of the county chiefs were from royal ancestral lineages, the issue of 
establishing a secretary general or president was complicated by clan rivalries as each 
wanted their man to hold this post. The District Commissioner, R.M Bere, was however 
opposed to the idea of a paramount chief, stating in 1949 that: 
It will not be permitted to try and make a sort of hereditary king whose 
family would become rulers. This would not be at all in accordance with 
modern ideas and the intention of giving the people more say in their own 
government.45 
There remained a need, however, for the Provincial Government to establish better 
communication between local and central government, and so in 1950 two new posts 
were created: Lawirwodi who would chair the District Council and act as Senior 
Executive Officer of the Acholi local government, and Langolkop Madit who would be 
Chief Judge of district courts. As the title Lawirwodi translates as ‘Rwot who is first 
among equals’ and its advocates were associating it with the concept of paramount, the 
colonial administration were specifically opposed to Payira or Padibe filling the post.46 
The district councillors from among the County Chiefs instead elected Mateo Lamot, 
Chief of Agago47 as Lawirwodi and Yona Odida, Chief of Aswa,48 as Langolkop Madit. 
There was increasing competition for the Lawirwodi post, which aroused ‘considerable 
chiefdom rivalry’.49 In 1953 Mateo Lamot lost the post to Phillip Adonga, County Chief of 
Chua, and Rwot of Pajule.50 
The District Council was not, however, satisfied with the Lawirwodi post and still sought 
an executive district head who would then be able to meet with the Kabaka of Buganda 
and the Kyabazinga of Bunyoro on an equal footing. In 1959, after much debate between 
the Protectorate Government, the Ministry of Local Government and the District 
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Council, the Lawirwodi position was abolished and a ceremonial head, entitled Laloyo 
Maber (good ruler), was created. The Laloyo Maber post, although non-executive, once 
again sparked considerable rivalry, particularly amongst the major clan heads.51  
At the same time as the ‘Laloyo issue’ two political parties sought to consolidate power. 
These were the Uganda National Congress (UNC), which later became Uganda’s People’s 
Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP). According to Leys, although clan loyalty 
was significant in Acholi politics, its centrality could be easily exaggerated and was 
‘distinctly subordinate to party allegiance’.52 East and west Acholi was generally divided 
along UNC/UPC and DP lines, with the former also being predominately Protestant and 
the latter Catholic. Not only this, the official UPC candidates for the two parliamentary 
positions in west Acholi were Payira, Alex Ojera and Peter Oola, and to secure Payira 
votes promised to install the retired County Chief Rwot Yona Odida as Laloyo Maber.53 
This created tensions within the UPC party as UPC leaders in east Acholi were under 
pressure to support an eastern based Padibe candidate.54 When the District Council met 
in 1963 to fill the new office of Laloyo Maber, Philip Adonga, the DP backed candidate, 
who had previously been the Lawirwodi, was elected owing largely to a defector from 
the UPC. 55 The creation of constitutional district heads across Uganda were being locally 
conceived in terms of creating their own ‘Kabaka-substitutes’ in imitation of Buganda.56 
As Leys wrote, during the years of Buganda’s dominance, the remainder of the country 
had learned to envy her advantages and to aspire to a similar degree of administrative 
autonomy, even to having similar political arrangements, in particular some form of 
traditional king’.57  
The way the issue of a Laloyo Maber featured as part of campaigns for the General 
Election in April 1962 and the District Council Elections, illustrates the way a new class 
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of Acholi was emerging; an educated class often with experience of living away from 
Acholi and who could strategically appeal to traditional sentiment for political 
leverage.58 The fact that the Laloyo Maber issue had political leverage demonstrates that 
there was support amongst the Acholi for such a position, although who occupied the 
post was an issue of contention. People were also in favour of council members being 
elected directly by the people and were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the rule 
of county chiefs. The UPC tapped into this feeling and became ‘champions of the people 
against officialdom’, challenging their dominant position in the councils and challenging 
the chiefs on the grounds of incompetence, inefficiency, inability to change with the 
times, and oppressive behaviour towards the rural population.59 In the face of a 
dominant colonial power structure, Acholi ethnicity also became actualised through 
‘struggles to participate in central power’ and as Acholi sought to ‘objectify their own 
way of life’ through the invention of Acholi traditions and an ethnic history.60 The 
method of British administration also contributed to the emergence of an Acholi 
ethnicity and reified the group as a ‘tribe’.61 
Although clan loyalty remained ‘alive’ and translated into rivalry and competition over 
political posts in local Government, the political power of traditional authorities had 
been severely weakened and undermined. Girling wrote that only the ritual authority of 
minor traditional functionaries remained and he expected that this would eventually 
too fade away. He wrote of an emerging new class of Acholi, mainly from commoner 
lineages, economically empowered and ‘cut off from the values of the traditional order 
of society’.62  
The old men who enshrined in their persons the values of the traditional 
order were dying out, their sons had difficulty in maintaining the traditions if 
they wished to do so....The ritual contexts in which the Rwot is important 
become fewer. The ritual counterpart of political authority remains after the 
decay of the latter, but ritual, too, tends to disappear in time. 
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The persistence of an ancestor-worshiping cult had, however, maintained social 
cohesion amongst the village lineages, even though the chiefdoms which they formed 
were disappearing as a relevant polity.63  
 
NEO-TRADITIONALISATION ELSEWHERE IN UGANDA 
 
In areas of the Uganda Protectorate where a more centralised system of governance 
operated (Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole) the ‘kings’ were afforded a special 
status in comparison to the authorities, such as Rwodi, found in the ‘state-less’ 
societies.64 Gingyera-Pinycwa argued that it was because the monarchical institutions 
resembled more closely the “civilised” states of Europe and therefore were through to 
have a higher level of cultural development, unlike the ‘savages at a lower level of 
development’.65 Colonial Administration ruled more indirectly through centralised 
structures and gave a unique and favourable status to Buganda over the other 
kingdoms66 in Uganda through the 1900 Agreement.67 This caused bitterness throughout 
the rest of the protectorate and resulted in attempts to emulate monarchy.  
Initially the Omukama of Bunyoro, Omukama of Toro and the Omugabe of Ankole were 
able to exercise more centralised power through a patrimonial and personalised 
politics, but over time their increasingly autocratic behaviour was criticised and in the 
cases of Bunyoro and Ankole the Omukama and Omugabe found their authority 
significantly curtailed and undermined by the 1930s. In Bunyoro, educated Banyoro, ex-
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chiefs and disappointed aspirants to chiefships, were critical of the Omukama for by-
passing the Bunyoro council in local government affairs, eventually resulting in 1955 
with the Omukama’s position being reduced to that of a constitutional head, with his 
powers thereafter gradually declining.68  
Ankole experienced the farthest reaching decline in its monarchy, but from the 1930s 
also shows the most impressive attempt at a ‘revival’. By the mid-1930s the Ankole 
kingship’s traditional functions and ‘essential meaning’ had been eroded69 and so in 
response to a decaying monarchy the ruling group in Ankole, the Bahima, increasingly 
focused attention on the ceremonial aspects of kingship, which became lavishly 
adorned. Despite initial reluctance to recognise and support anything that did not seem 
‘genuinely’ traditional, the District Commissioner at the time not only agreed to a 
request for the Omugabe to have a throne, but asked if there were any symbolic 
decorations they would like incorporated into the woodwork.70 Following this success, 
the Engazi requested a crown and ceremonial robes for a fully-fledge coronation of the 
Omugabe. Over the 1940s and 50s ‘the Ankole royalty [was] made more royal’  through 
the adoption of quasi-traditional titles such as Omuramuzi (Chief Judge) and Omubiki 
(Treasurer), terms that had gained currency at the time, borrowed as they were from 
Buganda.71 The wife of the Omugabe was given the title Omwigarire and it was agreed 
that the English equivalent of this was Queen, with their sons and daughters becoming 
known as princes and princesses. In addition to special regal looking clothes, there were 
‘still other ways the monarchy was dressed up’. The residence of the Omugabe became 
known as a Mugaba (palace), a Royal Standard was designed and printed on official 
stamps and seals of the Ankole government. Amidst the re-invention of traditions there 
were also only a few attempts to revive cultural attributes that had been practiced prior 
to colonialism which had fallen into disregard. One of these was the preservation of the 
royal drum.72  
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The Ankole may have sought to make royalty ‘more royal’, but in Busgoa the 
Presidential position that headed the Native Administration from 1919 was officially re-
titled Kyabazinga, and made ‘King’ in the eyes of Busoga in 1938. Politics up to the mid-
1950s was largely shaped by the two main contenders for the Kyabazingaship, as well 
as the status of the district and its position in wider Uganda.73 Although the British 
accepted the Kyabazinga title they insisted the post was not a Kingship and Busoga was 
not a Kingdom, despite Busoga attempts to mimic the Buganda in this way. In 1962, 
Kyabazinga Sir William Nadiope ‘personalised the Kyabazingaship in such a way that 
the institution became hereditary and succession was confined to his sons and affines’.74  
The economic strengthening experienced by Baamba and Bakonzo living in the 
Rwenzori mountains in Western Uganda during colonial rule, and the exclusionary 
politics they were subject to under the Toro Kingdom and the minority circle of 
Mwenga, resulted in the Rwenzori Rebellion. The Baamba and Bakonzo demanded 
separation from Toro and began to talk in terms of the ‘Rwenzururu Kingdom’.  
The Independence Constitution of Uganda in 1962 served to uphold rather than 
undermine the more politically centralised parts of Uganda as Bunyoro, Ankole and 
Toro were for the first time constitutionally recognised as Kingdoms, rather than 
Districts. A federal structure was established giving Buganda full federal status, 
Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole semi-federal status, Busoga was recognised as a ‘territory’ 
and the non-Kingdom areas were divided into unitary districts.  
 
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, MUSEVENI AND 1990S REVIVALS  
 
The process towards political independence in Uganda was fraught with ‘ethnic’ and 
regional differences operating through the framework of a multi-party political system. 
The uneasy UPC-Kabaka Yekka (the King alone) political alliance took Uganda to 
independence in 1962. An amendment to the constitution in 1963, resulting from 
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complaints by Buganda who refused to recognise a Prime Minister over the Kabaka and 
other hereditary chiefs, saw Kabaka Mutesa II posted as the ceremonial President of 
Uganda. Milton Obote was vested with executive powers and relations between the new 
Government and the Buganda Kingdom soon broke down, reaching its lowest moment 
in May 1966 when Obote ordered an attack on the Kabaka’s palace, killing hundreds of 
people. The next day a state of emergency was declared, the Baganda Kingdom was 
announced defunct and the following year a new unitary Constitution was imposed. The 
1967 Constitution removed the Kabaka as President, dissolved the post of Prime 
Minister, placed Obote as the Executive President, and abolished monarchy and 
federalism. This dramatic move was felt most deeply amongst the Baganda as the 
Constitution dismantled the long standing hierarchy of traditional authorities, divided 
Buganda into four districts and stripped Buganda of its federal status.75 Obote sought to 
rectify the dual operation of government by targeting the prototype, the Buganda 
model, as well as its representational head, the Kabaka. Obote wanted to establish ‘one 
state, one Government, one Parliament, one People’ and so denounced the Kabaka and 
also the educated elite, put emphasis on the ‘common man’ and proclaimed that the 
‘rulers of Uganda must be all the citizens of Uganda as a whole.’76 Abolishing Kingdoms 
and centralising power would also dismantle the powerful district authorities that had 
been based on the Buganda model.77 The neo-traditionalisation efforts across Uganda 
came to a standstill, and although we can today see that it would only be temporary, at 
the time the abolition of traditional authorities seemed to mark the final nail in the 
coffin, as with Ankole, or the beginning of the end.  
As soon as Idi Amin took power in 1971, however, there followed proposals from the 
Baganda for their Kingdom to be restored. At a Conference of Elders, the Baganda 
carefully worded their proposal to make clear that their request was for the restoration 
of Kingship that would be restricted to Buganda alone, and was not a request for a King 
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of Uganda. The money to run the Kingship, they insisted, would come from the Baganda. 
They too harked back to the colonial period when Uganda ‘was happy and progressive’ 
as a Republic under a Governor General, with the Kings of Uganda alongside the district 
administration, and tried to strengthen their argument by referring to the tribal 
problems of Zambia that they said were created not by Kings but by ‘greedy, self-
seeking politicians’.78  
Although there was a circle of elite in Baganda with a determined drive to see the 
restoration of the Kingdom, in other parts of Uganda reactions to the abolition of 
traditional authorities was not received with such disdain, but rather the broad mood 
was a ‘pervasive indifference’ and only ‘occasionally joy’.79 The series of Memoranda 
written to Amin following the 1971 conference by elders of Kigezi and Ankole are an 
example. Although the Baganda were only requesting that their monarchy be restored, 
the fear shared by the elders of Kigezi and Ankole was that this would spark revivals 
across Uganda. The elders did not see a place for ‘tribal’ authorities because the roles 
they used to play in the past, such as the allocation of land and court cases, were seen as 
having ‘naturally and rightly been taken over by appropriate arms of the Uganda 
Government’ and that these arms should not be surrendered to ‘local and tribal 
institutions’80. Some of the specific reasons the elders gave against restoring Kingdoms 
and chiefdoms in Uganda was that it would ‘most likely revive political divisions and 
factionalism’ and ‘definitely cause undesirable disunity in Uganda’, ‘hamper Uganda’s 
economic and social development’ and ‘lead to victimisation and possible bloodshed in 
the Region’. The Kigezi Elders were also keen to point out that those who supported the 
restoration of traditional institutions were of ‘the old order’ seeking to amass a personal 
gain from the restoration of traditional institutions’.81 One of the underlying fears 
driving the elders’ view that was widely felt across Uganda was towards the possibility 
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that a restoration of the Buganda Kingdom may lead to a restoration of a Buganda sub-
imperial rule. The concern both Amin and Obote, who had a second term in office after 
overthrowing Amin in 1979, had towards restoring the Buganda Kingdom and 
Kabakaship was its potential to shift power back to central Uganda, to the Buganda, 
when both Obote and Amin were from northern districts and ruled as such, placing 
northern elite in positions of power and recruiting for the army from their home areas.  
A restoration of traditional authorities was to come, however, as both a result of 
pressures from monarchists and a need for votes by the most recent governing party in 
Uganda, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Following Yoweri Museveni’s bush 
war that led to the National Resistance Army (NRA) seizing power from Obote’s second 
period as President in 1986, the Baganda expected ample rewards for its assistance 
through the contribution of people and territory towards the NRA’s victory.82 Initially 
the Baganda were given prominent representation in the post-1986 administration83 
and later, in 1993, under pressure to secure votes for a prolongation of NRM rule in a 
no-party system, the NRM amended the constitution to cancel the abolition of 
traditional rulers. 
The 1995 Constitution, Chapter sixteen, Article 246, posited that ‘the institution of 
traditional leader or cultural leader may exist in any area of Uganda in accordance with 
the culture, customs and traditions or wishes and aspirations of the people to whom it 
applies’.84 Conscious of preventing political challenge from traditional leaders, or rather 
from Buganda, as this was the only Kingdom that posed a potential threat, the 
constitution makes clear that ‘a person shall not, while remaining a traditional leader or 
cultural leader, join or participate in partisan politics’, and stipulated that ‘a traditional 
leader or cultural leader shall not have or exercise any administrative, legislative or 
executive powers of Government or local government’. Unlike other countries in SSA, 
such as South Africa, the Ugandan government was not going to formally incorporate 
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traditional authorities into the state apparatus. Instead the Government has explicitly 
and repeatedly referred to traditional authorities in terms of ‘culture’, re-producing 
culture and politics as binary opposites, to the intended effect of situating traditional 
authorities firmly in the former. I will return to the NRM’s government’s discourse of 
cultural institutions in chapter four.  
 
Whilst the constitution enabled a new freedom to recognise the Kabaka, of equal 
importance for Buganda was the Traditional Rulers Statute that included a restoration 
of assets (the Baganda call Ebyaffe, meaning ‘our things’) that had been confiscated 
from Buganda in 1967. These included the Kabaka’s palace, Bulange (the Lukiko’s 
parliamentary building) and 350 square miles of land, including the obligatory rent and 
rates on this land from tenants. In anticipation of constitutional amendments, in July 
1993 Sabasajja Muwenda Mutebi II was crowned Kabaka of Buganda, which was also 
quickly followed by coronations in Toro and Bunyoro.  
The restorations of the latter two Kings in Uganda have been coloured by controversy 
and tensions. For example, although the Toro Kingdom has been reinstated, its former 
boundaries, which included areas that were majority Baamba, Bakonzo and other non-
Bantoro, have not. The Toro kingship, as a result, has ‘lost much of its former 
significance and appeal as a result of the ‘secession’ of Bundibugyo and Kasese 
districts’.85 In Bunyoro, there was little enthusiasm to revive the monarchy and the 
process of restoration has been beset by a struggle between two contenders from the 
royal Babiito clan.86 In the same year Ankole monarchists crowned the 22nd Omugabe of 
Ankole, Prince John Barigye, but, given the potential for objections publicised the event 
as the last funeral rites of the previous Omugabe. The NRM swiftly declared the 
coronation null and void fearing that a restoration of monarchy in Ankole would incite a 
revival of antagonisms between the Bairu and Bahima, many of whom worked alongside 
one another in the NRM, united by their common involvement in the political party.87 
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The restoration of the Omugabe in Ankole has since been at the centre of fierce debate,88 
which still remains unsolved.  
The restoration of the Buganda Kingdom has been particularly pertinent, especially as 
Buganda-State relations continue to shape traditional authorities elsewhere in Uganda.  
Englebert argues it has been one of the most far reaching restorations of a traditional 
Kingdom in Africa as, following the impressive theatrical display at the coronation in 
1993,  
the king wasted no time creating executive, legislative and administrative 
structures...Mutebi appointed a parliament (lukiko), with representatives of 
districts, clan elders and other appointees...[he also] promptly set up a 
government, in many ways a modern cabinet with the portfolios one finds in 
its national counterpart, including a prime minister (the Katikiro) and 
ministries of land, public buildings, finance, commerce and industries, local 
government, water and electricity, information and broadcasting, education, 
health, agriculture, economic planning and youth, as well as an attorney 
general, together with fourteen ‘ministers of state’.89 
Symbols were also reinstated or created, such as an anthem, a flag and national 
monuments, and an ideology emerged ‘based on a claim of moral regeneration’ that is 
‘pro-development,...albeit a development based on the rural world and predicated on a 
return to tradition’.90 As discussed in the previous chapter the Buganda Kingdom has 
established two NGOs: the Kabaka Foundation to fund the strengthening of the 
traditional institution and the Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation 
(BUCADEF) that claims to work for the socio-economic development of Buganda. 
BUCADEF publicises an impressive list of funders on its website ranging from 
international donors such as USAID, ACDI-VOCA, Water AID, UNDP small Grants 
Programme and the McKnight Foundation, to religious groups such as the Church of 
Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints in the USA and local and central government. The 
success of many projects has resulted not so much in the mobilisation of famers or 
generating income for local communities, but rather in ‘generating cultural awareness 
and promoting ideological unification among Buganda, while sending the signal to 
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remote villages that the kingdom is back’.91 This was particularly the case for the project 
to restore cultural sites as tourist attractions under the Heritage Trails project funded 
by the Uganda Community Tourism Association and the British NGO Action for 
Conservation through Tourism.92  
Although the Kingdom projects images of its main NGO, BUCADEF, as an extension of 
the Kingdom that facilitates development for the Buganda, there is a danger for 
Kingdom authorities that rural Baganda perceive it differently. BUCADEF projects are 
not only administered through district authorities rather than traditional counties, they 
are also mainly funded by foreign donors and therefore may be producing a sense of 
alienation, often the product of relations between the development industry and local 
population.93 Despite such challenges Buganda has created a quasi-state institution, 
through carving an international as well as local public profile, enhancing its fiscal 
independence, promoting its own development policies and engaging in numerous 
development projects. According to Doornbos, what has been revived in Buganda ‘is not 
so much the culture of Buganda but rather the potential power of culture in the political 
process.’94  
The restoration of Buganda also ushered in a renewed debate between supporters of 
federalism and ‘decentralisation’ and as far as Buganda is concerned they have wanted 
to make sure they are prepared for a time when monarchists can make a credible claim 
for autonomous local self-government in a new federal system.95 A decade on and 
relations between the Buganda Kingdom and the NRM Government have soured and 
come to significant and violent blows,96 as I will return to discuss further in chapter four.   
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The ‘revivals’ of traditional authorities have not been restricted to Kings, however, as 
numerous ‘traditional authorities’ across the country have sought state and local 
recognition over the past fifteen years. Englebert has noted with interest that there are 
also a ‘multiplicity of political entrepreneurs from groups in Uganda without a strong 
tradition of centralised statehood or kingship who have claimed the status of traditional 
leaders in order to benefit from the recognition granted by the constitution.’97 Busoga 
royalists, for example, have resumed the monarchization process they had got 
underway in the 1950s, by crowning, for the second time, the seventy-four year old 
Henry Wako Muloki in February 1995 as Kyabazinga. Following his death in 2008, 
Busoga entered a tense period as a new Kyabazinga was elected from the royal clan 
heads. One newspaper reported that the ‘Kingdom’ was torn ‘between two princes, 
Edward Columbus Wambuzi from Bulamogi and William Nadhiope of Bugabula, who 
were both elected Kyabazinga amid controversy’.98 In 2011 there was a heavy 
deployment of police forces around the Kingdom headquarters as Wambuzi finally 
assumed office as Kyabazinga, despite continued petitions against the election.99 
Advocates of the Rwenzururu Kingdom were reported in the national newspapers not 
only to be reinstating the King, but also training a private army and beginning to collect 
taxes.100 The Itseo, Padhola, Alur, Lango, and Acholi have also witnessed ceremonies 
‘reviving’ ‘traditional leaders.’101 Contrary to the other traditional authority revivals in 
Uganda, however, calls to revive Acholi traditional authorities in the 1990s were voiced 
against the background of a protracted conflict and widespread violence in northern 
Uganda.  
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The question of what exactly should be revived with regards to ‘traditional authorities’ 
has been central to debates and tensions across Uganda and as the following chapters 
show, this also holds true for Acholi. In relation to the Ankole restoration of traditional 
authorities Doornbos has pointed out a divide amongst advocates for a revival who have 
imagined the reinstatement of traditional authority in different ways, taking for granted 
the vision each has as the obvious and ‘genuine’ expression of traditional authority. On 
the one hand a group envisioned and ‘took for granted that reinstatement would 
concern the institution as it had been inherited from colonial times, not the pre-colonial 
Nkore kingdom’, whilst others argue this would amount to symbolically reviving an 
ethnically ascribed kingship, which was discriminatory over regions that had not 
historically formed part of the kingdom. They claim it would be more traditional to 
revive the pre-colonial Nkore kingship with roots in the fifteenth century, than the 
‘colonially restructured institution that had lasted little longer than sixty years’.102 This 
case confirms the assertion by much of the broader literature on traditional authorities 
that ‘regards tradition as a specific construction at a specific time for specific 
purposes’.103 As I show in the following chapters this also holds for the revival of Acholi 
traditional authorities and the emergence of Ker Kwaro Acholi.  
In order to be able to move more lucidly through my critique of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
revival, I have painted in this chapter, through broad brushstrokes and moments of 
highlighted details, a picture of Acholiland and Uganda in relation to governing 
authorities over the long durée. I have introduced the authority of Rwot as it has been 
conceptualised prior to the recent revival of Acholi traditional authorities and drawn 
attention to the moment when Acholi was appointed a ceremonial head or Laloyo 
Maber in the 1950s. I then mapped the inventing and re-imagining of traditional 
authorities across Uganda, highlighting the process of monarchization in Busoga and the 
                                                          
102 M. Doornbos, The Ankole Kingship Controversy: Regalia Galore Revisited (Kampala: Fountain, 
2001), 107.  
103 E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Niewaal and R. van Dijk, "Introduction: The Domestication of 
Chieftaincy: The Imposed and the Imagined," in African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political 
Landscape, ed. E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Niewaal and R. van Dijk (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1999), 1.  
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desperate attempts to keep monarchy alive in Ankole. I also pointed to the central and 
influential role the Buganda Kingdom plays in traditional authority politics in Uganda. 
The overview I have given of traditional authorities in Uganda has drawn from the thin 
body of literature available. Besides Englebert’s critique of how Baganda monarchists 
strategically and successfully restored the Buganda Kingdom far beyond its stipulated 
cultural role, the only other significant study of a contemporary traditional revival in 
Uganda is Doornbos’ critique of attempts within Ankole to restore the monarchy and its 
colonially created territorial boundaries. Although these significant contributions give 
crucial insights for critiques of traditional authorities in Uganda and beyond, scant 
attention has been given to the numerous other traditional authority revivals in the 
country.104 My study of Ker Kwaro Acholi, therefore, is a contribution to this lacuna. 
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BECOMING A TRADITIONAL CULTURAL AUTHORITY 
 
In the midst of prolonged conflict in northern Uganda, calls to revive Acholi traditional 
authorities and the international support these calls received re-introduced a cohort of 
Rwodi to the political landscape in Acholiland. A Paramount Chief of Acholi was also 
elected from amongst the Rwodi and a relatively discreet ceremony in 2000 marked this 
unprecedented event as well as the re-installing of numerous Rwodi. Over the following 
five years the Council of Rwodi headed by a Paramount Chief became more commonly 
known as Ker Kwaro Acholi and recognised as the institution of traditional authorities 
and custodian of Acholi culture, amongst national and international actors, and found 
particular support by those in the field of ‘traditional justice’.  
In this chapter I analyse both the dominant discourses that enabled and shaped the first 
phase of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival as a traditional cultural institution, as well as the 
events and strategic practices of the central actors of the emerging Ker Kwaro Acholi. I 
begin the first part by giving an overview of the recent conflict in northern Uganda that 
became an enabling environment for the revival of traditional authorities and 
emergence of Ker Kwaro Acholi. I do not, however, seek to give a comprehensive 
account of the complexity of war in northern Uganda, as this has been done extensively 
elsewhere1; rather, in my overview I want to draw attention to the emergence of 
particular discourses that shaped the initial phase of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s ‘revival’. I 
discuss how discourses of ‘cultural breakdown’ and ‘traditional justice’ emerged and 
became dominant ways of understanding the situation in northern Uganda and which 
framed the calls to revive traditional authorities. In the second part of the chapter I turn 
to analyse pursuits by Ker Kwaro that were significant in the process of Ker Kwaro 
becoming known, particularly amongst national and international actors, as the 
                                                          
1 The most recent and comprehensive studies are in T. Allen and K. Vlassenroot, eds., The Lord's 
Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (London: Zed Books,2010).  
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traditional cultural authority in Acholi. In this section, I discuss public ceremonies, 
examine Ker Kwaro Acholi’s first Strategic Plan published in 2005 and show that Ker 
Kwaro Acholi’s dominant self-presentation is to a significant degree re-produced in a 
key document on traditional justice produced by Dr Erin Baines of the Conflict and 
Development Programme, Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British 
Columbia. One of the purposes of the chapter is to illustrate and emphasise that the 
emergence of Ker Kwaro Acholi was founded upon ideas to revive traditional 
authorities on the premise they had the potential to bring peace and stability to 
northern Uganda.  
 
VIOLENCE IN ACHOLILAND AND POLITICAL RECONFIGURATION 
 
Whilst the NRA/M were forming alliances with Baganda in the 1980s and later 
experiencing the benefits of relative stability, economic liberalisation and development 
in the 1990s, northern Uganda was becoming increasingly unstable and debilitated by 
physical, emotional and psychological violence.2 Despite Obote’s attempts to de-
ethnicise Uganda, the 1970s and 1980s saw an increase in tension along ethnic, 
religious and sub-regional lines – including the reinforcement of a north-south divide. 
Under Idi Amin, Acholi political order was widely destabilised as local government 
became an extension of the security forces. The ‘violent political purges in Acholi and 
Lango districts, leading to tens of thousands of civilian deaths’ and which drove Acholi 
elite into exile and lineage-based authorities to ‘generally withdraw from political life’, 
served to sever ‘the link between the Acholi in the district and the national state’.3 The 
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occupation was ‘peasant farmer’, perhaps recognising that his status as Rwot of Payira carried 
little currency in the climate of anti-‘tribalism’. G. Acana, "Pension Form 2, Gulu District 




colonial stereotype of Acholi as warriors and a martial people4 was also re-produced by 
Museveni as he fought his bush war and sought to garner support from Baganda and 
other southerners who had felt they had been at a disadvantage since independence 
under the series of rulers who all came from the north.5 A major battle fought between 
the NRA and Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) in the ethnically heterogeneous 
area of Luwero in central Uganda, was effectively framed by Museveni in regional terms, 
as a fight to ‘throw out the north in favour of the south.’6 As the inhabitants of Luwero 
had suffered during the UNLA’s counter-insurgency, and the UNLA was populated 
predominantly by Acholi, the latter felt the brunt of the perpetuated anti-northern 
sentiment.  
Contrary to opinions of observers from outside Uganda, Museveni’s Government 
brought little relief to northern Uganda, rather the violence in central Uganda merely 
shifted ‘toward the north and the country’s other peripheries’.7 It was reported that 
twenty-seven different rebel groups were taking up arms and resisting the government 
following Museveni’s takeover of power.8 Soldiers from the previous governments fled 
northward and many who initially formed a base in Sudan returned to Gulu and formed 
the Uganda People’s Democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A). On arrival they tenuously 
cooperated with Acholi elders and ‘faced with a common external enemy’ who 
‘identified all Acholi as its ethnic enemy’, managed to ‘stabilise internal order around a 
discourse of Acholi identity’.9 Hot on the heels of ex-UNLA were Museveni’s bush rebels 
turned army who captured Gulu in 1986, committed violent atrocities and looted the 
                                                          
4 The British colonial rulers adopted a policy of recruiting for the King’s African Rifles from 
northern areas, whilst encouraging southerners, and particularly the Baganda, to fill civilian 
white collar jobs.  
5 Milton Obote was from Lango, Idi Amin was from West Nile, and Bazilio Olara-Okello and Tito 
Okello were both from Acholi 
6 A. Branch, "The Roots of LRA Violence," in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T. 
Allen and K. Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), 30, S. Finnström, Living with Bad 
Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 74.  
7 S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 69. 
8 G.C. Bond and J. Vincent, "The Moving Frontier of Aids in Uganda: Contexts, Texts, and 
Concepts," in Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories: Contemporary Africa in Focus, ed. 
G.C. Bond and N.C. Gibson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), cited in S. Finnström, Living 
with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 69.  
9 A. Branch, "The Roots of LRA Violence," in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T. 
Allen and K. Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), 34.  
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majority of cattle. According to one of Finnstrom’s informants ‘it appears the NRA 
soldiers were repeatedly told that the Acholi were the enemies, so when the NRA 
arrived in Acholiland, they first behaved well, but soon begun to destroy Acholiland 
systematically’.10 The army’s looting of cattle was broadly perceived in Acholi as a 
deliberate strategy to plunge Acholi into poverty.11  
The peace agreement signed between the UPDA and NRA in 1988 only signalled a 
further consolidation of war in the rural areas, and saw mass displacements in 
government efforts to evacuate civilians from the war zone. Between 1988 and 1994, in 
addition to intense fighting in northern Uganda, ‘the NRA forcibly cleared 
approximately 100,000 people from their homes in and around Gulu town’ whilst 
committing ‘hundreds of extra-judicial executions’ and ‘burning down homesteads and 
granaries’.12 Further restrictions were placed on people’s movement when in 1992, for 
example, a resolution was passed that ‘any person leaving his place of residence and 
going for a visit to another area must get a letter from RC1 [Resistance Councillor at the 
village level] of his area. On arrival there he must report to RC1 of that area. When 
leaving he must get a letter from RC1 showing that he is leaving the place’.13 
Although the NRM claimed to be introducing a participatory form of democracy through 
the establishment of Resistance Councils (RC) and committees from the village level to 
the National Resistance Council, in Acholiland the RC system embodied ‘a hierarchy of 
agents, serving an ethnically exclusive central state’.14 Forming out of what had become 
a crisis of leadership across Acholiland was Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement 
(HSM).15 Her primary objective was to purify the Acholi and later the whole of Uganda 
                                                          
10 Onyango-Odongo, (informant) quoted in S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008), 82.  
11 Ibid., 72. 
12 Amnesty International, "Breaking the Circle: Protecting Human Rights in the Northern War 
Zone," (London: Amnesty International, 1999), 75, quoted in C. Dolan, Social Torture: The Case of 
Northern Uganda, 1986-2006 (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 45.  
13 I. Ojara, "Resolutions Passed at a Joint Meeting of Councillors RCV, RCIV and Division 
Operation Commander 4th Division, 4 April," ed. G.D. Council (Gulu: Gulu District Archives, 
1992).  
14 A. Branch, "The Roots of LRA Violence," in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T. 
Allen and K. Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), 40.  
15 Lakwena is the name of the spirit thought to have possessed Alice, whose family name was 
Auma. For more on the HSM see T. Allen, "Understanding Alice: Uganda's Holy Spirit Movement 
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from the violence and corruption inflicted through the NRA/M. Within Acholi, one of the 
actions of the HSM was to reintegrate and rehabilitate the returning soldiers who had 
become ‘liminal and impure’, and to ‘redefine their place in society’.16 Elders and 
lineage-based authorities who also felt they had a vested interest in wanting to restore 
or maintain a particular moral order are thought to have collaborated with the Holy 
Spirit Movement, whilst also laying claim as the sole authorities and principle arbiters 
of traditional rituals and customs in an attempt to strengthen their positions, especially 
as the Holy Spirit Movement, and Alice Lakwena in particular, was challenging the 
patriarchal order.17  
Although the HSM was short lived, another group formed in the aftermath, the Holy 
Spirit Forces, that later took the name the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph 
Kony. However, although the two groups were perceived as similar in their spiritual 
motivations in comparison to the politically motivated UPDM/A rebel groups,18 there 
was a significant difference between the cleavages the HSM and LRA operated upon. 
Whereas the HSM sought to cleanse the Acholi and later those outside Acholi from the 
NRA, the LRA sought to cleanse those within Acholi who were not considered genuine 
Acholi because of perceived collaboration with the NRA/M.19  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in Context," Africa 63, no. 3 (1991), H. Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in 
Northern Uganda, 1986-1997 (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).  
16 H. Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda, 1986-1997 (Oxford: 
James Currey, 1999), 43.  
17 A. Branch, "The Roots of LRA Violence," in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T. 
Allen and K. Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), 32, 36-38. Finnstrom gives a slightly 
different picture, as he points out that over time the movement ‘came to conform to more 
conventional African gender hierarchies’ and ‘in addition to this...several of the female spirits 
possessing Alice Lakwena were increasingly marginalised when new male spirits entered the 
scene’ S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 77.  
18 S. Finnström, "An African Hell of Colonial Imagination? The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, 
Another Story," in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T. Allen and K. Vlassenroot 
(London: Zed Books, 2010), 77. Although Finnstrom observed that Acholi made this distinction, 
it did not mean that Acholi saw the LRA as only spiritual and non-political, as has been its 
popular portrayal in western and Ugandan media, and amongst academics such as Branch (A. 
Branch, "Gulu Town in War...And Peace? Displacement, Humanitarianism and Post-War Crisis," 
in Crisis States Research Centre Working Papers (London: LSE, 2008).) Finnstrom goes on to 
argue this point in the chapter cited above.   
19 A. Branch, "The Roots of LRA Violence," in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T. 
Allen and K. Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), 38-42.  
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Over the years the LRA constructed a reign of violence in Acholiland and adopted tactics 
to discipline society according to the LRA’s needs.20 Thus, rules and sanctions were 
imposed that restricted, for example, when people could move about, how they 
travelled and the days they worked. Drawing on a deplete source of volunteers in 
Acholi, the LRA resorted to forced abduction and in 1991 began to use tactics of 
mutilation and maiming, including padlocking people’s mouths and chopping off lips 
and ears to send the message to the wider Acholi population to beware of 
communicating with the Government.21 Havoc ensued throughout the 1990s, supported 
by the Sudan Government and with little protection from the Ugandan army.22 Indeed 
those assigned to protect civilians have been accused in frequent reports of misconduct 
including rape, fatal shootings, robberies and thuggery.23 The formation of local 
‘homeguards’ and local defense units, who collaborated closely with the NRA, also were 
insufficient efforts to safe-guard the population or to reduce levels of violence. Even 
minors were recruited, voluntarily or forcefully, into the homeguard units, becoming 
the first line of defence and easy targets of LRA attacks.  
Following a series of major atrocities committed by the LRA in the mid-1990s, the 
Government implemented a strategy of moving the population into ‘protected villages’, 
that later became known as Internally Displaced People camps. By 2000 approximately 
472,000 people were living in camps in Acholiland, in 2002 the figure was 522,000, and 
in Gulu district those that lived in camps represented 74% of the population of the 
district.24 According to Finnstrom, whose anthropological study offers invaluable 
insights into the violent changes to everyday practices in Acholiland and ways Acholi 
have conceptualised and coped with these changes, ‘forced encampment has 
undermined Acholi ways of organising life’ and threatens ‘traditional values, cultural 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Much has been written about the LRA, see for example the contributions in T. Allen and K. 
Vlassenroot, eds., The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (London: Zed Books,2010).  
22 For critique of LRA-Khartoum relations see M. Schomerus, The Lord’s Resistance Army in 
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23 S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
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knowledge, and social institutions of everyday life’.25 His informants complained that 
the practice of evening meetings around a lit fire, known as wang oo, where young 
people were told educative stories and tales, were no longer possible because of camp 
curfews and the fear that the light would attract rebels.26 Also being jeopardised was the 
balance between the living and dead as it was proving too costly to perform the 
appropriate rituals for moving the ancestral shrines (abila) that would usually be an 
integral part of the movement of groups in order to maintain ‘roots of belonging’ that 
are ‘conceived... in kin groups, in ancestors, and in a genealogical position’.27 Social 
relations formed through marriage were changing too as the inability to pay 
bridewealth due to loss of cattle and means to raise funds, meant women found it 
difficult to establish themselves as an unthreatening insider within the new social 
context of her husband’s kaka, because until bridewealth is paid, ‘many Acholi argued, 
the woman’s loyalties will remain uncertain’.28 In addition, ‘her partner will have neither 
the legal right to nor the formal responsibility for the children, adding to the uncertainty 
of her and the children’s situation’.29  
From Dolan’s perspective the Government’s strategy of ‘protected villages’ upheld by a 
number of actors such as international humanitarian organisations, has been central in 
a process of ‘social torture’ in Acholiland, where physical and psychological debilitation 
and, what Dolan terms, ‘cultural debilitation’ rendered people unable to break out of 
their situation and return home.30 ‘If asked to be specific’, Dolan recalled, ‘people could 
point to a long list of concrete indicators of breakdown’. For example,  
Parents were unwilling or unable to help young people to marry in the way 
they would have done in the past, yet young girls were at times being turned 
into camp followers by their own parents. Children were being abducted and 
forced to kill, girls were committing suicide because their teachers had made 
them pregnant. Teachers were drinking too early in the day, women were 
swallowing pesticides in protest at the untenable positions they were left in 
                                                          
25 S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 146.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 192.  
29 Ibid.  
30 C. Dolan, Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986-2006 (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2009), 160.  
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by their husbands’ over-drinking, and fear of HIV created a climate of inter-
personal distrust.31 
Dolan also observed, in line with Finnstrom’s insights, that ‘the language of moral, 
cultural and social breakdown’ enabled its users to internalise responsibility and 
thereby, 
allowed some sense of control, or at least the possibility of regaining control 
over a chaotic situation. Reversing moral collapse, re-instilling traditional 
values, re-integrating traumatised youth, picking fallen women off the floor, 
all are within the realms of the feasible – unlike other aspects of the war 
situation, such as the rebels, or the army, or the food distributions, which 
were externally controlled, and therefore, in a literal sense, out of control’.32 
However, although ‘an unacknowledged consensus emerged that there was a 
breakdown going on...perspectives differed on what exactly was getting broken. 
Teachers saw moral breakdown in the youth, youth saw it in women, parents saw it in 
teachers (and their own children), and religious leaders noted it in “men drinking 
alcohol”’.33 One particular event involving elders and lineage-based authorities was 
widely thought to have contributed and exacerbated the continuation of social 
breakdown in Acholi. Acholi traditional leaders are alleged to have given a blessing to 
Joseph Kony when he took up arms. During the 1993-1994 peace talks Komakech 
George, an LRA field commander, ‘claimed that Acholi elders had presented them with 
the oboke olwedo twigs as a blessing’.34 Kony himself and other prominent LRA 
commanders further claimed that the blessing was turned into a curse ‘after a 
prominent elder in Gulu town...ritually displayed his penis while condemning the 
rebels...saying “if these children who are in the bush originate from my penis, I curse 
them”’.35 Whether the incidents occurred or not rumours of the curse may have had the 
effect of increasing violence against elders, healers and ‘other arbitrators of Acholi 
cosmology’.36 Part of this backlash was the killing of two elders in 1996 by the LRA when 
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33 Ibid., 169. 
34 S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 212.  
35 Ibid., 213.  
36 Ibid.  
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they sought to negotiate peace with Kony.37 In the eyes of some Acholi, the escalation of 
violence in the mid 1990s could be explained by ‘some kind of fundamental imbalance’ 
that was ‘haunting the Acholi surroundings of the living and the dead’.38  
Museveni’s declaration to collaborate with the USA on a military tactic to end the 
conflict, following the failed peace talks initiated by an Acholi MP Betty Bigombe in 
1994,39 unsurprisingly fuelled concerns in Acholiland that increased militarisation 
would exacerbate violent activity, lead to the loss of more lives, the further abduction of 
children and a further breakdown of the moral order. Elders and Rwodi, alongside the 
religious leaders of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), became 
particularly vocal in advancing a non-military solution to the conflict and were involved 
in trying to revive peace talks. They were also at the forefront of suggesting the 
restoration of an Acholi traditional justice system. Their support for the blanket 
amnesty passed by the Government in late 199940 was closely linked to their expressed 
desire for a restoration of Acholi traditional approaches to justice, said to be based on 
principles of reconciliation, forgiveness and a non-punitive approach.  
 
                                                          
37 For more on this incident see R. Gersony, "The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a 
Field-Based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda," (Kampala: Commissioned by 
US Embassy and USAID Mission, 1997), S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008), 212-213. 
38 S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 216. 
39 In an act that undermined Bigombe’s efforts, Museveni issued an ultimatum to the LRA to turn 
themselves over to government forces within seven days. Instead violence resumed and 
brought to an end the prospect of peace that had looked likely. It is questioned whether this was 
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has certain political advantages: see T. Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and 
the Lord's Resistance Army (London: Zed Books, 2006), 48-49. Dolan has looked at the 
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masked by the unanimous support for the Bill, see M. Bradbury, An Overview of Initiatives for 
Peace in Acholi, Northern Uganda (Cambridge: Collaborative for Development Action, 1999), 16. 
Finnstrom’s young informants were also skeptical of the amnesty offered by Government, 
seeing it as part of a strategy to side-step the political issues at the national level S. Finnström, 
Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 119.  
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INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION OF A “CULTURAL BREAKDOWN” 
 
The perceived and real devastation across northern Uganda provoked the arrival of 
international organisations, although relatively few. Between 1996 and 2000 the 
number of relief agencies had increased from five to sixty,41 with the majority concerned 
with addressing the local or ‘internal’ aspects of the war.42 In line with the official 
government discourses on the conflict and therefore perceiving the situation in terms of 
an intra-Acholi affair, many international organisations contributed to re-producing a 
depoliticised discourse. Ethnic mythologizing of the Acholi and the fantastic emanations 
of the conflict produced through poor media coverage43 also encourage a resignation 
that the war in northern Uganda was too bizarre to comprehend, rendering it almost by 
default a humanitarian rather than a political crisis.44 According to Finnstrom, images of 
the LRA and northern Uganda have been constructed in accordance with colonial and 
western stereotypes of Africa and conflict more generally. With reference to film 
documentaries on the conflict, such as The Mission (1998) and Invisible Children (2003), 
he points to the reproduction of the ‘heart of darkness’ narrative and criticises De 
Tenerman’s Aboke Girls documentary novel for dehistoricising events in northern 
Uganda.45 The other problem Finnstrom notes is that the conflict is often reduced to a 
single individual, Joseph Kony, which has enabled solutions of the conflict to be reduced 
to the elimination of Kony.46 The Ugandan national media has also played a significant 
role in misrepresenting the conflict, preferring sensationalist headlines and emphasis 
on the bizarre and spectacular.47 One of the effects of depoliticising and internalising the 
conflict was that the causes of the conflict became ‘located in the ‘weakness’ of Acholi 
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social institutions, rather than in national or regional politics’.48 International 
organisations such as Responding to Conflict, Mennonites and the Nairobi Peace 
Initiative thus sought to train local development NGOs and religious leaders in 
‘community-based peace-building reconciliation strategies’.49 Bradbury noted how local 
organisations began to appropriate the language and approach of community based 
reconciliation, which further contributed to locating the causes and solution to the 
conflict internally.50  
Perceiving the conflict as an internal Acholi affair, discourses of a ‘cultural breakdown’ 
gained traction and were taken up by international actors. However, international 
discourses of cultural breakdown in Acholiland were distinct from local discourses of a 
societal and cultural breakdown in an important way. For many local Acholi, as 
discussed above, they sought to make sense of their surroundings and drew on local 
cosmologies, as well as their historically rooted understanding of local, national and 
international politics, to do so. Within local discourses making sense of the conflict, and 
trying to gain a degree of control within such uncertain circumstances, in terms of a 
breakdown of social order rarely meant depoliticising or dehistoricising the conflict and 
their everyday practices. In fact, politics understood as the ‘order of things’ was at the 
heart of Acholi conceptions of a cultural breakdown. Within local discourses there was 
evident concern for power relations, for example amongst the living and dead, and 
amongst local and national state political structures, and a desire for a solution to the 
violence in Acholiland that would address these relations of power. At an international 
level, on the other hand, discourses of an Acholi cultural breakdown tended to be 
produced through depoliticised and dehistoricised perceptions of the conflict and 
therefore had different effects, both intentionally and unintentionally. International 
discourses of cultural breakdown produced an unreflexive approach to the position of 
international actors and were effective in framing intervention in neutral, non-political 
terms. The tendency to regard causes and effects of conflicts in terms of a breakdown in 
social order, is not unique to Acholiland, but has been particularly prevalent within 
international development discourses since the 1990s. Duffield has pointed out that 
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where outcomes of violence are understood in Hobbesian terms, there is a certain 
utility...[whereby] the destruction of culture furnishes the opportunity for aid agencies 
to establish new and replacement forms of collective identity and social organisation’. 
Within this framework international intervention is also positioned as urgent.51 It also 
provides an opportunity and moral premise for the type of intervention predominantly 
pursued by international development institutions – that of embedding particular 
norms and values favourable to a liberal conception of development.  
As part of a broader critique of the politics of intervention in northern Uganda, Adam 
Branch has recently traced the shift from humanitarian rights intervention, premised 
upon ‘upholding human rights through international intervention without regard for 
state sovereignty’, to what he terms ‘total intervention’, which is an, 
expanded human rights discourse, in which intervention was no longer to 
fulfil only the basic humanitarian rights of people in crisis, but a wide array 
of human rights, from children’s rights, to the right to development, to 
victim’s rights, to the right to mental health, to the right to peace.52 
In addition, Branch notes that the causes and consequences of war and violence in 
Africa are understood in terms of ‘poverty, weak states, disease, rights violations, 
environmental pressures and so on’, and thus war is perceived as so widespread that it 
is ‘presumed to be ubiquitous.’53 The ubiquity of war, with its ‘symptoms...conceived of 
as internal deficits’, produces the ideal argument for remedial external intervention. 
Similarly to Duffield’s argument that intervention is ultimately about embedding liberal 
norms and values, Branch has highlighted that within international human rights 
discourses each solution claims to bring African individuals, societies, economies, 
cultures, or states back into line with models of properly functioning, normal, 
responsible models, all in the name of peace’.54 So, although a distinction between local 
and international discourses of cultural breakdown seems to be the absence of a 
concern for politics in the latter, in fact, politics is also at its heart. The refusal by 
international agencies of intervention to recognise their own politics does not detract 
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from the pursuit of producing a liberal political order, envisioned predominantly by 
international, western actors, or from its desired effects, which have implications for the 
practices, behaviours and most importantly for this study, what authorities are deemed 
legitimate and worthy of attention. In addition, and on the other hand, because 
intervention relies on local access, has a ‘desire for efficacy and legitimacy through 
participation’, is ‘emergency-centred’ and employs ‘a vague human rights discourse’ 
over an ‘expansive domain’ it is open to instrumentalisation by those within the target 
population who already exercise arbitrary power and are ‘looking to increase it 
further’.55 In Acholiland Branch is concerned that ‘intervention offers resources that can 
consolidate unaccountable power’.56  
 
TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the coronation of Buganda’s Kabaka, prior to official 
recognition of traditional authorities in the 1995 Constitution, ignited a wave of revivals 
of traditional authorities across the country and Acholiland was not an exception. 
Indeed, as an informant who has been closely involved in Ker Kwaro Acholi’s emergence 
remarked, there was an awareness of traditional authority revivals in West Africa, 
Kwazulu Natal in South Africa and in Somaliland.57  
In Acholiland, during June 1992, at a meeting that included the newly elected Acholi 
Resistance Councillors and some Gulu district elders, the secretary of the Gulu District 
Elders, Levi Arweny, relayed a message to the members of the meeting.58 After 
congratulating the newly elected councillors the message from the Gulu Elders 
expressed concerns about the lack of respect shown to elders in Acholi. They ‘urged on 
respect and cooperation with elders by councillors and not to take elders as “scraps”’, 
whilst also requesting that councils of elders be formed at all level of RC’s I to V, and for 
committees to be formed to explore economic development through ‘the exploitation of 
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our resources [and] urging the assistance of loaning and donor agenices’.59 The Council 
of Elders finally ‘emphasised on “Unity under one leadership with the team spirit geared 
at accepting mistakes and solving our common problem together”’. It is unclear whether 
this was a suggestion for the establishment of a paramount chief/lawirwodi position or 
a plea for unity under the NRM’s Resistance Council structure. In light of the broader 
message from the Gulu Elders it seems likely to be the latter. In response, the Gulu 
District Chairman (RCV) ‘vowed to work together’ with the elders, stating that ‘an 
honourbale elder...has “an ability in society derived from tradition, to inform, advice, 
warn and act as an arbitrator”’. Gulu elders certainly seemed to be trying to restore 
these roles, as early that year they had contacted the Deputy Minister for Public Affairs, 
Charles Alai, with the minutes of a meeting a group of ‘prominent Gulu elders’ had held. 
They received a positive reply from Alai, who was keen to support the idea of 
integrating elders and making them ‘part and parcel’ of the Resistance Councils. Alai 
also agreed with the Elders that the problems in Acholi were related to culo kwor and 
that mato oput was needed to restore peace. Alai advised that the District Resistance 
Council should pass a bye-law to enforce cleansing ceremonies on the basis that peace 
and unity are prerequisits for development. 60 Although no such bye-law was passed the 
Elders organised Reconstruction and Development Meetings at the District Council Hall 
in Gulu and invitied the District Administration to take the ‘opportunity to meet some of 
Acholi intellectual sons and daughters with reconstructional and developmental 
abilities working and living outside Acholi districts of Gulu and Kitgum’, framing the 
meetings as important for deciding the future of Acholi. Local government did engage 
with the Council of Elders and worked closely with them, for example, when forming the 
Local Defense Units mentioned earlier.  
The Payira Cultural Association was also seeking support from District authorities in the 
early 1990s, but its request for financial assistance to ‘promote the association’ was 
turned down with the excuse that the revenue base of the district was too low.61 
However, the Association was also suspected of being a political organisation, as was 
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hand scribbled across the archived letter, clearly not intended to be viewed by the 
Association. It is unclear to me who constituted the Payira Cultural Association, 
although it was evidently an organisation with the intent of bolstering the Payira in 
some way. Curiously, a group of ‘Rwodi moo Councillors’, also known as Kal Kwaro, 
emerged by 1997 with the Payira Rwot Godfrey Acana as the chairman, and too made 
requests to the District.62 They wanted a collection of taxes and ‘market dues’ as a way 
of raising funds to help Kal Kwaro with ‘the upkeep of their visitors’. The request was 
refused on the grounds that ‘because of the insurgency, the District is unable to collect 
any locally generated revenue’ and because ‘there was no provision for the upkeep of 
the Kal Kwaro in the 1996/97 budget. A ‘special grant’ was requested by the District 
from central government and was apparently approved, but no funds had been released. 
Finally in the letter, the District Chairman LCV,63 Stephen Lanek, assures the Gulu Rwodi 
moo of its assistance wherever possible.  
Evidently, Acholi traditional authorities, both elders and Rwodi, at least in Gulu District, 
were becoming increasingly recognised by local government, even if not always with a 
positive response, and were seeking to carve a space for themselves within the 
governance structure in Acholiland: a structure that as I have already mentioned, was 
weak and regarded with suspicion by the majority of Acholi. One space within which 
traditional authorities could claim exclusive authority and seek to exercise power was 
in the realm of ‘the traditional’, which was a space or field of practices that ‘modern’ 
government officials were implicitly exempt. Collaborating closely with religious 
leaders in promoting forgiveness towards the LRA and lobbying for the Ugandan 
Government to pass and take seriously the Amnesty Act, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Acholi traditional authorities were also therefore at the forefront of a call for what was 
framed as a restoration of an Acholi traditional justice system, which became part of an 
international agenda following the Kacoke Madit (“big meeting”) in 1997 and the 
publication of a report written by Dr Dennis Pain.  
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Created in 1996 as an international forum, Kacoke Madit was organised and financed 
primarily by the Acholi London diaspora and later received funding from the British 
Government and the London-based INGO Conciliation Resources. The series of meetings 
in ‘97, ‘98 and 2000 64 brought together religious leaders, Acholi traditional authorities, 
representatives from the Government of Uganda, Acholi members of Parliament and 
district leaders, to raise the profile of suffering in Acholiland, represent different views 
and agree on practical solutions for ending the conflict.65 The discussion during the first 
meeting in London revolved around the ‘erosion of Acholi values as a result of war, and 
a decision was made to promote Acholi unity and strengthen the Acholi cultural 
heritage’.66 Following the meeting International Alert commissioned Pain to produce a 
report that would give feedback to those ‘who have a role to play in resolving the 
conflict in northern Uganda’, based on consultations with ‘opinion leaders’ in 
Acholiland. 67 Pain’s report, The Bending of Spears, described a ‘unique’ Acholi approach 
to justice that he described stood ‘among the highest practices anywhere in the world’.68 
Although criticised for its methodological and conceptual flaws,69 Pain’s report was 
influential amongst the NGOs and donors whose remit was to address conflict 
resolution in northern Uganda.70  
Advocates of an Acholi traditional justice system, asserted that the Acholi have their 
own alternative approach to justice, which is based on principles of reconciliation, 
forgiveness and reintegration, and the ritual of mato oput was given particular emphasis 
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and ‘talked about as if it was something unique’.71 The Acholi principle of conflict 
resolution, Pain wrote,  
 
is to create reconciliation which brings the two sides together. Between 
individuals this involved elders, particularly the moral authority of the Rwot 
kaka, investigating the circumstances, leading to an acceptance of 
responsibility for carrying out a wrong action and an indication of 
repentance. Then terms were laid down by the elders such as 10 cows or a 
girl for compensation implying potential for a future marriage, possibly 
elsewhere, producing replacement in the case of death and restoring a nexus 
of relationships.  Then reconciliation occurred with the simultaneous 
drinking of a bitter root extract drink from a common calabash set on the 
ground - “mato oput”.   
 
Between groups the process required a delegation of elders to investigate the 
fault and identify the cause and for those concerned to accept their 
responsibility. The acceptance of responsibility is a group acceptance - not 
so-&-so, son of X, but we have done this. Then the compensation is 
determined, traditionally cattle or girls, and lastly reconciliation occurs with 
the “bending of two spears” and mato oput.  “There should be individual mato 
oput for children at the sub-county level and a final mato oput between 
groups - Acholi, Government and LRA - at a public event”. 
In spite of their marginalisation from political authority, the Rwodi-mo 
continue on occasion informally to carry out reconciliation with a 
compensation element to the victim in addition to court decisions.  This is to 
ensure restoration of relationships, which modern court proceedings neglect. 
Although rebels are seen to have rejected society, “if society now establishes 
the means of reconciliation, the rebels will accept that authority”. Such 
acceptance has been confirmed by a representative of the LRA.72 
 
Pain urged ‘an international donor or NGO...to support the traditional authorities in 
establishing the reconciliation procedures to be used in resolving the conflict’.73 
Traditional authorities and particularly Rwodi were also emphasised elsewhere in the 
report as a traditionally important authority in Acholi culture, whose eroded power has 
contributed to a sense of disorientation amongst the Acholi. The marginalisation of the 
Rwodi since the colonial period is presented as their ‘potential strength’ in that the 
Rwodi have ‘become independent of the political and administrative processes’, and are 
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left with a ‘residual and traditional importance in the settling of disputes and in 
reconciliation [that] is just what is needed’.74 The Payira clan are also given particular 
attention as holding ‘pre-eminence’ amongst the clans, with Rwot Payira seen as ‘de-
facto primus-inter-pares of the Rwodi-mo’.75 Other traditional authorities, such as the 
ludito kaka (male elders) and the lawi-mon (women elders), are also mentioned as 
important stakeholders to fostering peace in Acholiland, and it is recommended that 
together with Rwodi and church leaders they agree on a ‘common approach to a full 
mato oput reconciliation process’.76  
Empowering traditional authorities is seen in Pain’s report as part of a wider process to 
‘repair the positive traditional cultural elements which have been so destroyed by 
political events over the years’ and an opportunity for Britain, through its NGOs and 
donors, to apologise of the ills of colonial rule.77 Throughout the report NGOs and 
donors are referred to as neutral actors who could play a crucial role in monitoring 
processes such as the payment and use of compensation monies between reconciling 
parties.78 Although Pain recognises that assistance given by the government may 
compromise the position of the Rwodi, it is envisioned that assistance by development 
agencies would not. The relationship advocated by Pain between development agencies 
and the empowerment of traditional authorities is presented and reduced to an 
unproblematic endeavour of technical capacity building.  
Stirred by The Bending of Spears report the Belgian Government funded further 
research into the potential of traditional authorities in Acholiland to contribute to 
consolidating peace. The Agency for Cooperation and Research (ACORD) was tasked 
with the research project and in contrast to Pain’s findings painted a slightly more 
critical picture. Working together with local government and religious leaders ACORD 
travelled throughout the Acholi districts ‘holding consultations with local leaders to 
identify who the Rwot are, and to discuss what the role of elders could and should be’.79 
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One of the key findings was that traditional structures were ‘weak and fragmented’, to 
the extent of ‘widespread disagreement’ about who ‘the real traditional leaders’ actually 
were.80 The conclusion stated however that there was ‘little doubt that the traditional 
leaders’ had the ‘potential to play a large role in healing and reconciliation processes at 
the local level’, but for this potential to be realised some obstacles caused by the conflict 
would have to be addressed.81 For example, the traditional leaders were ‘no longer 
automatically respected’ and ‘some rituals’ had become ‘unclear through disuse’.82  
Importantly, the opinion that the positive roles traditional authorities could potentially 
play in Acholiland led to support for a ceremony in 2000 to officially re-install a number 
of Rwodi and create the post of an Acholi Paramount Chief. The chairman of the Rwodi 
moo Councillors, Godfrey Acana, was elected from amongst a handful of Rwodi who 
were around at this time, although there had been contestation over the post.83 Falling 
sick shortly before the ceremony in 1999 Godfrey Acana called his son David Onen 
Acana back to Gulu from Rwanda where he was working. He died soon afterwards with 
instructions that his son was to succeed him as Rwot Payira.84 It was also decided 
amongst the Rwodi that the young man Rwot David Acana would fill the post of 
Paramount Chief and that the post would rotate amongst the Rwodi every five years. 
Over the following years, between 2002 and 2005, this loose cohort of Rwodi, headed by 
Paramount Chief Acana II, became known as Ker Kwaro Acholi through a series of 
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events and strategic practices, and by re-producing and appropriating dominant 
discourses.  
 
INCREASING VISIBILITY AND RE-IMAGINING TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
The ‘unprecedented, uncoordinated and fragmented rush’ of international agencies 
followed a particularly violent phase of the conflict in Acholiland caused by the Uganda 
People’s Defence Force offensive, Operation Iron Fist, and the fierce response by the 
LRA. The increase in attacks and abductions prompted the displacement of more than 
90 per cent of the population of northern Uganda’, which pushed the number of 
displaced living in 218 official and dozens of ungazetted camps, to 1.6 million by 2005.85 
The increase of international attention and agencies, however, is commonly cited as 
following the visit and declaration by the United Nation’s Under Secretary General for 
Humanitarian Affairs in 2003, who shone a spotlight on northern Uganda by calling it 
“the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today.”86 
Most agencies were concerned with humanitarian relief in the camps and the 
rehabilitation of LRA returnees who were mostly children, but there was also an 
‘injection of funding and external support for the implementation of the traditional 
justice agenda, premised on the assumption that local rituals performed under the 
auspices of chiefs and elders would... lead to social reconciliation’.87 Randy Harris, a 
former World Bank delegate to Uganda and senior consultant on northern Uganda to 
USAID recalled in an interview that he had nominated Paramount Chief David Acana for 
sponsorship to undertake the International Visitors Programme of the US Government 
in New York aimed at empowering young leaders in Africa.88 Paramount Chief Acana’s 
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experience in the US was cut short, however, with the bombing of the twin towers in 
2001. Another opportunity shortly followed to study abroad again, this time in 
Birmingham, UK.  Rosalba Oywa, a Program Coordinator at ACORD, said that she had 
suggested to Respond to Conflict, the organisation that had funded her conflict 
resolution training in the UK, to offer the same chance to Paramount Chief Acana.89  
After Paramount Chief Acana II returned from the UK he began to act on a vision he had 
of Ker Kwaro Acholi as a “strong and mighty government”.90 He drew on the expertise of 
Kenneth Oketta, an Acholi development consultant he had come to know when his 
father was sick in 1999. As Oketta described it, he came on board informally at first “to 
pick up” the cultural institution as it had “gone into limbo” and shared the view with 
Acana that Ker Kwaro Acholi needed to become more known, “not only locally but also 
nationally and internationally.”91 Oketta’s role was made more formal through the 
creation of a Prime Minster post within Ker Kwaro Acholi and to which he was 
appointed in 2006.92 Already Paramount Chief Acana was working closely with Rwot 
Francis Oryang Lagony of Koch because as Acana described him, “he was elderly, more 
knowledgeable…[and] more experienced”. Indeed although Paramount Chief Acana did 
not mention it, Rwot Lagony was also a civil servant working for the Public Services 
Commission and had lived in Tanzania. Paramount Chief Acana, Rwot Lagony and 
Oketta, would have been all too aware of the lucrative potential traditional cultural 
institutions had in attracting donor funding, as the Buganda Kingdom was 
demonstrating in central Uganda, where both Rwot Lagony and Oketta lived. The influx 
of NGOs and donors into Acholiland looking for local partners with which to anchor 
their projects created an opportune moment for these central actors to pursue 
initiatives that would present Ker Kwaro as the traditional cultural institution of Acholi.  
It is important to remember at this point that although particular positions of 
leadership and authority can be traced into the recent and distant past, such as the 
position of a Rwot within today’s Acholiland, these positions have never been, and are 
still not, fixed. All authority is in a constant process of being reinscribed and reimagined 
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through discourses of the present, which draw on memories of the past and 
expectations and aspirations of the future; where ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ are utilised 
more as powerful metaphors than as a description of an inherent reality. With this in 
mind I now turn to discuss moments and strategies Ker Kwaro Acholi utilised to present 
itself in a particular way that would strengthen its image and consolidate a politics of 
truth about Ker Kwaro as the traditional cultural institution of Acholi.  
 
CLEANSING AND RECONCILIATION CEREMONIES 
 
Between 2003 and 2005 Ker Kwaro Acholi was reported to have conducted thirty one 
cleansing ceremonies,93 mostly facilitated by the International Organisation for 
Migration, Caritas and Catholic Relief Services, with the Liu Institute funding two and 
the UNDP funding one.94 At least seven ceremonies are reported to have featured the 
‘appearance of Rwodi moo from different clans, led by the Paramount Chief of Acholi’, 
the attendance of Elders, Local councillors (1-5), community members, local NGOs and 
UPDF; and speeches by Rwodi, the deputy paramount chief and lastly the paramount 
chief.95 The same report recognised that one effect of the ceremonies was for 
participants and onlookers to see the Rwodi and Paramount Chief ‘stand together as an 
example to local communities’, which strengthened ‘the leadership of cultural leaders’.96 
Sixteen of the thirty one ceremonies Ker Kwaro Acholi are reported to have facilitated, 
involved large groups ranging from twenty six to eight hundred, reaching over two 
thousand people in total.97 Although from a population of over 1.8 million this only 
represents a small minority of Acholi. Alternative views, particularly amongst some of 
the elders, saw the adaptations being made to cleansing and reconciliation rituals, for 
example with large groups, as deviating from Acholi tradition, and where it was being 
conducted in towns there was concern that the rituals would concentrate cen (spirits of 
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the deceased) in that place.98 Rwodi were also accused of ‘interfering’ in rituals seen as 
the preserve of elders and even of ‘fighting against the real rituals’.99 However, although 
there was confusion and controversy over how the ceremonies were being conducted 
and where, a confusion caused by the Paramount Chief and the Rwodi themselves,100 the 
events remained opportunities for Rwodi to negotiate their positions of authority and, 
particularly when the Paramount Chief was involved, for Ker Kwaro Acholi to present 
itself and make itself known both locally and to the journalists, NGOs and donors who 
witnessed the ceremonies.  
 
CORONATION AND INAUGURATION 
 
Although increasing the visibility of Rwodi and the Paramount Chief was a side effect of 
the cleansing ceremonies, the decision to organise a public coronation ceremony for 
Paramount Chief Acana and a public inauguration ceremony for the Rwodi was a 
strategic decision to draw attention to Ker Kwaro Acholi and cast it in a particular light. 
An organising committee was established in 2003 and set to work raising funds for the 
occasion. The budget calculated at over sixty five million Uganda shillings, 
approximately twenty eight thousand dollars, indicates the event was intended to be a 
grand spectacle. One thousand guests were expected to attend with great consideration 
paid to the ‘ceremonial venue’ and surrounding area, so that its decoration ‘would 
match the status of the occasion’.101 A large portion of the budget was allocated to 
repairing and renovating the old colonial offices where Ker Kwaro Acholi now had an 
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operational office. Although nothing like the calculated budget was raised, the 
optimistic budget illustrates Ker Kwaro Acholi’s desire to make an impressive impact.  
Drawing inspiration from monarchies across Uganda and beyond money was allocated 
to purchase ceremonial items not only to set the Paramount Chief apart and as the 
leader of the Rwodi, but also to elevate him and set him amongst the Kings of Uganda. 
Royal robes, a royal carpet and a crown were thus purchased, with coronation shades 
and uniforms for guards intended to further create a sense of pomp and circumstance. 
Apparently a leopard skin was also bought for just under $140, as an important symbol 
of rwotship.102 In order for the images of the coronation ceremony to be widely 
dispersed Ker Kwaro Acholi used radio, television, print media, t-shirts, posters and 
banners to convey a message that just like other kingdoms across Uganda and Africa, 
the Acholi also had a comparable traditional institution. The event took place in January 
2005 with the attendance of the President of Uganda, other government officials, NGOs 
and members of the general public. The following year anniversary celebrations were 
held with Kings from across Uganda invited, fleets of cultural dancers sent to the towns 
of Kitgum and Pader in Acholiland and ten bulls allocated for the feast. The overall cost 
amounted to over seventeen million Ugandan Shillings, donated by individuals and 
institutions such as the EU-Acholi Programme who gave three million, four hundred and 
fifty thousand shillings, The World Bank’s Northern Uganda Social Action Fund who 
gave over two million shillings, World Vision who gave eight hundred and forty 
thousand shillings, and Care International who gave seven hundred and fifty thousand 
shillings. President Museveni also showed his support for the event by donating one 
million shillings. 103 These donations from international institutions and President 
Museveni, although relative to their funds are miniscule, are tokens of recognition and 
illustrate the importance the donors also attached to the symbolic public display of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi as the Acholi traditional cultural authority.  
The national newspaper reported on the ceremony, noting the ‘silk blue robe decorated 
by golden embroidery and a matching headdress’ the enthroned Paramount Chief wore, 
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the ‘thousands of cheering people [who] braved the scorching sun to witness the 
coronation ceremony,’ and the dancers who entertained the cheering crowds, who 




In 2005 Ker Kwaro Acholi produced a booklet entitled Ker Kwaro Acholi, Strategic Plan 
2005-2007. To ensure the content reached its target audience the Strategic Plan was 
launched at an event in September where NGOS and donors were invited to attend. The 
purpose of the Strategic Plan seemed to be an attempt by Paramount Chief Acana, with 
his close associates Kenneth Oketta and Rwot Francis Lagony of Koch, to give Ker Kwaro 
Acholi (including the ‘non-traditional’ members who were soon to be appointed into 
Ker Kwaro, as I will discuss in the following two chapters) a focused vision and set of 
goals for the future. However, not all the Rwodi had a copy of the Strategic Plan and 
many Rwodi could not read the document as it was produced in English. It also became 
clear to me in interviews with Paramount Chief Acana and Kenneth Oketta that in fact 
the main purpose of the Plan was to publically present an image of Ker Kwaro Acholi to 
an audience of state officials and donors as an organised group of traditional leaders, 
who together form a body that has traditional roots in Acholi, and who have developed 
a programme of activities for the coming years and for which they require financial 
support. Kenneth Oketta was brought on board, Paramount Chief Acana told me, as ‘a 
consultant’ and ‘a subject who is loyal and had the expertise to help free of charge’, and 
Rwot Francis Lagony played a role in scrutinising the document.105 With reference to the 
Strategic Plan, Oketta proclaimed in our interview that, ‘you cannot only be known 
locally, you must also project yourself globally and nationally’,106 and this was one of the 
purposes of the plan. 
 
                                                          
104 A. Wasike, C. Ochowun, and J. Moro, "Acana, Acholi's Hereditary Leader," New Vision, 16 
January 2005. 
105 Email Correspondence with D.O. Acana, 1 February 2012.  
106 Interview with K. Oketta, Gulu, 19 June 2010. 
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Calling the booklet a Strategic Plan suggested at the outset the focus of the booklet lay in 
the latter half where the proposed activities of Ker Kwaro Acholi were set out. This has 
the effect of casting the first half of the Plan where the historical background of Acholi 
and of Ker Kwaro is given in a matter of fact tone, where the reader is introduced to the 
basic ‘facts’ about Acholiland and Ker Kwaro. In a later chapter I will return to the latter 
half of the Plan, but here I want to examine the section that presents a particular 
historical narrative of Ker Kwaro, in order not to reveal a hidden ‘truth’, but to elucidate 
the image Ker Kwaro presented of itself, intentionally or unintentionally, to its target 
audience.  
The two most salient messages in the booklet are that Ker Kwaro Acholi is a traditional 
institution and secondly that the institution is the custodian of Acholi cultural traditions. 
Ker Kwaro Acholi is described as an institution that dates back ‘to about 1400 AD’ and 
comprises of the ‘fifty traditional leaders of Acholi’. Although somewhat ambiguous, the 
‘traditional leaders’ referred to seem to be the Rwodi and the impression given in the 
booklet is that as ‘kings’ of chiefdoms over the past six hundred years they have also 
existed in an alliance, as a fairly homogenous and organised body of chiefs known as Ker 
Kwaro Acholi. Each of the Rwodi, who are listed next to their ‘clan/chiefdom (kaka)’, 
were all simply described as having ‘been enthroned by their various clans’ with no 
further details given about the process that led to their reinstallations or the disputes 
and tensions stirred in many cases by identifying and reinstalling Rwodi. Rather, a 
general and simplistic picture is given of fifty ‘traditional leaders’ organically emerging 
and being enthroned as a result of local desires in their clans, which suggests they hold 
local legitimacy. In describing the Rwodi, emphasis is given to their ‘traditional role’ in 
‘reconciliation and conflict management’, with elders described as being ‘directly under 
the Rwot’ to offer advice on matters ‘concerning social justice [and] harmony between 
different clans’.107  
British colonial administration and a vague reference to ‘political changes’ that have 
‘taken place all this time’ are identified as the factors that have weakened the Rwodi and 
thereby Ker Kwaro Acholi. In particular, colonial administration was identified as 
abolishing what is portrayed as a stable pre-colonial Acholi society of fifty ‘well-
                                                          
107 Ker Kwaro Acholi, Strategic Plan: 2005-2007 (Gulu2005), 5. 
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established, semi-autonomous chiefdoms’ through the appointment of non-hereditary 
chiefs. The reconstitution of Ker Kwaro Acholi, dated to 2000, is therefore framed as the 
revival and ‘reinstallation’ of a particular stratum, namely the Rwodi, of the traditional 
authority structure, that is said to date back to 1400 AD and although weakened by 
colonial rule and unidentified ‘political changes’, has remained resilient and relevant as 
an authority in conflict resolution and reconciliation. As the Paramount Chief wrote in 
the Foreword, ‘the Rwodi ha[ve] limited capacity but as an institution they are 
themselves a resource’.108  
The position of the Paramount Chief is dehistoricised in the narrative, with no mention 
of it being a newly created post or how and why this position was created. Instead the 
booklet simply states that ‘the Paramount Chief of the Acholi Chiefdom come[s] from 
the Payira clan’ and that ‘each of the clans in Acholi has cultural obligations to the 
Paramount Chief’.109 These statements have two important effects. Firstly, Acholi is re-
imagined as a ‘chiefdom’, rather than a district, which ‘traditionalises’ the boundaries 
that currently form the state created Acholi sub-region and provides the Paramount 
Chief with a domain within which he can begin to inscribe his authority. Employing the 
term ‘chiefdom’ plays on the common misunderstanding that the Acholi existed as a 
coherent group of people who self-identified as Acholi prior to the colonial period, and 
thus the idea of an Acholi chiefdom serves to bolster the image that Ker Kwaro Acholi 
also existed in the distant past. 
Interestingly the chiefdom of Ker Kwaro Acholi as depicted within the Strategic Plan 
takes no account of the substantial Acholi population who live across the northern 
Uganda border in South Sudan. It is unclear therefore from the Strategic Plan how Ker 
Kwaro Acholi seek to relate to cross-broader Acholi populations, and the lack of 
recognition of Acholi outside Uganda further suggests that the Strategic Plan is a 
document for the consumption by actors who work primarily within state boundaries, 
such as the Government and western donors. Secondly, the statements about the 
Paramount Chief imply that the post always hails from Payira, which the historical 
reflections in chapter two of the thesis have shown to be problematic.  
                                                          
108 Paramount Chief, Foreword, in Ibid., 1.  
109 Ibid., 6-7.  
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Although an ‘Acholi Traditional Leaders Council’ is mentioned in the Plan, as constituted 
by the fifty traditional leaders working together ‘with their elders, women and youth 
leaders’, and said to function as ‘the highest governing council of the institution’, this is 
presented as an innovation since the reinstallation of the traditional leaders in 2000. 
The brief mention of the Acholi Traditional Leaders Council, with no further information 
given about who exactly constitute it (more specifically than ‘women’ and ‘youth’) or 
how it functions, contributes to producing the idea that Ker Kwaro Acholi is not only 
rooted firmly in the past through the ‘traditional leaders’ but is also relevant for the 
present through its recognition of women and young people on the governing council of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi.  
In addition to emphasis given to the traditional roles of the Rwodi in reconciliation and 
conflict management, the second predominant image projected of Ker Kwaro Acholi is 
as ‘the custodian of Acholi cultural practices and traditions’.110 The booklet summarises 
what Acholi culture comprises of and what cultural practices used to do ‘in the past, 
before the insurgency’.111 Acholi culture is presented as something that was bounded 
and stable in the past and inherently good, ‘promoting economic development, good 
health, unity, education and the general standard of living’, but ‘since the war’ has been 
in a steady decline.112 The decline in ‘cultural development’ is then said to have been the 
cause of and resulted in the ‘decline in health standards, production levels, education 
and unity, and rise in spread of diseases, deaths, conflicts, frustrations etc’.113 The 
discourse of a cultural breakdown in Acholiland is re-produced alongside descriptions 
of Ker Kwaro Acholi as the ‘custodian of Acholi cultural practices and traditions’, which 
has the effect of presenting Ker Kwaro Acholi as part of the solution to what it describes 
as the ‘steady decline in the cultural development of the people of Acholi...during the 
past 15 years’. I will pick up on this point again in chapter five, but for now I want to 
draw attention to the way discourses of a cultural breakdown in Acholiland, that turn on 
essentialist conceptions of a pre-colonial Acholi cultural identity disrupted by colonial 
and post-colonial society and infected by western ideas and practice, provided space 
                                                          
110 Ibid., 3.  
111 Ibid., 2.  
112 Ibid., 3. 
113  Ibid.  
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and an ideological framework where Ker Kwaro Acholi could position itself as the 
traditional authority that enabled and facilitated this golden past.  
In Pain’s report eight years earlier, The Bending of Spears, a similar picture of Rwodi was 
presented, as traditional and neutral mediators of conflict, custodians of a ‘true’ Acholi 
culture and in need of empowerment so they can resume their traditional roles and be 
restored as unproblematic positions of authority in Acholiland. Thus Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
self-presentation in the Strategic Plan, for those who may have read or browsed Pain’s 
report, would have supported an image of traditional authorities in Acholiland they had 
already encountered. Erin Baines, the author of Roco Wat i Acholi (“the restoration of 
relationships”)114 that was published in the same year as the Strategic Plan in 2005, built 
on Pain’s report as she examined and offered ‘analysis of what traditional justice in 
northern Uganda is, how it is currently practiced and what value it could add’, which 
was part of a broader objective to ‘document traditional rituals with the aim of seeing 
how they could be further adapted to suit the context of an enduring conflict.115 The 
report drew extensively on the views and opinions of elders and Rwodi, who the author 
and researchers had been in a working relationship with since 2002. 
In Roco Wat, Baines works within a similar ideological framework and ‘ethnojustice’ 
discourse116 as Pain and Ker Kwaro Acholi. Although Baines described Ker Kwaro as a 
‘contemporary institution’, she also saw Ker Kwaro as the body of Acholi traditional 
leaders. The further empowerment of Ker Kwaro was thus advocated in the report 
                                                          
114 E. Baines, Roco Wat I Acholi, Restoring Relationships in Acholi-Land: Traditional Approaches to 
Justice and Reintegration (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2005).  
115 E. Baines, Executive Summary, Roco Wat I Acholi, Restoring Relationships in Acholi-Land: 
Traditional Approaches to Justice and Reintegration (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 
2005).  
116 Branch draws on a critique of ethnophilosophy by Hountondji and analyses what he terms 
‘ethnojustice’; ‘an agenda that focuses on promoting social order through so-called traditional 
justice’. Branch also describes ethnojustice as a discourse ‘that combines elements from 
ethnography and from the study of law and morality to describe what it claims are traditional 
systems of justice of non-Western cultures. In describing a traditional system of justice, 
ethnojustice purports to describe a single, coherent, positive system that is presented as being 
universally, consensually, and spontaneously adhered to by all members of that culture and 
that, even if in abeyance today, remains valid and should be revived’. A. Branch, Displacing 




because traditional authorities were seen as central for successfully reviving the 
traditional justice mechanisms viewed as crucial for restoring relationships in 
Acholiland. 
In a section on Rwodi the report bolsters the view that Payira have a more natural and 
legitimate claim to hold the Paramount Chief position. Although it is recognised by an 
anonymous informant in the report that the Paramount Chief post is a re-invented 
institution in Acholi, the report identifies the Payira Rwodi, Ocama and his son Awich, as 
‘informal leaders of Acholi’ during colonialism. In the post-independence period, the 
report goes on to say, ‘Rwot Adonga of the Payira clan’ was ‘installed by Rwodi as “the 
perfect leader” (laloyo maber)’, but ‘displaced’ by Amin’s dictatorship. The narrative 
casts Payira Rwodi in continual positions of leadership over Acholi, at least since the 
1960s, as elected by the other Rwodi, and only disrupted by the brutality of Amin’s rule 
in the 1970s. This interpretation of history is inaccurate on a number of counts, such as 
Rwot Adonga being of Pajule and not Payira, but as it was written with reference 
predominantly to interview material and with no explicit reference to historical 
accounts, what is being reflected is how the traditional leaders and informants wished 
to remember and recall the past. Although for particular purposes there is significant 
value in such an endeavour, the report does not present the information in these terms 
and with consideration that memories are often reinterpreted to suit needs and desires 
of the present.  
Although the report seeks to identify the weaknesses and challenges Ker Kwaro Acholi 
are contending with, such as its ad hoc coordination of activities, centralisation in Gulu, 
being too political in its activities and working too closely with Government, and 
concerns over its male dominated representation, the report remains committed to 
empowering what it takes as a modified traditional authority in Acholi, even if its 
expectations and hopes are that Ker Kwaro Acholi will adapt to the changing gender and 
age roles in Acholi society, because it sees Ker Kwaro Acholi’s ability to adapt as being 
where the legitimacy of the institution ultimately lies.117  
 
                                                          
117 E. Baines, Roco Wat I Acholi, Restoring Relationships in Acholi-Land: Traditional Approaches to 
Justice and Reintegration (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2005), 32-33.  
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The EU-Acholi programme recognised Paramount Chief Acana as the legitimate 
authority in Acholi in 2003 by funding the building of a four bed-roomed brick house for 
Paramount Chief Acana next to the building where Ker Kwaro Acholi was locating its 
offices. Although the house has come to be referred to as the Palace of the Paramount 
Chief it does not look particularly palatial but it does stand out in stark contrast to the 
mud huts that surround its relatively spacious grounds. The President of Uganda also 
marked his recognition and approval of the new Paramount Chief position created in 
Acholi and the provision of a grand house, by laying and engraving the foundation stone 




Changes to the 1995 Ugandan constitution opened up new possibilities for claimants to 
traditional authority across Uganda to carve a space for themselves in the socio-political 
landscape. In anticipation of this constitutional change the Buganda Kingdom coronated 
the Kabaka in 1993, in a flamboyant ceremony that was sponsored by multinational 
corporations. In northern Uganda, those who sought recognition and empowerment 
with recourse to a traditional authority status did so in the midst of continual violence, 
mass displacement and emerging discourses that understood the situation in terms of 
an inter-Acholi affair. Without dismissing the enormous difficulties anyone living in 
northern Uganda at this time faced, the conflict also created opportunities. Tendencies 
to view the conflict in northern Uganda as an internal Acholi issue where a real and 
perceived breakdown of moral and social norms was viewed as both an effect of conflict 
and sometimes thought to have prolong violence, led to support for reviving traditional 
leaders who were being reimagined almost solely in terms of traditional reconciliation 
and as neutral mediators of conflict and brokers of peace. Evidently not any expression 
of traditional cultural authority would find support from government and international 
                                                          
118 Approximately twenty three and a half Uganda shillings, over nine thousand US dollars, was 
provided to the Gulu District Local Authorities for the building of the house. Reference two 
documents: G. Obura, "Letter from Godfrey Obura, District Engineer, Gulu to the Chief 
Administrative Officer, Gulu, Re: Construction of Rwot Acana Ii's House, 23 December," (Gulu: 
Gulu District Archive, 2003).  
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actors, as the groups that were precursors to Ker Kwaro Acholi, the Payira Cultural 
Association and Rwodi moo Councillors, found.  
In this chapter I have sought to analyse what I call the first phase of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
emergence by highlighting dominant discourses that created fields of possibilities and a 
fertile environment for a revival of traditional authorities in Acholiland. I have also 
sought to elucidate ways Ker Kwaro sought to become known as the traditional cultural 
institution in Acholi arguing that Paramount Chief Acana, Kenneth Oketta and Rwot 
Francis Lagony re-produced dominant discourses in a process to render Ker Kwaro 
Acholi recognisable as a traditional authority in national and international spheres.  
Having been recognised by significant actors, such as the President of Uganda and 
donors,  as the legitimate traditional cultural authority of Acholi, Ker Kwaro goes on, as I 
will analyse in the following two chapters, to re-imagine the traditional authority 
further, as a cultural institution and government body, and as an agent of development. 
Once again these images of Ker Kwaro Acholi, which become realised to a degree, are 
produced in the context of dominant discourses that shape the strategic practices of the 






BECOMING A GOVERNMENT-CULTURAL INSTITUTION 
 
In 2004 Kenneth Oketta was appointed Prime Minister of Ker Kwaro Acholi, which was 
part of a broader initiative to create, what Ker Kwaro called, a ‘government structure’ 
for Ker Kwaro Acholi. In addition to establishing a Prime Ministers post, a host of 
Ministers have also been appointed over the years, including an Attorney General. This 
second phase of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival, where a government structure was 
gradually created, was framed by Ker Kwaro as an initiative to strengthen the 
institution through improving the efficiency of the Paramount Chief and Rwodi. At the 
same time significant changes were also being proposed by the Government of Uganda, 
which would alter power relations between local and central government, and between 
government and traditional authorities.  
As I discussed in the previous chapter, since Paramount Chief Acana’s return to 
northern Uganda in 2002, after his trips abroad, Ker Kwaro Acholi began to establish 
itself in the public eye as a legitimate traditional cultural authority of Acholi. I discussed 
how through drawing on vestiges of the recent and distant past to re-cast Acholi history 
and traditional authorities in a particular light Ker Kwaro Acholi projected images of 
itself that appealed to various audiences. Upheld by, and contributing to, dominant 
discourses in northern Uganda, that emphasise the cultural devastation of the region 
over the past two decades and the need to revive cultural practices of reconciliation, Ker 
Kwaro Acholi experienced little resistance to its ‘revival’ and found willing facilitators 
within the international community. In this chapter, I illustrate how Ker Kwaro re-
imagines itself as a stronger institution through the creation of a government structure, 
examining this process in the light of changes in Uganda’s political landscape and 
government discourses on traditional cultural institutions.  
I have divided the chapter into three sections, starting with an examination of a concept 
paper written by Ker Kwaro Acholi in 2006 for district authorities, which presents a 
proposal to set up a ‘government structure’. The document illustrates Ker Kwaro Acholi 
being further imagined as both a traditional authority and government structure, and a 
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desire for this vision of Ker Kwaro to be recognised by local government officials. I then 
turn to discuss the national scene, summarising NRM attempts to capture power at the 
local level and discussing Government discourses on traditional cultural institutions 
that have emerged out of power relations between local and central government and, 
more significantly, out of power relations between the NRM and the Buganda kingdom. 
In the third section I will return to how Ker Kwaro sought to frame its relationship with 
government as one of partnership, whilst seemingly subverting government discourses 




Paramount Chief Acana told me how impressed the Rwodi had been of Kenneth Oketta 
in 2005 as Oketta successfully led the production of the first Strategic Plan and liaised 
with World Bank officials of the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund on behalf of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi.1 Out of the other elders such as Amboise Ola, who had also been assisting 
Ker Kwaro, Oketta was described by Paramount Chief Acana as ‘having more points 
than the other ones’, and so when it came to creating the position of a Prime Minister of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi in 2006 as part of developing Ker Kwaro as ‘an institution of its own 
with full capacity’, Oketta was voted in. In June the same year, Ker Kwaro Acholi invited 
various government officials, including the Chief Administrative Officers across 
northern Uganda in Gulu, Kitgum and Amuru, to attend a ‘workshop for the formation of 
the Ker Kwaro Acholi government structure’.2 The workshop was due to take place on 
the 26th June at Ker Kwaro Acholi, Gulu premises, and would involve reviewing the 
governing structure of Ker Kwaro, detailing duties and responsibilities of the various 
offices in the structure and, once coming to an agreement on the proposal, determining 
the way forward for its implementation.3 The letter of invitation was accompanied by a 
‘concept paper’ written by Ker Kwaro Acholi which set out and described it’s proposed 
                                                          
1 Interview with D.O. Acana, Birmingham, 20 June 2011. I will return to Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
engagement with the World Bank’s Northern Uganda Social Action Fund in the following 
chapter.  
2 D.O. Acana, "Letter of Invitation from Lawi Rwodi Acholi, David Onen Acana Ii, to Mr Patrick 
Langoya, Chief Administrative Officer, Gulu, 21 June," (Gulu: Gulu District Archives, 2006).  
3 Ker Kwaro Acholi, "Proposed Government Structure Concept Paper," (Gulu: Gulu District 
Archives, 2006).  
98 
 
‘government structure’ for Ker Kwaro Acholi. The authors of the paper, Paramount Chief 
Acana working in close consultation with Prime Minister Oketta and Rwot Francis 
Lagony of Koch, sent out particular messages by proposing such a structure, to an 
audience that included local government officials and in particular one of the most 
powerful positions in local government, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO); the 
appointment of which, in 2005, had been recentralised.  
The fifteen paged concept paper began by introducing Ker Kwaro Acholi, in much the 
same way as the Strategic Plan had done. There was a paragraph on the ‘history of the 
Acholi people’, information on how Acholi is organised politically, economically and 
socially, details of the lineage of Rwot Payira and a summary of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
background. The concept paper then went on to summaries the background to the 
proposed structure of Ker Kwaro Acholi government, gave bullet points identifying 
problems of ‘the current structure’, provided two diagrams of the proposed government 
structure and finally detailed the ‘functions, duties and responsibilities’ of not only the 
Paramount Chief and Council of Rwodi, but also of the newly proposed positions. There 
seems to have been a clear intent that what was being proposed would be open for 
discussion with the fifty participants invited to the workshop, given the three days 
allocated for the event and the provision of a concept paper to be reviewed before the 
workshop. However, the concept paper did not provide a clear picture of what was 
being proposed but rather is full of inconsistency and incongruence. Below are the two 
diagrams of the proposed structure which illustrate, for example, different relations 
between the Prime Minister, Executive Committee and Council of Rwodi.4 
 
 
                                                          
4











In the first diagram the Prime Minister seems to hold a position below that of the 
Executive Committee and Council of Rwodi and functions in a separate branch of Ker 
Kwaro under the Paramount Chief and directly over the Ministers. Whereas, in the 
second diagram the Prime Minister is above and seems to have a leadership or 
managerial role over the speaker, Executive Council, Ministers and the structure of 
traditional authorities. Details of the Prime Ministers duties and responsibilities given 
later in the paper do not provide much more clarity, as it states he will act ‘as a 
secretary to the executive committee and the Council of Rwodi’, which does not seem to 
reflect either diagram. Despite the lack of clarity in the document, images of a future Ker 
 
Diagram B of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s proposed government structure 
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Kwaro Acholi as an institution with competencies and capacities in a plethora of areas, 
that take Ker Kwaro beyond only acting within the realm of traditional reconciliation, 
were projected.  
Framed as a response and solution to a list of observations made on the ‘current 
structure’ of Ker Kwaro, which were that Ker Kwaro 
does not clearly allocate responsibility, [is] too general, cannot support the 
work load and responsibilities the institution is handling, does not clearly 
define power and authority, the structure is not yet gazetted, [and] in some 
cases it is not in conformity with cultural practices both in Acholi and 
elsewhere, 
Ker Kwaro then stated, 
We need to have a small, vibrant but standard structure of government, with 
competent people and clear mandate in order to lead and serve our people 
effectively. We need the Legislative arm and the Cabinet to run the Ker 
Kwaro Acholi Government. We need to reduce the workload on HH and the 
Rwodi as far as the administration of the Chiefdom is concern[ed]. We need 
to understand that serving in this structure is voluntary and out of respect 
and dignity one accords to his cultural institution, but not for financial gains 
or prompts.  
To achieve this vision of a government structure it was proposed that a host of 
Ministers be appointed, with expertise in a wide range of areas, such as; ‘Culture, 
Antiquities and Social Development; Education and Technology; Gender, Youth and 
Special Interest; Rehabilitation and Economic Development; Health and Community 
Welfare’. The Minister’s duties, the paper details, are to revolve around liaising, 
promoting, mobilising and advocating, through engagements with a range of actors such 
as central government, local government, NGOs, Faith Based Organisations and 
development partners. The Minister for Culture, Antiquities and Social Development is 
the only Minister assigned the duty of making policies, whilst the Minister for Gender, 
Youth and Special Interest Groups, is assigned the role of liaising with government and 
development partners in the creation of policies and programmes. Each Ministerial role 
is expected to liaise with central government, local governments and development 
partners in the promotion, formulation and implementation of programmes and 




An Executive Committee, or Executive Council of Lawirwodi/Parliament as it is also 
called in the second diagram, is described as the ‘cabinet’ of Ker Kwaro and expected to 
have an outward looking role overseeing ‘external relations and diplomatic affairs’. This 
organ of newly appointed non-traditional members of Ker Kwaro are also to manage the 
operations of Ker Kwaro Acholi, and is envisioned to formulate and implement policies 
and programmes, along with the Ministers and Council of Rwodi who are also expected 
to make bye-laws that conform to Acholi culture and traditions. The other additional 
post that constitutes Ker Kwaro Acholi’s government structure is the post of Attorney 
General. This is the only other post, in addition to the Council of Rwodi, assigned to 
formulate by-laws. However, the Attorney General is also expected to propose and 
formulate ordinances to be approved by the Council of Rwodi and to represent Ker 
Kwaro on legal issue and in Court, and is to draft agreements, memorandum and 
contracts on behalf of Ker Kwaro.  
The newly created post of Prime Minister was clearly established for the main purposes 
of being the predominant interface of Ker Kwaro Acholi as the position was assigned the 
role of ‘liaising with central and local government on all administrative, financial and 
political matters concerning and affecting’ Ker Kwaro Acholi. Also the Prime Minister’s 
post came with far-reaching responsibilities within Ker Kwaro Acholi, tasked with 
managing, controlling, supervising, overseeing and coordinating to greater and lesser 
degrees each aspect of Ker Kwaro Acholi. In contrast to the Prime Minister’s role, the 
Paramount Chief’s roles and responsibilities emphasise his ‘cultural’ leadership position 
over the people of Acholi and the Rwodi, and his role as mediator of ‘cultural disputes’ 
and presider ‘over all cultural ceremonies in accordance to the Acholi traditions’. 
In summary, the images of Ker Kwaro projected in the concept paper illustrates a 
further imagining of the traditional institution by the leadership of Ker Kwaro Acholi, 
and shows that as far as they were concerned a strong cultural institution needed a 
body of non-traditional members who were authorities and experts in various fields 
from economics and law to cultural activities and education. Similarly to the Buganda 
Kingdom the leadership of Ker Kwaro intended to incorporate its body of experts using 
the form of a Parliament with a Prime Minister, cabinet of Ministers and an Attorney 
General, and similarly to Buganda it seems Ker Kwaro Acholi was also being re-
imagined as a quasi-state-like structure.  
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Amidst the details of the proposal, Ker Kwaro Acholi made reference to the national 
context shaping the changes. The invitation letter stated, ‘keeping in mind that the 
regional tier system of government will begin in July 2006, I invite you for a workshop 
for the formation of the Ker Kwaro Acholi government structure and assigning duties 
and responsibilities for different departments’, and it was noted in the concept paper 
that ‘this is a local affair taking place within a national framework...so what we shall 
come out with will reflect on us both nationally and internationally’. In addition, the 
message in the concept paper was that the Rwodi and other stakeholders of Ker Kwaro 
were to be educated on a number of government related issues, such as, Roles and 
Mandate of Cultural Institution in Uganda; Structure of Governance; The Systems and 
Functions of Governments; The Functional Relationship between National Government 
and the Cultural Institution Government; and The Regional Tier System of Government. 
It was further written in the paper that understanding these issues was crucial if the 
Rwodi and other stakeholders were to contribute effectively to the cultural institutions. 
The relationship between Ker Kwaro Acholi and government was clearly an important 
matter to the leadership of Ker Kwaro and authors of the paper, who seemed to want to 
also convey this publically. 
Turning to examine the national context in the following section, I will show it is 
perhaps unsurprising Ker Kwaro Acholi sought to project an image of itself to local 
government as an institution with institutional, and more specifically, governmental 
strength, given the characteristics of the NRM’s decentralisation policies, proposals to 
implement a regional tier system of government and the souring relationship between 
the NRM and Buganda Kingdom. Although over the years Ker Kwaro Acholi has 
substantiated its government structure, which I will touch upon in chapter six, in this 
chapter I remain concerned predominantly with the years 2005/2006 and the initial 






NATIONAL POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL 
AUTHORITIES 
 
DECENTRALISING AND CAPTURING LOCAL POWER  
 
Since the NRM came into power in 1986 it has invested significantly in the local 
government structure. Local democratic control was instituted through the creation of 
Resistance Councils and there was an increase of popularly elected posts. Compared to 
previous post-colonial rulers, the NRM was transforming Uganda’s local government 
system. The Resistance Councils were organised into a five tiered structure, and since 
1995 the names of these councils have been Local Councils, representing the village 
(LCI), parish (LCII), sub-county (LCIII), county (LCIV) and the district (LCV). Financial 
decentralisation and the devolution of decision-making functions on matters of local 
significance, has increased powers of the Local Governments, not least in the area of 
land. The 1998 Land Act decentralised control over land from the Uganda Land 
Commission, based in Kampala, to District Land Boards and Parish Land Committees.  
Despite the Government’s stated intentions for decentralisation to give equal power at 
the various levels of the LC government system, it has been overwhelmingly 
concentrated at the district level.5 The LCV for example receives financial support from 
central Government, unlike LCI-LCIV who until 2005 had to raise revenue through the 
Graduated Personal Tax, which proved unpopular and therefore low yielding as a 
source of financial support. In addition donors often bypass Government and fund 
directly through the district, which creates further fiscal concentration at the district 
level.6 To capture power and maintain control over local politics the NRM established 
NRM Committees that were established at each level of local government and as each 
committee elected the members of the lower level, they constituted NRM party 
members. Although these committees still operate when there is an election, on a day-
to-day basis central Government maintains a hold on power at the district level through 
                                                          
5 E. Green, "Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda," Security and Development 8, no. 4 (2008): 
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the two posts created to represent central Government; the Chief Administrative Officer 
(CAO) and the Resident District Commissioner (RDC).7 In 2005 the CAO position was 
recentralised and the appointment of the post taken over by the Public Service 
Commission from the District Service Commission. The Ministry of Local Government 
has also been known to take over the functions of appointing and firing the CAO.8 The 
role of the Resident District Commissioner is responsible to and appointed by the 
President, whilst also being in charge of overseeing planning on the District 
Development Committee and government programmes more generally. Museveni has 
tended to appoint NRM candidates who have been unsuccessful in elections to the RDC 
position and thus has built up a cadre of political allies at the district level across 
Uganda.9 As Green notes, quoting a Ugandan Parliamentarian, decentralisation in 
Uganda seems to have boiled down to powerful district leaders being appointed and 
assigned by central government, rather than elected locally.  
The prolific creation of districts has also been a key feature of Museveni’s 
decentralisation approach, premised on the argument that more districts will take 
services closer to the people. The NRM has been criticised for using district creation as a 
distraction from its power hold on the district and, because a new district creates a 
number of jobs and have thus proved popular, Museveni has been criticised for using 
district creation to ‘buy votes’.10 In 2005, the creation of twenty one districts, the largest 
number created at one time, was announced, months before elections in 2006 and one 
week before Parliament voted to over-turn the presidential term limit, allowing 
Museveni to run for office for a third time.11 Between 1986 and 2008, the number of 
districts rose from thirty three to eighty, and an incredible one hundred and eleven by 
2010. Acholi sub-region had three in 2006, but today in 2012, stands at seven.  
 
                                                          
7 Ibid.: 436-438. 
8 Ibid.: 437.  
9 It is commonly thought in Acholiland that Rtd. Col. Walter Bosco Ochora was appointed RDC of 
Gulu after he failed to be re-elected as LCV of Gulu in 2005.  
10 E. Green, "Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda," Studies of Comparative 
International Development 45, no. 1 (2010).  




The concentration and control of power at the district level is a reflection of Museveni’s 
efforts, that began in the mid-1990s, to ‘control and manage all steps towards political 
liberalisation...[and] began  to actively limit political space and centralise power’.12 Tripp 
has argued that despite some of the genuine democratic features in Uganda, they are 
tangled up with a façade of democratisation, which has left Ugandan politics constituted 
by contradictory realities that include ‘seeds of democratisation’ and ‘reminders of its 
grim authoritarian past’.13 One of the most significant contradictions, certainly for a 
study of Ugandan traditional authorities, has been Museveni’s rhetoric to minimise the 
salience of ethnicity whilst at the same time harnessing ethnic politics to exercise 
power.14 For example, in the previous chapter, I mentioned how Museveni garnered 
support for his bush war, fought in Luwero, in regional and ethnic terms and how 
Museveni has continued to frame conflict and insecurity in northern Uganda as an inter-
Acholi issue and problem rooted in Acholi ethnicity. NRM political appointments have 
also become more regional and ethnically determined with Baganda and western 
Ugandan’s, including Ankole (Museveni’s group) holding the majority of government 
posts since 1986, whilst those in the east and north have been marginalised.  
As Goodfellow and Lindeman have observed, whilst data suggests Baganda enjoyed 
prominent representation at the central state level following 1986, after the turn of the 
century Baganda overrepresentation fell from 101% in 2000 to 38.2% in 2008, and 
many of the influential Baganda ministers who were close to Mengo had been 
sidelined.15 In 2007, Baganda occupied none of the top seven strategic state positions, 
and a Banyankole-Bahima dominance (Museveni’s group) in the army became firmly 
entrenched, which excluded Baganda access to ‘what is arguably still the real locus of 
power in Museveni’s Uganda’.16 In fear of opposition politics, reformists in the 
                                                          
12 A.M. Tripp, "The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa: The Case of Uganda," Africa 
Today 50, no. 3 (2004): 8.  
13 Ibid.: 24.  
14 S. Lindemann, "Just Another Change of Guard? Broad-Based Politics and Civil War in 
Museveni's Uganda," African Affairs 110, no. 4 (2011). 
15 S. Lindemann and T. Goodfellow, "From Strongest Ally to Fiercest Rival? The Fallout between 
the Museveni Government and the Buganda Kingdom," in ASAUK Biennial Conference 
(Oxford2010), S. Lindemann, "Just Another Change of Guard? Broad-Based Politics and Civil War 
in Museveni's Uganda," African Affairs 110, no. 4 (2011): 396. 
16 S. Lindemann and T. Goodfellow, "From Strongest Ally to Fiercest Rival? The Fallout between 
the Museveni Government and the Buganda Kingdom," in ASAUK Biennial Conference 
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Movement, particularly multi-party activists have experienced suppression, as have 
Baganda who supported the restoration of a Baganda political monarchy through a 
federal system of government.17  
Kingdoms in Uganda pose the other significant loci through which power can potentially 
be exercised. As I discussed in chapter two, the Buganda Kingdom wasted no time 
following the coronation of the Kabaka in 1993 in establishing a prime minister, 
parliament and government with ministers. However, although some of the assets the 
Baganda call ebyeffe were restored to the Kingdom, the demands of Buganda 
monarchists for federal status have been continually refused by the NRM who do not 
wish the Kingdom to exercise any political powers. In efforts to manage the challenges 
posed by the Buganda Kingdom; to attract voters, whilst maintaining control; the NRM 
have made specific constitutional provisions that have been intended as a compromise 
but which staunch Buganda monarchists have rejected. The NRM has also invented a 
specific rhetoric of traditional authorities as ‘cultural institutions’, and an opportunity is 
rarely missed where Museveni reminds traditional authorities of their roles as 
custodians of culture and as such ‘important tools’ for local and national development. I 
will now turn to discuss Government discourses on traditional cultural institutions.  
 
GOVERNMENT DISCOURSES ON ‘TRADITIONAL/CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS’ 
 
In early 2003, ‘more than 100,000 Baganda held a peaceful demonstration demanding 
the restoration of federal rule (federo) for Buganda and the return of Kampala to the 
kingdom.’18 The introduction of multi-partyism in 2005, further strengthened calls 
amongst royalist Baganda for a federal system of government. Although Museveni’s 
government has kept in staunch opposition to this demand, in 2005 an alternative was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Oxford2010), 8-9. See also A.M. Mwenda and R. Tangri, "Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms and 
Regime Consolidation in Uganda," African Affairs 104, no. 416 (2005): 460.   
17 J. Oloka-Onyango, "'New Breed' Leadership Conflict and Reconstruction in the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa: A Socio-Political Biography of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni," (Unpublished: 
CODESRIA, Undated). cited in A.M. Tripp, "The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa: The 
Case of Uganda," Africa Today 50, no. 3 (2004): 8. See also J. Oloka-Onyango, "The Question of 
Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics," Journal of Contemporary African Studies 15, no. 2 
(1997).  
18 A.M. Tripp, "The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa: The Case of Uganda," Africa 
Today 50, no. 3 (2004): 16.  
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proposed; to establish, what Ker Kwaro Acholi were acutely aware of in their proposal 
to establish a government structure, a regional tier of government. To understand what 
was being proposed in a regional tier structure and how it would alter relations 
between the state and traditional authorities we need to trace the relationship between 
the Buganda Kingdom and the NRM over the matter of federalism and look at Article 
178 of the 1995 Constitution; an Article that is directly referenced in Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
2005 Strategic Plan as part of its claims over state recognition and legitimacy.  
As I touched upon in chapter two, federalism has been a demand of traditionalist 
members of the Buganda Kingdom since the NRM came into power in 1986, as the close 
relationship at the time between the NRM and Buganda, and the restoration of 
traditional authorities in 1993, seemed to open a new window of opportunity. The 
government’s pursuits of decentralisation had, for many Baganda elites, proved 
unsatisfactory and the creation of districts, unlike elsewhere in Uganda, was viewed 
with deep suspicion that it was part of a ‘divide and rule strategy’ that would ensure 
Buganda does not act as a single unit.19 Although not all Baganda have supported 
federalism, its popularity in Buganda has increased considerably beyond Mengo.20 
As a concessionary alternative to federalism and in response to Mengo’s dissatisfaction 
with the Government’s creation of districts on non-ethnic criteria, Article 178 of the 
1995 Constitution gave the provision for culturally similar districts to cooperate in the 
areas of culture and development and for that purpose to set up councils, trust funds or 
secretariats. In effect, Article 178 was allowing for Baganda to create a ‘Buganda 
Council’ that could coordinate over policy in Buganda’s districts and be ‘granted certain 
legislative powers’, although not to levy taxes. The districts of Buganda were, in 
addition, assumed to have ‘agreed to cooperate’ on the coming into force of the 
constitution. ‘What the constitution offered the kingdom by and large, was the 
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assumption that the districts located on Buganda territory had come together to 
recognise the authority of Mengo to represent them in certain matters.’21  
Buganda monarchists rejected this provision on two points. Firstly, they saw that Article 
178 positioned the Kingdom as a derivative of the district, rather than recognising that 
Buganda historically predates districts and, in their eyes, politically transcends them.22 
The empowerment of the state structure over the Kingdom was also seen as displacing 
the centre of agency and creating a dependency that Mengo found unacceptable.23 There 
was also concern that a Buganda Council would not be able to levy taxes and that the 
arrangement would only grant positions of power to those directly elected, which ruled 
out a substantial proportion of the Mengo elite who favoured a political King and 
appointed Prime Minister (Katikiro).24 Although the Mengo ultra-royalist core wanted 
nothing less than to integrate Buganda as a sovereign entity, Englebert has noted a class 
and generational gap on the issue and identified Ganda educated elite and civil servants 
who are interested in maintaining a situation that enables them to straddle positions in 
both systems, whilst younger Mengo officials have been interested in pursuing 
opportunities as political entrepreneurs above a loyalty to ‘the purity of Buganda’s 
rebirth’.25 
In the run up to the 2006 presidential elections Museveni was under increasing 
pressure to engage in negotiations on the issue of federalism, if he was to retain votes in 
Buganda. In the hope of stemming the federalist tide, whilst retaining Buganda’s favour, 
and in response to the rejection of Article 178, Museveni introduced the idea of a 
‘regional tier’ of government that would sit below central government and above the 
                                                          
21 P. Englebert, "Born Again Buganda and the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa," Journal 
of Modern African Studies 40, no. 3 (2002): 363.  
22 Ibid, S.S. Kayunga, "The Federo (Federalism) Debate in Uganda," in Working Paper (Kampala: 
Centre for Basic Research, 2000), 57. 
23 P. Englebert, "Born Again Buganda and the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa," Journal 
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24 S. Lindemann and T. Goodfellow, "From Strongest Ally to Fiercest Rival? The Fallout between 
the Museveni Government and the Buganda Kingdom," in ASAUK Biennial Conference 
(Oxford2010), 12.  
25 P. Englebert, "Born Again Buganda and the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa," Journal 
of Modern African Studies 40, no. 3 (2002): 363. 
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district.26 Tabled as an amendment of Article 178, the regional tier, as stated in Uganda’s 
2006 Constitution, provides for, not only that districts can cooperate and form councils, 
trust funds and secretariats, but that a regional tier of government may form through 
district cooperation and have ‘political, legislative, executive, administrative and 
cultural functions in the region.’27 The regional assembly, constituted by elected 
members, with representation of women, youth and disabled people, would also be able 
to establish ‘standing and other committees or organs for the efficient discharge of its 
functions’.  
The constitution assumes or anticipates that ‘representatives of cultural interests’ in a 
region ‘shall constitute the standing committee on cultural matters’, and ‘as against the 
rest of the members of the regional assembly’ will be given ‘exclusive jurisdiction on the 
cultural matters of the region.’ The constitution defines ‘cultural matters’ as,  
a) the choice and installation of a traditional leader or cultural leader 
b) all traditional and cultural matters relating to the traditional or cultural 
leader and to the institutions of the traditional leader or cultural leader 
as well as royal members of the traditional leadership 
c) the choice, appointment and succession to clan and subclan leadership 
d) clan, traditional and customary matters 
e) matters relating to cultural rites, cultural succession and customary heirs 
f) cultural or traditional lands, sites, shrines and installations 
g) clan lands, sites, shrines and installations 
h) traditional, customary and cultural practices which are consistent with 
the Constitution 
Stating that representatives of cultural interests will form the committee on cultural 
matters seems to remove the need for the members of the regional assembly to be in 
favour of forming a committee on cultural matters, as it has been given constitutional 
provision. In effect, therefore, the constitution allows sympathisers of traditional 
authorities to form a committee that would have the exclusive power to choose and 
                                                          
26 S. Lindemann and T. Goodfellow, "From Strongest Ally to Fiercest Rival? The Fallout between 
the Museveni Government and the Buganda Kingdom," in ASAUK Biennial Conference 
(Oxford2010).  
27 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 2006, Article 2 and Fifth Schedule. 
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install a traditional leader of a region, as well as exercise power over the appointment 
and succession of traditional leaders in the rest of the traditional structure. Compared 
to Article 178 that only granted powers to those elected, the amendment in 2006 seems 
to be an accommodation for Mengo elite to maintain power over electing the Kabaka 
and appointing the Katikiro.  
With regards to what the constitution was offering, the traditional or cultural leaders 
who exist in the region, and thus the Kabaka, they shall  
a) be the titular head of the regional government.  
b) be the titular head of the regional assembly and shall open, address and 
close the sessions of the regional assembly. 
c) enjoy the benefits, privileges and roles as provided for in Article 246 of 
Constitution and by Parliament and the regional assembly 
However, in addition it was made clear that the standing committee on cultural matters 
must ‘consult the traditional or cultural leader of the region as well as the relevant clan 
leaders’, and that a ‘decision of the standing committee on cultural matters shall not be 
effective until the decision has been approved by the traditional or cultural leader of the 
region and, in the case of succession...by the clan or cultural leader’s council’. These 
provisions, which Museveni’s Government couched as concessions for the Buganda 
Kingdom, were understood more widely as attempts to incorporate the later whilst 
restricting and limiting its power.  
The rhetoric of traditional authorities as distinctly ‘cultural institutions’ has formed the 
Government’s strategy to contain the Buganda Kingdom and keep it from being a 
political threat. At any opportunity, and particularly the coronation ceremonies he 
attends, Museveni reiterates that cultural institutions must focus on ‘cultural matters’ 
such as the ‘preservation of culture’ and languages, and ‘fill the gaps that are not 
addressed by structure of modern democracy’.28 An address Museveni gave to Uganda’s 
Kings and Cultural Leaders Forum in 2009, and on the occasion of the forum’s 
establishment, is illustrative of the public relationship between traditional cultural 
institutions across Uganda, excluding the Buganda Kingdom, and Museveni’s 
                                                          




Government.29 The Forum was established at the same time as a new draft bill on 
traditional leaders was being approved by Museveni’s Government.30  
As published on Uganda’s State House website newsletter, Museveni began by 
‘challenging traditional leaders to contribute to the recovery of the African people’s 
dignity by promoting and protecting African languages and cultures instead of creating 
disunity’ and in reference to the ‘embarrassment’ he felt at hearing Africans speaking in 
English charged the traditional leaders present to ‘save our people from behaving like 
African Europeans...[and] to help our people to properly describe their languages...[and 
to] go back to our roots and rediscover ourselves’.31 It was not long before Museveni 
‘cautioned traditional leaders against creating disunity among the people and against 
partisan politics, adding that there are already too many politicians and there is an 
oversupply’ and added that, 
When I supported the restoration of cultural institutions, I emphasized the 
additional role of promoting unity – okwongera omugaso – not create new 
problems or resurrect old ones. This is what I told Kabaka Ronald Mutebi in 
London, to unit[e] the people like they were before, not disunite them.  
Whilst addressing a number of issues, such as high power tariffs, and making appeals 
for the traditional leaders to support policies he was pursuing, such as not granting bail 
to hard core criminals, Museveni also announced that he was ‘considering increasing 
support given to traditional leaders’ and on the issue of regional tier suggested that 
royalties to Kings and to local governments would be ‘worked on’. ‘Cultural institutions’ 
were also ensured they would ‘get some funding for agricultural modernization to 
promote food security’. The message was clear; there are benefits to be had from 
supporting the government, staying out of politics and remaining within your cultural 
roles. The forum of traditional authorities pledged they were committed to non-partisan 
development programmes and had met ‘to see how they can communicate to their 
                                                          
29 The Uganda Kings and Cultural Leaders Forum was established in 2009 as a limited company 
and is chaired by the King of Bunyoro-Kitara, Rukirabasaija Gafabusa Iguru I. Its members are 
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30 M. Henry, K. Pascal, and B. Gladys, "Cabinet Approves New Bill on Kings," New Vision, 18 
November 2009.  
31 "President Challenges Traditional Leaders on African People's Dignity," State House, 18 
November 2009.  
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subjects messages that cause development and bring the people together to build 
Uganda’. The traditional leader of Adhola ended the meeting by ‘commending the 
President and government for restoring traditional and cultural institutions and 
providing them with decent transport to carry out their work’ and in an open display 
expressed that the forum of traditional leaders now felt ‘firm to support government 
policies and programmes in harmony and to help correct the wrong impressions caused 
by negative forces’.  
The establishment of the Uganda Kings and Traditional Leaders Forum and the meeting 
attended by Museveni in November 2009 occurred at the same time relations between 
the Government and Buganda Kingdom hit a particular low. In September that year the 
President had blocked the Kabaka visiting a district that the Kabaka claimed came 
under the Buganda Kingdom, which resulted in rioting protests in Kampala and the 
Government responding to this by closing down the Buganda Kingdom’s radio station, 
Central Broadcasting Station.32 A month after these riots the Energy Minister, Hilary 
Onek, was in Gulu addressing the Gulu University inter-cultural gala, and criticised 
‘some politicians for using cultural institutions for selfish gains’, which according to the 
Minister had contributed to the Buganda riots, and took the opportunity to reinforce the 
Government’s view that ‘culture must not be mixed with politics’.33 He then ‘warned 
cultural leaders against seeking elective political positions, describing the situation as a 
conflict of interest’, before reminding the audience that ‘the Constitution prohibits 
cultural leaders from getting involved in politics’ and finally that ‘as cultural leaders, if 
you get involved in elective politics, the public will undress you and you will lose face. 
Your role is to settle disputes between estranged political leaders and to preserve our 
cultural values for the future generations’.  
In what seemed as a political manoeuvre to emphasise the sort of activities that 
Museveni approved cultural institutions concerning themselves with, he launched the 
                                                          
32 F. Muzale, "Ssabanyala to Fight and Defeat Mengo's 'Black Colonialists'," Daily Monitor, 10 
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Bamasaba cultural circumcision ceremony in Mbale District in 2010.34 Falling almost at 
the anniversary of the Buganda riots in 2009, Museveni once again took the opportunity 
to give ‘a stern warning to cultural leaders not to engage in active politics, saying that 
this might cause violence in the country’, and adding “My advice to you is to play the 
roles and responsibilities within your boundaries.” Museveni had donated UGX 10 
million towards the function, ended his speech by, in a similar gesture to that made at 
the cultural leader’s forum, pledging to provide a vehicle to the Bamasba cultural leader 
and backed a proposal to carve out a new district in the area.  
 
APPROPRIATION AND COOPERATION 
 
With such strong government rhetoric on traditional authorities as cultural institutions, 
and the clashes between Government and the Buganda Kingdom over ‘cultural’ matters, 
Ker Kwaro was aware of the importance of being seen and known in overtly cultural 
terms and of avoiding involvement in politics. In each of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s Strategic 
Plans there is a strong narrative to consolidate the institution as a traditional authority, 
while appropriating government discourse on ‘cultraul institutions’ as bastions of 
cultural heritage. Both Plans state that Ker Kwaro Acholi ‘was reconstituted in 2000...as 
a legal Cultural Institution’ and in the 2005 Plan the ‘goals’ of Ker Kwaro were ‘to 
achieve sustainable cultural integration of the Acholi people as a mean[s] of achieving 
lasting peace, and enhancing their welfare and productivity.’ The ‘vision’ and ‘mission’ 
in the 2005 Plan were along similar lines to those in 2009; they read, ‘A prosperous and 
culturally enlightened people with one identity’ and ‘to promote, develop and preserve 
the culture of Acholi’.  
Ker Kwaro also emphasised the ‘cultural’ nature of the institution before delivering the 
proposal for a government structure. The concept paper read, 
As we go to discuss on the new structure and form a government to run Ker 
Kwaro Acholi, we need to note that: We are a cultural entity with perpetual 
succession,...protected by the constitution and supported by government. 
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It then went on to stress the cultural role of the Paramount Chief, described as he was as 
the ‘Cultural Leader of Acholi’ whose role was to ‘provide cultural leadership...to the 
people of Acholi’, ‘issue guidelines to the Rwodi on cultural matters’, ‘settle cultural 
disputes’, chair ‘cultural meetings’ of Ker Kwaro and ‘preside over all cultural 
ceremonies in accordance to the Acholi traditions’.35  
As well as overtly framing Ker Kwaro Acholi in cultural terms, Ker Kwaro also embeds 
the institution within government discourses on cultural institutions through reference 
to Article 178 and expressing its intentions to work in partnership with the 
government. Article 178 is referred to in Strategic Plan 2005 at the outset as part of 
where Ker Kwaro ‘draws its mandate...to promote, preserve and document the culture 
of Acholi as a way of promoting holistic development of the Acholi people’.36  
Ker Kwaro also communicates in its second Strategic Plan in 2009 that it has aligned its 
‘strategic intervention...to contribute to national and local government development 
strategies such as PRDP’ (The National Peace, Recovery and Development Programme) 
and ‘will work together with its people [and] the government’.37 PRDP was launched in 
2007 by the Government of Uganda, ‘to stabilise and recover the north’, recognizing that 
‘Northern Uganda has not improved at the same pace as the rest of the country’.38 The 
Commissioner of PRDP received an acknowledgment at the beginning of the Strategic 
Plan from Oketta for the ‘financial and technical assistance’ given in the production of 
the Plan; a request Oketta had asked of the Commissioner based on their personal 
relationship.39 Ker Kwaro also claimed to have played a key role in ‘mobilising the 
community on development programmes such as PRDP and ‘other government 
programmes’, as well as explicitly stating that the PRDP, along with the District’s 
Development Plans, were taken into consideration during the writing of the Strategic 
Plan. Part of the support the Commissioner provided to Ker Kwaro was the sponsorship 
of a workshop to develop the plan and to ‘sensitise’ on PRDP so ‘that they could also 
come up with what should be in the plan’. Perhaps as a result of this workshop the 2009 
                                                          
35 Ker Kwaro Acholi, "Proposed Government Structure Concept Paper," (Gulu:Gulu District 
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116 
 
Strategic Plan speaks directly to the government’s PRDP agenda in northern Uganda, 
through both reflecting its main concerns as well as adopting key phrases and at times 
mirroring its format.  
The four main stated concerns of the PRDP were to strengthen local state governance, 
assist the reintegration and development of communities, reactivate productive sectors 
in the region, and ensure a continued prevalence of peace. Ker Kwaro’s strategic 
objectives similarly include activities to contribute to each of these objectives in PRDP, 
even proposing to provide ‘farm inputs, micro credits and technical support’ to 
communities and ‘establish farm input centres’, which seem a far cry from cultural 
activities such as preserving language and rituals. Although these are arguably useful 
and needed initiatives in Acholiland, to be provided by Ker Kwaro illustrates how the 
institution is imagining its functions in increasingly broad terms. With regards to PRDP, 
which puts significant emphasis on improving the economic productivity of northern 
Uganda, particularly through agricultural means, the Plan speaks directly to one of the 
Government’s main stated concerns by identifying these possible programmes.  
Also central to the PRDP, is a concern with consolidating state authority in northern 
Uganda. The Government proposes to strengthen the ‘demand side’ of local governance 
and enable ‘civil society and informal governance structures... [to] demand more 
accountability, responsibility and transparency of local authority.’40 Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
fourth strategic objective, to ‘promote inclusive governance’, proposes to contribute 
directly to strengthening the ‘demand side of governance’, by acting as a facilitator of 
‘activities that raise awareness on the rights of people and the responsibilities of 
government’, as well as ‘supporting community monitoring mechanisms’ of government 
and community development initiatives’. Ker Kwaro Acholi imagines itself as a 
‘platform’ that will ‘increase opportunities for vulnerable people to strengthen their 
membership in civil society organisations that include and involve them in decision 
making’, and will ‘facilitate continual linkages and learning between communities, CBOs 
and various local government institutions’.41 
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However, whilst Ker Kwaro has responded to government discourses on cultural 
institutions by shrouding the institution in cultural rhetoric, supporting Article 178 and 
aligning itself with the PRDP, Ker Kwaro has also responded to government discourses 
by pursuing a strategy to increase Ker Kwaro Acholi’s technical capacity and expertise, 
and has presented this structure using distinctly governmental and political terms. The 
questions this provokes is whether Ker Kwaro has intentions, beyond mere 
administrative efficiency of the institution, to assume a governance position and shares 
Buganda’s aspirations for a federalist state. There is little in Ker Kwaro’s self-
presentations that point in the direction of Ker Kwaro as a political governing body in 
Acholi, which renders the seeming contradiction within Ker Kwaro Acholi’s public 
image, as both a non-political cultural institution, but with a government capability, 
puzzling.  
Recent communication with Paramount Chief Acana and Prime Minister Oketta did little 
to help me understand the puzzling contradiction and to understand why they chose to 
present an advisory body of experts as a government structure, particularly when it was 
so important to be seen as a strictly non-political cultural institution in order to remain 
in the Governments favour, which was more important for weaker traditional 
institutions who have received houses from the Government, than for the Buganda 
Kingdom. Instead, Paramount Chief Acana and Prime Minister Oketta seemed to want to 
distance the creation of a government structure from regional tier, and instead insist in 
vague terms that these changes to Ker Kwaro Acholi were in response solely to the 
internal needs of Ker Kwaro.   
In response to asking about the relationship between the creation of a government 
structure for Ker Kwaro Acholi and the Government’s proposal to establish a regional 
tier of government, Acana responded that, 
the creation of a governance structure at Ker Kwaro Acholi was to effect the 
administration of the Paramount Chief; not in the real sense of a governance 
with its parliament, judiciary and staff. So we created the offices of PM and 
Ministers to facilitate Paramount Chief in administering the Ker...The coming 
in of the Regional tier was to create a formal working relationship between 
government and cultural institution.42  
                                                          
42
 Email communication with D.O Acana, February 2012. 
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It seemed as if Acana was keen to make clear that Ker Kwaro’s government structure 
should not be associated to governance, ‘with its parliament’, but rather simply to 
improve the administration of his role as Paramount Chief. Acana then dismisses 
acknowledges that regional tier was introduce a particular working relationship 
between government and cultural institutions such as Ker Kwaro, but does not 
elaborate on what this more formal relationship might look like, and seems to want to 
distance the creation of a ‘governance structure at Ker Kwaro’ from ‘the coming in of 
regional tier’. 
The Executive Council, whose functions in the concept paper were described as, the 
‘Cabinet of Ker kal Kwaro’, to formulate and implement policies and programmes and 
deal with the ‘external relations and diplomatic affairs’ of Ker Kwaro, was also 
described by Paramount Chief Acana, in a casual way, as being ‘all about administration’ 
and constituted by ‘people who can make things happen...who can make decisions, 
and...bring together the Minister and Rwodi. 43 
When I asked if Ker Kwaro Acholi’s structure had been modelled on Buganda, Oketta 
replied that ‘The Ker Kwaro Acholi organs... [are] for ease of administration and 
coordination of the functions of the various chiefdoms in their functions of preserving 
the culture and welfare of the Acholi Community’ and are not modelled on Buganda but 
‘base[d] on our understanding of institution[al] requirements’.44  
Oketta also framed his role and that of the ministers in technocratic terms, saying that 
their purpose is only to ‘provide the technical backup which the chiefs require in order 
for them to function properly’. In addition to this image of a technically capable 
institution, Oketta claimed that Ker Kwaro is also at an equal footing and standing to 
Buganda because of these changes to Ker Kwaro. 
Signs that the Paramount Chief and Prime Minster were strengthening the institution in 
preparation of more than internal administrative effectiveness and to be able to 
cooperate with local and central government, became visible when Paramount Chief 
Acana said that his ‘vision to make Ker Kwaro mighty and able to perform its roles’ was 
to get Ker Kwaro ‘to a level, because at one point, definitely, we have to deal with 
                                                          
43 Interview with D.O. Acana, Birmingham, 20 June 2011.  
44
 Email communication with K. Oketta, February 2012. 
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government on some issues that could be really, really, really controversial and we need 
people with brains to be there.’45 The suggestion that Ker Kwaro Acholi’s relationship 
with government may not always be easy or amicable is not communicated in Ker 
Kwaro’s dominant images, and self-projections, but, as I will touch upon in chapter six, 
there is a disjuncture between Ker Kwaro’s projections as a government structure and 




Since 2006 Ker Kwaro Acholi embarked on a process that involved drawing on its 
images as a traditional cultural institution to project a further image of Ker Kwaro as a 
government structure. In this chapter I have sought to illustrate that this phase of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi’s revival needs to be understood in the light of changes in Uganda’s 
political landscape and in particular to government discourses on traditional 
authorities. More specifically I have argued that Ker Kwaro’s pursuits to establish a 
government structure was a response to Article 178, proposals for a regional tier of 
government, and the opportunities these provisions could bring for Ker Kwaro Acholi. 
Although for the monarchists of the Buganda Kingdom, anything less than a federalist 
state was not deemed preferential, for Uganda’s other Kingdoms and cultural 
institutions Article 178 and regional tier promised a status and role in the affairs of 
their areas they would otherwise struggle to attain given the weaker public support 
they receive in comparison to the Buganda Kingdom.  
Ker Kwaro’s adoption of overtly political language to describe a new structure of the 
institution that was ‘solely for administration’, as Paramount Chief Acana described it, 
seems puzzling and produces a contradiction for an institution that seeks to be seen and 
known as an explicitly cultural institution. However, this seeming contradiction is 
reproduced by Ker Kwaro Acholi in the public images it projects, which provokes the 
question as to whether there is a productive effect from the contradiction. In chapter six 
I will return to this question as I examine less visible discourses of Ker Kwaro and the 
disjuncture’s between these and the dominant images Ker Kwaro has sought to project. 




In the following chapter I turn to critique the third phase of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s ‘revival’ 
and the production of its dominant image as an agent of sustainable development. 
Similarly to the previous two chapters I draw attention to both strategies and practices 
within Ker Kwaro that carve a particular image of the institution, whilst illustrating how 
they are situated and shaped by dominant discourses at local, national and international 




BECOMING AN AGENT OF DEVELOPMENT  
 
Ker Kwaro’s excellent list of core values...shows that the institution could possible 
become a very important and useful institution. It shows that it’s not going to be 
anchored on the past, but that it’s looking at its relevance in the future and the 
present contexts.1 
 
Before 2005 Ker Kwaro Acholi was predominantly understood as a cohort of chiefs 
revived in order to address the issues of conflict and peace in northern Uganda through 
facilitating reconciliation rituals. Indeed advocates for the revival of Acholi traditional 
authorities lay great emphasis on reconciliation being the main reason for the 
empowerment of Rwodi. However, despite Ker Kwaro’s involvement in facilitating 
reconciliation and cleansing ceremonies and advocating for a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict, it was a loosely organised institution and a relatively peripheral and little-
noticed actor within northern Uganda.  
There was a significant turn-around for Ker Kwaro Acholi, however, when it began to 
actively consolidate an image and project itself as the traditional cultural institution of 
Acholi, particularly when it began to receive attention from the state and development 
practitioners. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Ker Kwaro then further built upon 
its identity as a traditional authority, to re-imagine and project itself as a governmental 
institution, with a Prime Minister and cabinet of Ministers, through appropriating and 
resisting national discourses of traditional authorities. In this chapter, the final of part 
two, I will continue exploring the way Ker Kwaro’s revival was shaped by the interplay 
of strategic practices and dominant discourses and focus on how Ker Kwaro became 
known as an agent of development; as a suitable partner for organisations seeking to 
implement and fund sustainable development in northern Uganda. Between 2005 and 
2010 the attention Ker Kwaro received from NGOs and international development 
institutions resulted in the creation of a Ker Kwaro Acholi secretariat to undertake the 
day-to-day workings of the institutions, and facilitate partnerships with donors on a 
                                                          
1 Interview with J. Huber, Gulu, 21 April 2010. 
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variety of projects, from altering agricultural practices to addressing the issue of 
gender-based violence in Acholiland. As far as donors such as The World Bank, the 
United Nations and USAID were concerned, Ker Kwaro Acholi was becoming an 
important agent for the development of northern Uganda.  
To explore this phase of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival, I first draw upon my initial 
encounter with Ker Kwaro in 2006 and return to the 2005 Strategic Plan to illustrate 
how Ker Kwaro sought to project a particular image of itself that once again built upon 
its image as a traditional cultural authority, in order to position itself as a vital actor for 
development in northern Uganda. I then turn to analyse the engagement between the 
World Bank’s Northern Uganda Social Action Fund and Ker Kwaro Acholi, shedding light 
on a mutually productive relationship between the preconceived imaginings of 
traditional authorities held by the World Bank and images Ker Kwaro Acholi projected 
of itself. Having focused attention on the period around 2005 and 2006, in the final 
section of the chapter I discuss the setting up and subsequent bolstering of Ker Kwaro’s 
secretariat in 2009 and the second Strategic Plan that the new secretariat of Ker Kwaro 
produced that year. The aim of the chapter is to examine the emergence of a dominant 
way of seeing and knowing Ker Kwaro as an agent of development and to show how it 
has been produced through Ker Kwaro’s self-presentations and discourses within 
international development.  
 
ENCOUNTERING KER KWARO ACHOLI  
 
As I sat in Ker Kwaro’s office building in Gulu, in September 2006, waiting to meet with 
one of the deputy Paramount Chiefs, I was handed Ker Kwaro’s Strategic Plan 2005 by a 
young man, Solomon, sat behind a desk and computer. The formality of the building and 
business-like manner of Solomon had struck me on this first encounter with Ker Kwaro 
Acholi, as did the suited deputy Paramount Chief who kindly agreed to talk with me. 
With little prior knowledge of northern Uganda and even less of traditional authorities 
in Acholi or beyond, I was not sure what I expected to find at the residence and offices of 
the Acholi Paramount Chief. I am sure, however, that I was typical of most other novices 
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of chiefs in Africa, and expected to find a robed man occupying a grand and elaborate 
home made from traditional materials of mud and thatch.   
In my meeting with the deputy Paramount Chief, where I was asking basic questions 
about the situation in northern Uganda, he was keen to emphasise the authority of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi as the traditional custodian of Acholi culture and traditional 
representative of the Acholi people, and was crucial to the peace process because of its 
facilitating role of the ritual mato oput. The Acholi, he said, wanted to forgive the LRA, 
including Joseph Kony, so that the Acholi could be ‘one’ again and any international 
intervention with a punitive approach would be going against Acholi culture. Mato oput, 
he insisted, was the ritual of reconciliation the Acholi people wanted and thus the only 
solution to the conflict in northern Uganda.2 Although I was sceptical that a consensus of 
this view existed within Acholi in the emphatic way the deputy chiefs were insisting; 
particularly as this view relied on a gross generalisation of the Acholi, at the time I was 
unaware of alternative perspectives.  
With this image of Ker Kwaro at the centre of facilitating traditional reconciliation 
rituals in Acholiland, I turned, later that day, to flick through the Strategic Plan that had 
been handed to me on my visit. Immediately I noticed that on the back cover was a 
colourful photo that continued to corroborated more closely with my preconceived 
ideas of African chiefs. Paramount Chief Acana was sitting in a large chair that looked 
like a throne, was wearing a regal robe and a grand hat, and met the onlookers gaze 
with a serious expression. As I glanced through the shiny booklet, the first half 
continued to ignite curiosity and feed a picture of Ker Kwaro Acholi as a centuries old 
institution that had been at the centre of Acholi political life until events of the last 
century had prevented it from fulfilling its traditional roles. The ‘fifty traditional leaders 
of the Acholi people’ seemed to be have all been restored, however, since 2000, and had 
formed a Council with elders, women and young people.  
Continuing through the Plan, however, and my preconceived ideas of traditional 
authorities were once again challenged. Firstly, by the order and layout of the booklet, 
and secondly by the programmes Ker Kwaro seemed to be busily engaged in, such as 
fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS and ‘gender mainstreaming’ cultural activities. Both the 
                                                          
2 Interview with M. Otinga Otto Yai, Gulu, 18 September 2006.  
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form of the text and the programmes were what one might expect to read in an NGOs 
briefing mandate or policy document. But here it seemed there was a traditional 
institution of chiefs, rooted in Acholi culture and history, that was not only interested in 
building peace through traditional reconciliation and cleansing practices, but was also 
pursuing broader development objectives that were in line with issues at the top of the 
international development agenda. It was precisely Ker Kwaro Acholi’s traditional 
cultural role, the Strategic Plan made clear, that rendered Ker Kwaro a ‘vital supplement 
to address challenges of peace and development’ in Acholiland. 
The challenges identified, where Ker Kwaro saw its ‘cultural roles’ could help, were 
labour productivity, poverty reduction, HIV/AIDS prevention and gender equality. 
Clearly Ker Kwaro Acholi was presenting itself as wanting to be active in more than a 
peace building capacity, but it was not immediately evident what Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
‘cultural roles’ were or how these were to address developmental issues, such as those 
identified. Further on, the Strategic Objectives proposed in the Plan, followed by a 
breakdown of activities, gave an indication of what exactly Ker Kwaro Acholi was 
claiming it could do, in its cultural capacity, to contribute to development in Acholiland. 
The six Strategic Objectives were as follows: 
1. Consolidating peace and reconciliation amongst the people of Acholi.  
2. Mobilizing the community on education, agricultural production and 
increasing household incomes. 
3. Gender Mainstreaming of cultural activities. 
4. Fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS at the impact level and reduce the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on the community.  
5. Capacity building of the traditional institution in Acholi. 
6. Documentation and communication of Acholi Cultures and Traditions. 
This list affectively proposed that Ker Kwaro Acholi’s ‘cultural roles’ were to mobilise 
people on particular issues, alter practices within ‘cultural activities’ that improved 
gender equality and practices more broadly in society related to the spread and impact 
of the HIV/AIDS virus, build the capacity of Ker Kwaro Acholi as well as be involved in 
the codification of culture and tradition. The underlying assumption, and thus the 
impression the list also gave was that Ker Kwaro Acholi held widespread legitimacy 
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throughout Acholiland, which would enable the institution to foster change within 
people’s everyday practices.  
The breakdown of activities proposed in the Plan further illustrated and reinforced an 
image of Ker Kwaro Acholi as an institution that could exercise influence over groups 
within Acholi, such as youth, clan leaders and farmer groups and thus bring about 
‘development’. Under the first strategic objective, for example, Ker Kwaro Acholi 
proposed to ‘sensitise local leaders on how to dialogue’, as well as ‘sensitise youth on 
peace building and conflict resolution’ and under the second strategic objective Ker 
Kwaro Acholi proposed to ‘organise sensitisation meetings on land matters’.3 
Particularly related to youth, Ker Kwaro Acholi presented one of its roles as the 
‘integration of children and youth into the Acholi cultural practices and dignity’;4 
suggesting Acholi young people had fallen ‘outside’ of Acholi cultural practices and with 
this lost their dignity. The ‘mission’ of Ker Kwaro Acholi to ‘promote, develop and 
preserve the culture of Acholi’ seemed associated, therefore, to restoring a lost morality 
in Acholiland, particularly amongst young people.  
Although preserving Acholi culture and integrating young people into these practices 
was being presented as contributing to improved morality within Acholiland, in 
addition, Acholi cultural practices were claimed to have ‘promoted economic 
development, good health, unity, education, and the general standard of living of the 
people’ before the insurgency.5 Over the past fifteen years, therefore, the ‘decline in 
health standards, production levels, education and unity, and [a] rise in spread of 
diseases, deaths, conflicts, frustrations, etc’ can be explained, the Plan suggests, by the 
‘steady decline in the cultural development of Acholi’.6 The message seeming to be that 
cultural practices promote ‘good things’, which as a result of the recent conflict and its 
effect on culture, have been in decline.7 Accompanying this claim was a description of 
Acholi culture as comprising of ‘Acholi music, dance, drama, Acholi cuisines, Acholi 
dresses, Acholi language Leb Lwo Kur, and Acholi means of production’.8 Thus, these 
                                                          
3 Ker Kwaro Acholi, Strategic Plan: 2005-2007 (Gulu: Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2005), 13-14.  
4 Ibid. 12.  
5 Ibid. 2.  
6 Ibid. 3.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid. 2. 
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cultural practices were presented as the means through which Ker Kwaro Acholi would 
improve the plight of Acholi.  
Although the above description of Acholi culture is very restrictive and bounded the 
Plan suggests elsewhere that Acholi culture, and thus identity, is in a process of 
fundamental change, and although the process of change may at times seem to be a 
project to restore and return to a ‘true’ Acholi identity that has been damaged over the 
years, the Plan also presents the process of change in Acholi culture and tradition as 
taking up ‘new’ values. Ker Kwaro provides a list of values the institution has recently 
been guided by, but that are ‘besides the hereditary Acholi culture and traditions’.9 The 
list read as follows: 
 It upholds respect for human rights and dignity 
 Promotes voluntarism and self help 
 Doing much using little resources 
 Working through grassroots and community based projects 
 Cooperation with central and local governments 
 Promote participation and empowerment; will power to advance together and 
reciprocity 
 Transparency and accountability 
 Equity and equality, equal opportunities, equal rights for all and equality 
between men and women 
If presuming Ker Kwaro Acholi was seeking to present itself and the culture it sought to 
preserve in a favourable light to its readership, one might be surprised that Ker Kwaro 
Acholi was suggesting these principles were not part of Acholi culture or tradition. It is 
as if Ker Kwaro was speaking to the ‘heart of darkness’ discourse, which regards any 
values regarded as civilised as the preserve of the West, to be learnt by Africans if they 
are to experience progress and modernity. However, given the pride attached to Acholi 
culture and traditions elsewhere in the Plan, the purpose here is not to put down Acholi 
culture or render it backward; as a culture that lacks respect for people’s dignity and is 
oppressive. Rather, this list is an explicit statement that Ker Kwaro Acholi aligns itself 
with other organisations who claim to hold similar principles. Describing the principles 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 12.  
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as ‘besides’ Acholi culture and traditions, allows Ker Kwaro to retain its ‘traditional’ 
cultural identity, whilst also making clear that it has signed up to a particular set of 
values common to discourses of international development.  
In addition to this set of principles, the Plan also quotes a definition of culture 
developed by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO), which although is quite different from the description of Acholi culture 
quoted at the beginning of the Plan, states that this definition has been taken into ‘full 
consideration’ when developing Ker Kwaro Acholi’s vision, mission and development 
objectives.10 The definition described culture as, 
a whole complex of distinctive, spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional 
features that characterise a society or social group. It includes not only the 
arts and letters, but also modes of life, fundamental rights of the human 
being, value systems, traditions, habits and beliefs.11  
Interestingly, although the Plan suggests Ker Kwaro Acholi has taken into consideration 
UNESCO’s definition of culture, where emphasis is placed on the complexity of features 
that constitute culture, including, various value systems, a plurality of traditions, habits 
and beliefs, the Plan elsewhere remains tied to a more homogenous understanding of 
culture as Ker Kwaro envisions to promote the integration of the Acholi into one 
‘culture of Acholi’ constituted by ‘one identity’.12 Despite, or perhaps through, the 
tension between conceptualisations of culture within the Strategic Plan, an image of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi as a progressive ‘traditional’ cultural institution is consolidated. By 
quoting UNESCO’s definition of culture and listing a set of guiding principles that 
correspond to values associated with western liberal norms, as well as claiming to have 
taken these on board, presents Ker Kwaro Acholi as aware of concerns on the 
international development agenda and as desirous to be seen as a like-minded agent of 
development. 
Since the 1980s, international development discourses more broadly have come to 
adopt a similar perspective on ‘culture’ as developed by UNESCO; that moves away 
from views that see culture as an expression of unchanging tradition and towards a 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 UNESCO, "Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies," in World Conference on Cultural 
Policies (Mexico City: UNESCO, 1982), 1.  
12 Ker Kwaro Acholi, Strategic Plan: 2005-2007 (Gulu: Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2005), 13.  
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perspective that casts culture as dynamic and reactive, as the site where individuals are 
socialised and values are formed and transmitted.13 During the 1990s in particular, the 
shift towards empowering and harnessing civil society for sustainable development 
was coupled with a shift towards regarding ‘culture’ as a crucial consideration in the 
implementation of successful and sustainable development. The Commission for Africa 
in 2005 identified the ‘inattention to culture in policy making of many donor countries’ 
as part of the reason for ‘the failure of so many development initiatives in Africa over 
the years’,14 whilst the World Bank has been advised to recognise that human incentives 
are of paramount importance in the productivity and sustainable development of 
Africa’s public and private sectors, and ‘human incentives cannot be dissociated from a 
people’s history and culture’.15  
Although not quoted in Ker Kwaro Acholi’s Strategic Plan, UNESCO’s definition of 
culture continues on to reveal a normative underpinning. Having defined culture as 
more than the arts, constituted by modes of life, value system, traditions and habits, 
culture was further defined, at The World Conference on Cultural Policies held in 
Mexico in 1982, as what 
gives man the ability to reflect upon himself. It is culture that makes us 
specifically human, rational beings, endowed with a critical judgement and a 
sense of moral commitment. It is through culture that we discern values and 
make choices. It is through culture that man expresses himself, becomes 
aware of himself, recognizes his incompleteness, questions his own 
achievements, seeks untiringly for new meanings and creates works through 
which he transcends his limitations. 
Thus, with such a definition that imbues culture with a normative purpose of producing 
reflective, rational beings, endowed with a critical judgement, it is unsurprising that 
UNESCO links ‘culture so irrevocably to development’.16 The positive correlation 
between culture and development is also a consistent theme of the Strategic Plan, 
summarised by Paramount Chief Acana in the Foreword as he declares that Ker Kwaro 
                                                          
13 The Commission for Africa, “Our Common Interest,” (Commission for Africa, 2005), Economic 
Commission for Africa, "Relevance of African Traditional Institutions of Governance," (Addis 
Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa, 2007). 
14 The Commission for Africa, “Our Common Interest” (Commission for Africa, 2005), 122.  
15 M. Dia, Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted 
Institutions (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1996), 53. 
16 UNESCO, "Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies," in World Conference on Cultural 
Policies (Mexico City: UNESCO, 1982), 1. 
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Acholi draws its mandate from the 1995 Constitution that ‘promotes culture for 
development’ and provides the provision for Ker Kwaro ‘to promote, preserve and 
document the culture of Acholi as a way of promoting holistic development of the Acholi 
people’.17 
As there have been warnings that any development programme that ignores culture is 
destined to fail,18 the images that Ker Kwaro projects of being a traditional cultural 
institution with authority not only in ritual ceremonies, but also within the site of norm 
and value production, have the potential to be very appealing to donors, such as the 
World Bank, who, in 2005, began talks with Ker Kwaro about partnering on an aspect of 
the Social Action Fund they had been struggling to implement in northern Uganda since 
2002.  
 
NORTHERN UGANDA SOCIAL ACTION FUND 
 
In September 2005, Ker Kwaro Acholi not only launched the Strategic Plan, but also met 
with members of the World Bank’s Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF). This 
workshop resulted in a series of recommendations for the traditional leaders of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi to be involved in the ‘booster initiative’, organised by NUSAF’s 
Management Unit, for enhancing the Community Reconciliation and Conflict 
Management (CRCM) component of the Social Action Fund. In the meantime two 
traditional leaders’ meetings were held at St. Monica’s Girls Tailoring School and the 
ACORD Resource Centre in Gulu where one of the points discussed and agreed upon 
was Ker Kwaro Acholi becoming ‘a facilitating and implementing entity for CRCM sub-
projects’.19 For Ker Kwaro Acholi to undertake this role it was seen that its technical 
capacity would have to be developed.   
 
                                                          
17 Paramount Chief Acana, Foreword in Ker Kwaro Acholi, Strategic Plan: 2005-2007 (Gulu: Ker 
Kwaro Acholi, 2005), 1. 
18 The Commission for Africa, “Our Common Interest” (Commission for Africa, 2005) T. Kelsall, 
"Going with the Grain in African Development?," Development Policy Review 29, no. S1 (2011). 
19 D.O. Acana, "Report on Consultation Meeting for Traditional Leaders of Acholi and NUSAF, 15 
November 2005," (Gulu: Gulu District Archives, 2005). 
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Two months on and another meeting was held between Ker Kwaro Acholi and NUSAF at 
Sunset Hotel, one of the new leisure sites resulting from the snowballing of 
development organisations needing places to hold meetings and conferences and to 
accommodate the high turnover of development workers flooding through Gulu on 
short term contracts. At this meeting on the 15th November, the following objectives 
were drafted; to follow up on the recommendations of the meetings of traditional 
leaders and the CRCM workshop, develop a CRCM implementation framework for 
Acholi traditional leaders and identify priorities and plan core CRCM activities for 
implementation by Acholi traditional leaders.20 What led to this point of engagement 
between NUSAF and Ker Kwaro Acholi is the focus of the discussion in the next section, 
which draws attention to the way traditional authorities and Ker Kwaro Acholi 
specifically are conceptualised by the Bank and how these preconceived ideas shaped 
the engagement. I will then lead into a brief critique of the meeting at Sunset Hotel. 
 
IMAGINING TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES  
 
In 2002 the World Bank presented the Ugandan Government with a Project Appraisal 
Document proposing a US$100 million credit to establish a Northern Uganda Social 
Action Fund. The project implementation date was forecast for five years, although 
entered a second phase in 2009 despite controversy over the implementation and 
accountability of phase one.21 The objective of NUSAF has been to ‘assist Government in 
its efforts to tackle poverty and bring about development through participatory 
community efforts that utilise community value systems.’22 Although the design of 
NUSAF was guided in part by the Ugandan Government’s development policies, such as 
the goals of the Country Assistance Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, it 
was also designed based on lessons learned from two precursory World Bank funded 
projects, the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project (NURP-I) and the Community 
                                                          
20 Ibid.  
21 R.M. Kavuma, "NUSAF: Developing Northern Uganda," Guardian, 11 January 2010. The second 
phase of NUSAF fell under the Government’s, largely donor funded, Peace Recovery and 
Development Plan, launched in 2007.  
22 World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of Sdr 80.1 
Million (Us$ 100 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Uganda for a Northern Uganda Social 
Action Fund," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002), 30. 
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Action Program (CAP).23 The former was a large, top-down, supply driven program that 
focused on infrastructural development such as building roads and schools, but was 
heavily criticised for poor community involvement.24 CAP on the other hand was ‘a 
demand-driven local infrastructure program, rooted in local community preferences 
and characterised by a strong participatory thrust’.25  In Robinson’s critique of the 
design and initial implementation of NUSAF, he comments that 
While NURP-I achieved many of its physical objectives, many investments 
were not sustainable, and its contribution to institutional development was 
negligible. By comparison, the CAP is generally acknowledged to have been a 
great success in terms of community assets and building local capacity.26 
NUSAF was designed, therefore, to be a move away from the top-down approach 
characteristic of NURP-I, with a key policy change involving the ‘placing [of] money and 
its management in the hands of the communities’. Like CAP, NUSAF was to build local 
capacity through, for example, fostering ‘community action, leadership development 
and resource mobilisation’ as well as mobilising ‘vulnerable groups’. Those labelled and 
targetted as vulnerable groups included ‘unemployed youths’, ‘female headed 
households’ and ‘orphans’, with the goal of bringing them into, and have them ‘join’, the 
‘mainstream development process’.27 As the target groups participated in the 
development process NUSAF proposed to ‘uphold the principles of community-driven 
development...by directly funding their priorities’.28 The World Bank was also driven by 
their own priority to reach communities and empower them in order that they ‘demand 
quality services from the sub-county, district and national levels’.29  
                                                          
23 CAP was originally being part of NURP but evolved into a separate program funded by the 
Netherlands government. See M. Robinson, "Community-Driven Development in Conflict and 
Postconflict Conditions:The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project," in Aid That Works: 
Successful Development in Fragile States, ed. J. Manor (Washington D.C.: World Bank 
Publications, 2007), 254. 
24 World Bank, "Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project: Performance Audit Report," 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2000). 
25 M. Robinson, "Community-Driven Development in Conflict and Postconflict Conditions:The 
Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project," in Aid That Works: Successful Development in 
Fragile States, ed. J. Manor (Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2007), 255. 
26 Ibid.  
27 World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of Sdr 80.1 
Million (Us$ 100 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Uganda for a Northern Uganda Social 
Action Fund," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002), 30. 





As CAP had demonstrated, an approach that was demand-driven, where project 
management is situated at the community level, can have favourable results for the 
effective implementation of large development projects. For example, ‘significant 
contributions of materials and unskilled labour for community investments’ occurred, 
local institutions were strengthened and were able to manage the maintenance of the 
local infrastructural projects and finally, local institutional capacity at local government 
levels were bolstered.30 Despite these ‘successes’, however, CAP had faced challenges 
and the design of NUSAF took these into account.31 NUSAF was thus learning from 
problems such as delays when mobilising the community to identify appropriate 
income generation ventures and the poor technical quality of small-scale infrastructure 
investments. The key limitation, however, found during CAP and which NUSAF wanted 
to avoid was the unintended creation of a parallel administrative structure, which did 
not integrate effectively into the local government machinery and thus caused tensions 
between governing bodies.32  
Bearing in mind lessons learned from CAP and NURP-I, NUSAF consisted of four 
component projects. These were the Community Development Initiatives (CDI) 
intended ‘to construct and rehabilitate small-scale socio-economic infrastructure’; 
Vulnerable Groups Support Sub-Projects; Community Reconciliation and Conflict 
Management; and Institutional Development which included the staffing of a small 
autonomous NUSAF Management Unit. Although much might be said for each of these 
components,33 for the purposes of the thesis and my study of Ker Kwaro Acholi I will 
focus on the third component, CRCM, and the Bank’s conceptualisation of ‘social capital’.  
                                                          
30 M. Robinson, "Community-Driven Development in Conflict and Postconflict Conditions:The 
Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project," in Aid That Works: Successful Development in 
Fragile States, ed. J. Manor (Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2007), 260. 
31 Ibid., 261. 
32 SNV, "Decentralisation and Empowerment: From Rehabilitiation to Growth in West Nile 
Region, Uganda. Report of an External Evaluation Mission," (Arua/Kampala1999). quoted in M. 
Robinson, "Community-Driven Development in Conflict and Postconflict Conditions:The 
Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project," in Aid That Works: Successful Development in 
Fragile States, ed. J. Manor (Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2007), 261.  
33 M. Robinson, "Community-Driven Development in Conflict and Postconflict Conditions:The 
Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project," in Aid That Works: Successful Development in 
Fragile States, ed. J. Manor (Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2007).  
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A World Bank assessment of Social Fund effectiveness, published in 2002, reported that 
increasing ‘community cohesion and the capacity for future community-based 
initiatives’, termed “bonding” social capital, as well as ‘improvements in the 
community’s links with outside’, known as “binding” social capital, are being enhanced 
through the opportunities World Bank Social Funds offer for collective action as 
communities work together on subprojects. However, as only five percent of sixty-six 
Social Fund projects ‘mentioned increasing social capital and community cohesion 
among their objectives...the Bank’s strategy for social protection proposes further 
increasing the emphasis on social capital in social fund projects’.34 A few years before, a 
paper presented by the liberal theorist Francis Fukuyama to the IMF conference on 
Second Generation Reforms, had also advocated that ‘the stock of social capital’ ought to 
be increased where possible, as ‘social capital is important to the efficient functioning of 
modern economies, and is the sine qua non of stable liberal democracy’. Interestingly, 
Fukuyama emphasises the point that although trust and networks are associated to 
social capital they are epiphenomenal; ‘arising out of a result of social capital but not 
constituting social capital itself’. Comparing this statement with the brief reference 
above to the World Banks’ review on Social Funds and their impact within communities, 
it seems the review is also referring to the products of ‘social capital’, such as ‘capacity 
for future community-based initiatives’, collective action and ‘links with outside’, rather 
than making clear what actually brings about these ‘goods’. Although social capital is 
often defined in terms of its manifestations, it is also commonly defined as the norms 
that produce active connections amongst people. The World Bank defines social capital 
as ‘the norms and networks that enable collective action. It encompasses institutions, 
relationships and customs that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social 
interaction’.35  
The Bank saw a particular role for ‘social capital’ in northern Uganda, believing that the 
‘restoration and transformation’ of social capital would ‘address poverty’ and improve 
                                                          
34 World Bank, "Social Funds: Assessing Effectiveness," (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2002), 
41.  
35 World Bank, "Overview: Social Capital," World Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/C0QTRW4QF0. 
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security by providing ‘powerful entry points’ and developing ‘community safety nets’.36 
One of the key objectives of CRCM was to ‘support social capital formation and create 
community cohesion’ and proposed to do this by ‘supporting community reconciliation 
and traditional leadership’.37 Traditional leaders in northern Uganda, the Community 
Needs Assessment (CNA) concluded, played a ‘critical role in instilling values’, providing 
community cohesion and, especially in Acholi, formed 'a strong building block for the 
peace building (efforts)’.38 
The role of traditional leaders in NUSAF’s projects was in part informed by previous 
social fund experiences. As we can read from the Bank’s report in 2002 on Social Funds 
in Malawi, Zambia, Nicaragua and Jamaica, local leaders, which includes village chiefs, 
headmen, engineers, mayors and religious leaders, ‘typically acted as intermediaries for 
getting social fund sub-projects to communities’.39 The process in Malawi, the reports 
inform us, often involves village leaders seeking the backing of chiefs, who then call the 
community together to inform them of a plan to apply for help to, for example, 
rehabilitate a school, which the community is required by the chief to participate in 
through the provision of resources or labour. On procuring the subproject any adults 
refusing to contribute incurred a monetary or livestock fine from the chiefs.40 The report 
concluded that local leaders or “prime movers” as they were also referred to, through 
mechanisms of mobilising communities and ‘enforcing community contributions’, 
played an important role in the social funds. 41  
The CNA, conducted to ‘bring out the views, perceptions and aspirations of the 
communities in the North’, also pointed to examples from northern Uganda where 
‘traditional’ or ‘informal’ institutions had been ‘instrumental in mobilising communities 
to promote participation for physical implementation of community activities’.42 In 
                                                          
36 World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of Sdr 80.1 
Million (Us$ 100 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Uganda for a Northern Uganda Social 
Action Fund," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002), 4.  
37 Ibid., 80-81. 
38 Ibid., 75. 
39 World Bank, "Social Funds: Assessing Effectiveness," (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2002), 
138. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 139. 
42 World Bank, Community Needs Assessment UGANDA: Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, 
Annex 12, in World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of 
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Acholi, for example, the CNA reported that communities had contributed materials for 
school construction and in nearby Teso materials and labour. No concrete example was 
given for neighbouring Lango, save for a vague mention that Langi ‘communities have a 
history of local efforts to address local problems’. The concluding statement, again 
lacking in specificity, stated that ‘in general all communities have indicated commitment 
and willingness to contribute to the development of their areas’, a commitment and 
willingness the report saw was ‘tied to traditional practices and values, which still exist 
and can be brought out with good facilitation’.43 With such a strong association between 
traditional practices, norms and values and their potential to lead to community 
willingness and contributions to development, coupled with conceptualisations of 
traditional or ‘informal’ institutions playing a ‘critical role in instilling values’, it is 
unsurprising the CNA report expressed concern for such institutions ‘getting extinct’, 




Although NUSAF had been active in northern Uganda since 2003, including the CRCM 
component, there was little engagement with Ker Kwaro Acholi until September 2005. 
As a result of the CRCM component experiencing a slow-rate of sub-project generation 
from inception compared to other components,44 the Northern Uganda Management 
Unit designed a booster initiative to enhance CRCM delivery. Two key objectives of the 
meeting at Sunset Hotel were therefore to discuss and ‘develop a CRCM implementation 
framework for Acholi Traditional Leaders’ and ‘identify priorities and plan core CRCM 
activities for implementations by Acholi Traditional Leaders’. The booster initiative was 
said by Ker Kwaro Acholi to have been ‘specially geared towards traditional and 
religious institutions because of their special roles and responsibilities in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sdr 80.1 Million (Us$ 100 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Uganda for a Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002), 76. 
43 Ibid., 75-76. There seems to be a conflation of ‘participation’ and ‘willingness’, particularly 
when practices such as fines were in place to ensure individuals cooperated, as in the Malawi 
case. In the Acholi case there seemed to be an assumption that a desire for ‘development’ 
translated as a mandate for the particular development agenda pursued by the World Bank. 
44 D.O. Acana, "Report on Consultation Meeting for Traditional Leaders of Acholi and NUSAF, 15 
November 2005," (Gulu: Gulu District Archives, 2005). 
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community’.45 Indeed Ker Kwaro Acholi were informed at the meeting that NUSAF and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were of the opinion that if the ‘ancient Acholi 
traditions, values and norms’ were ‘restored’ this ‘could help to accelerate a speedy end 
of the conflict and achievement of sustainable peace and development in Northern 
Uganda.’46 Ker Kwaro Acholi were also informed that NUSAF had appointed a 
consultancy firm to work ‘in collaboration with NUSAF, CSOs, CBOs and individuals in 
the sub-region to critically investigate the position of Ker Kwaro Acholi in respect of 
tradition, norms and skills available to resolve conflict or calamities such as wars, 
disease, famine and the roles of Witch Doctors and the issues of inter clan cattle 
rustling’.47  
In addition, the purpose of the consultancy investigation was to find ways of enhancing 
‘unity and cooperation between and among the local and government leaderships’ and 
spearheading communities to find solutions that will ‘bind cultural practices and 
literatures on Acholi cultures and traditions in conflict resolution.’ In other words, the 
research was not only to make sure NUSAF avoided the problems experienced on 
previous World Bank projects, as discussed earlier, such as creating parallel 
administrative structures that did not integrate effectively into the government 
structure, but also to ensure that NUSAF and CRCM effectively engaged and mobilised 
the community by unlocking ‘positive’ social capital within Acholi cultures and 
traditions. Preconceived ideas about traditional or informal institutions in other parts of 
Africa and northern Uganda seemed to have shaped NUSAF’s approach towards Ker 
Kwaro Acholi, placing expectations on Ker Kwaro Acholi to act as an ‘entry point’ for 
NUSAF to access communities. Or perhaps more specifically, the expectation was for Ker 
Kwaro Acholi to act as an entry point for NUSAF to access the sphere of culture and 
within this sphere, the specific norms of social capital, in order that culture and social 
capital be harnessed for the sustainability of CRCM objectives.  
From the minutes reporting on the meeting at Sunset Hotel there seemed to be an 
enthusiasm from Ker Kwaro Acholi to work with CRCM as an Implementing Agency, 
assigned to identify potential facilitators within communities who could generate 






subprojects for NUSAF to fund, as well as identifying innovative ways traditional 
approaches could be used for sustainable peace and development in northern Uganda. 
In the immediate weeks after the meeting it was expected that there would be a process 
of budgeting for the seven ‘core activities’ identified, compiling of office reports, 
submission of a request for funding from NUMU and further meetings for planning, all 
to be undertaken by Ker Kwaro Acholi. The Paramount Chief was specifically 
responsible for ‘monitoring and supervision’, writing ‘progress and accountability 
reports’ as well as reviewing and planning meetings, alongside the District and NUSAF. 
In order to manage these tasks and the technical issues of the CRCM projects under 
their responsibility, Ker Kwaro Acholi proposed that its ‘technical capacity should be 
developed’.48 In the Paramount Chief’s opening address at the meeting he said there was 
‘urgent’ need to establish an ‘institution committee’ to oversee the implementation of 
NUSAF funds and report progress and accountability to NUSAF offices. In addition it was 
agreed by Ker Kwaro Acholi that financial support from NUSAF should come directly to 
the office of Paramount Chief, rather than through the district, on the grounds that this 
would be the best way to make good use of NUSAF funding.49 One of the ways Ker Kwaro 
Acholi proposed to make use of NUSAF funding was through the ‘purchase of office 
furniture and equipment’, as a ‘prioritised core activity’ to take place over a six month 
period. The listed items needed included a generator, public address system, fridge, 
safe, cabinets, carpets, fans, stationary, office desks and a lawn mower. Fourteen tents, 
two hundred chairs, ten tables and thirty six office chairs, were also requested, which 
seem more appropriate items for ceremonial events than to furnish a handful of offices 
for administrative tasks. Perhaps this is an illustration that Ker Kwaro Acholi was well 
aware that its ability to perform the tasks CRCM requires such as mobilising 
communities, relied upon the public and spectacular events Ker Kwaro Acholi could 
host.  
Reviewing the progress of NUSAF in 2006, Findings reported in relation to the CRCM 
component, that ‘the organisational integrity of the traditional institutions, especially in 
the Acholi sub-region is beginning to be strengthened, enabling them to start 
influencing local government structures to deliver services to the needy and to promote 





positive synergies between the state, civil society and the poor’.50 However, it was also 
commented that there were concerns over the sustainability of some traditional 
authorities, followed by suggestions that traditional authorities should develop 
‘Community Foundations’ that can then ‘tap into various sources for funds’.51 The Patiot 
Development Services, a consultancy firm with its head office in Gulu, had also wrote to 
Ker Kwaro Acholi in 2005 with similar advice, stating that after the coronation of the 
Paramount Chief 
there is need now to focus on the sustainability of the Ker Kwaro Acholi 
institution. It is expected that the Ker Kwaro Acholi will have a set of Cabinet 
handling different issues/departments. It follows therefore that the formation 
of the Ker Kwaro Acholi foundation as an NGO will enhance easy way of 
sourcing for funds for its sustainability.52 
The expectation of the Patiot Development Services is most likely explained by the 
trend amongst other traditional cultural institutions in Uganda to set up, following the 
‘restoration’ of a traditional leader, not only a cabinet of ministers, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, but also some sort of foundation or NGO that can source for funds. 
Although in the Strategic Plan 2005, Ker Kwaro proposed that one of its ‘major 
strategies’ was to start a ‘Trust Fund...to cater for other social and economic 
development[s] of the people’, this initiative has not materialised. But what did begin to 
emerge, following Ker Kwaro’s engagements with NUSAF, and the increased attention 
from other international donors, was a Ker Kwaro Acholi secretariat. This was also 
proposed in the Strategic Plan; envisioned as a necessary component to build the 
capacity of the cultural institution.  
 
 
                                                          
50 C. Laker and N. Suleiman, "The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund: Community 
Reconciliation and Conflict Management Empower Communities in a Post-Conflict Setting," 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2006). Findings reports on work carried out by the World Bank 
and its member governments in the African Region. At the publication of the article Laker was 
the Executive Director of NUSAF and Namara a Social Protection Specialist, World Bank Country 
Office, Uganda.  
51 Ibid. 
52 J.C. Okodi, "Letter from J. Charles Okodi, Programme Manager, Patiot Development Services, to 
Rwot Francis Oryang Lagony, External Relation, Ker Kwaro Acholi, 22 February 2005," (Gulu: 
Gulu District Archives, Cultural Village, Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2005). 
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THE SECRETARIAT AND STRATEGIC PLAN 2009 – 14.  
  
By 2006, Paramount Chief Acana and Prime Minister Oketta had recruited a handful of 
administrative support staff, on a voluntary basis, but this was to significantly change as 
donors began to partner with Ker Kwaro and fund salaried staff at the secretariat for the 
duration of the partnerships. In 2009, Ker Kwaro sent a circular to the District RDC’s, 
CAOs, Chairmen of District Councils, NGOs and ‘all stakeholders’ of Ker Kwaro, to inform 
them of new staffing positions and that Ker Kwaro had ‘beefed up its secretariat’.53 
Reminding the readers in the letter that the purpose of creating the offices of Prime 
Minister and Ministers was ‘to separate the Lawi Rwodi [Paramount Chief] and the 
Rwodi from the day to day operation of Ker Kwaro as an institution and leave them to 
perform their traditional roles more effectively’, the letter then presented the 
strengthening of the secretariat as facilitating the separation of traditional leaders from 
the day to day operations of Ker Kwaro further. The purpose of the circular was not only 
to inform, but to ask for necessary cooperation and assistance from the Government and 
NGO recipients.  
Over the following year Ker Kwaro Acholi’s offices in Gulu were further furnished with a 
photocopier, laptops, printers and filing cabinets adorned with USAID stickers, with 
each piece of equipment and furnishing engraved carefully with the initials of one donor 
or another. The Danish Embassy and World Vision funded items such as video and 
recording equipment; Irish Aid provided a pick-up truck and Catholic Relief Services 
two motorbikes. All the staff of the secretariat have a background in development or the 
“NGO world”, as Mark Avola, Ker Kwaro’s first Programme Manager, put it to me. Avola 
had worked with World Vision for ten years and before that with Save the Children. 
With the secretariat growing and donors showing increasing interest, Prime Minister 
Oketta felt the Secretariat had become “fully fledged...with technical capacity”, with 
himself as the “technical head of Ker Kwaro Acholi”.54 
 
                                                          
53 K. Oketta, "Letter from Kenneth Oketta, Prime Minister of Ker Kwaro Acholi to the Resident 
District Commissioners, the Chairman District Councils, the Chief Administrative Secretaries, 
the Non Government Organisations, All Stakeholders of KKA, of Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader 
Districts, 9 April " (Gulu: Gulu District Archives, 2009). 
54 Interview with K. Oketta, Gulu, 19 June 2010. 
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One of the first projects the new salaried secretariat was assigned, led by Prime Minister 
Oketta, and funded by USAID’s Northern Uganda Transition Initiative (NUTI), was the 
writing of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s second Strategic Plan. NUTI sponsored a retreat for 
writing the Plan, subsequent meetings for its fine tuning and ‘to make it come out 
properly’ and its launch that, according to Oketta, ‘brought so many donors, which 
projected our image and visibility and... made us look not just like a footloose 
organisation these people used to think of, but we looked like a firm organisation with 
capacity’.55 Indeed the impression the second Strategic Plan gave smoothed over any 
images of Ker Kwaro as ‘footloose’ and instead projected images of success, 
organisation, efficiency, cohesion within Ker Kwaro and effective working relationships 
with various stakeholders.  
The second Strategic Plan began by identifying Ker Kwaro Acholi’s activities and 
achievements, which included maintaining community cohesion, facilitating 
reunification and reintegration of ex-combatants, the resolution of conflicts within the 
Acholi community and supporting resettlement of IDPs. It also pointed out that ‘the 
institution plays a key role in [the] mobilisation of the community on development 
programmes such as education, infrastructures, HIV/AIDS, PRDP and other government 
programmes; and empowering women’ whilst also ‘re-establishing good relationships 
with the neighbouring tribes’. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Strategic Plan 
also embeds Ker Kwaro Acholi within the national development framework and by 
presenting itself as a platform of opportunities for vulnerable people to become active 
members of civil society, and a facilitator of linkages and learning between 
communities, and local government, Ker Kwaro is thus presented as a potential 
generator of social capital; as a key link between the poor and civil society, as well as 
civil society and government, and therefore a potential key organisation for 
consolidating state authority.  
Whilst predominantly embedding the Plan within the national development framework 
and pledging to contribute to the consolidation of local governance in northern Uganda, 
it is also made clear that Ker Kwaro Acholi intends to continue working in partnership 
with international donors and consolidating their work and presence in northern 
                                                          
55 Ibid.  
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Uganda. The language of the Strategic Plan, similarly to the first, is common to 
development discourses, although there is an improved ‘fluency’ in the use of the 
language, which improves Ker Kwaro Acholi’s legibility for potential donors. The Plan 
also explicitly expresses Ker Kwaro Acholi’s wish to ‘strengthen partnerships, 
corporation, and cooperation spirit with...donors and financial institutions’,56 and 
acknowledges NUTI’s input in the editing stage of the Plan.57  
With thirteen proposed areas of work, including peace building, promoting community 
empowerment, increasing household incomes, fighting HIV/AIDS, strengthening the 
capacity of traditional courts, and gender mainstreaming both within society and in the 
cultural institution, the Strategic Plan continues to present Ker Kwaro Acholi as an 
institution with an ambitious vision, despite remaining under-resourced. The continued 
assumption underpinning the Paramount Chief’s call for support from ‘various 
stakeholders in Uganda and beyond’,58 is that with external support Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
inherent and latent capacity for mobilising, representing and strengthening Acholi 
people will be unlocked and realised.    
Accompanying the request for external assistance the Strategic Plan also highlights that 
for Ker Kwaro Acholi’s ‘functionality’ it ‘continues to restructure and organise itself into 
a working institution by putting in place other structures and policy organs such as the 
Council of Chiefs, Executives of the Council of Chiefs, Cabinet Ministers, [and] 
Secretariat’.59 The functions of the policy making organs and the secretariat, it states, are 
to deliberate ‘on issues’ and to ‘deliver the services for the Institutions’ of the various 
Rwodi, whereas the Secretariat is to take care of ‘day to day administrative issues’.60 
Compared to the previous Strategic Plan, Ker Kwaro Acholi by 2009 sounds as if it has 
become highly organised with experts and an administrative staff recruited to facilitate 
the implementation of the services Ker Kwaro Acholi has identified and proposes to 
deliver. Attention is also directed to a list of Ker Kwaro’s ‘core values’, 
 Upholds Respect for Human Rights and Dignity 
                                                          
56 Ker Kwaro Acholi, Strategic Plan, 2009-2014, (Gulu: Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2009), 5.   
57 Prime Minister Oketta Kenneth, Acknowledgment, in Ibid., iv.  
58 Paramount Chief Acana David, Foreword, in Ibid., v.  
59 Ibid., 2.  
60 Ibid., 5. 
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 Transparency and Accountability 
 Equality and Equity 
 Commitment and Dedication 
 Open to Learning  
 Innovative and Inclusive 
These, Ker Kwaro Acholi regard, ‘as the principle vehicle to achieving its objectives,’ 
with particular emphasis on upholding ‘the principle of accountability and adherence to 
policies and norms as it carries out its responsibility’.61 
The image of a more organised and efficient institution is reaffirmed through the pages 
of budgeting information that constitutes almost half of the entire booklet. Once again 
the impression given is that Ker Kwaro Acholi has an ambitious vision for the 2009-
2014 period with an estimated total budget at a surprisingly high total of UGX twenty 
billion, equivalent to an estimated US$ eight million. This is ten times the budget quoted 
in the Strategic Plan 2005, which although was for a three, rather than five year period, 
is still a dramatic increase. The two most highly budgeted activities are to ‘facilitate the 
functioning of the council of chiefs, executives, cabinets and secretariat’, and the 
‘construction of [a] Cultural centre at each chiefdom’,62 estimated for the 2010/2011 
financial year at UGX 806 million and UGX 1.3 billion consecutively. Comparing this 
amount to the figure quoted to ‘support farmer groups with farm inputs’, estimated for 
2010/2011 at UGX 375 million, it is evident that the empowerment of Ker Kwaro Acholi, 
through the additional organs and the chiefdoms of the Rwodi, is of paramount 
importance. In the Acknowledgement written by Oketta, ‘special recognition’ was given 
to the Rwodi, ‘because it was the inputs of various ideas from the Rwodi, which were 
filtered to produce this document’.63  
The overall impression of Ker Kwaro Acholi in the Strategic Plan is that the institution, 
with its traditional, governmental and developmental branches, has the capacity to 
address key concerns within post-war northern Uganda; is aligned with government 
authorities as well as non-government organisations; is well placed to contribute to 
                                                          
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 12-13.  
63 Prime Minister Oketta Kenneth, Acknowledgment, in Ibid., iv.  
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development because of its capacity to reach and empower poor and vulnerable people 
through being a platform; can establish and consolidate networks between community 
organisations and local government; and create links between traditional and formal 
justice systems. In the eyes of NGOs and donors, who are seeking local counterparts 
through which to work, under pressure also to align development initiatives to national 
development frameworks, wishing to strengthen civil society and support traditional 
practices that do not undermine western norms, the Strategic Plan paints a very 
attractive picture of Ker Kwaro Acholi. 
However, although the overall and predominant impression the Strategic Plan presents 
of Ker Kwaro Acholi is one of hope for its potential, I also found that there are moments 
in the Strategic Plan when a different image of Ker Kwaro Acholi can be glimmered, 
usually when there is a lack of clarity or when inconsistencies arise. It is as if alternative 
discourses are pushing against the dominant discourses the authors wish to produce 
through the Plan, and subverting the neat images Ker Kwaro Acholi has sought to 
project. As I explore in the next chapter these moments and areas of tension that are 
only subtly evident within the Strategic Plan will be shown as manifestations of deeper 
rooted realities of Ker Kwaro Acholi, often hidden from the dominant images projected 




In this chapter I have looked at ways images of Ker Kwaro Acholi, as a traditional 
cultural institution, have been the foundation for casting Ker Kwaro Acholi as a 
potential agent of development, despite ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’ previously being 
associated to anti-modernisation and blocks to ‘development’. Written for a donor 
audience, the Strategic Plans presented Ker Kwaro Acholi as a ‘genuine’ traditional 
cultural institution of Acholi through an historical narrative that dated Ker Kwaro 
Acholi to the fifteenth century. The Plan then projected images of Ker Kwaro Acholi both 
in the present and of an empowered Ker Kwaro Acholi in the future. These images 
aligned Ker Kwaro Acholi with international development discourse in a number of 
ways, positioning Ker Kwaro Acholi as a potentially important actor not only in the 
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peace process, but more specifically in the development process in northern Uganda. 
Firstly, and perhaps most strikingly, the presentational design of the Strategic Plan 
echoed the way information is often organised within public literature of development 
organisations, in terms of stating the goals, vision, mission statement and strategic 
objectives of the institution. The language adopted also made use of familiar terms or 
buzzwords commonly used in development-speak. For example ‘gender mainstreaming’ 
and ‘sensitisation workshops’ hold no specific meaning outside of development 
discourses, whereas within development discourses they function as signifiers to 
particular policies and practices. Thirdly, claiming to be guided by principles akin to 
those associated with western liberal norms, as well as taking into consideration 
UNESCO’s definition of culture, presented Ker Kwaro Acholi as a like-minded institution, 
who although foundationally traditional is at the same time sufficiently modern. The 
Strategic Plans presented Ker Kwaro Acholi as both legible and desirable to donors 
through the interplay of both the familiar and alien, for example, amidst the familiar 
language and form of the text were littered signifiers, such as infrequent use of Acholi 
Luo, a photograph of Paramount Chief Acana in royal attire and the list of Payira’s Rwodi 
lineage, implying Ker Kwaro’s link to local ‘tradition’ and culture. The most explicit and 
literal symbol was Ker Kwaro Acholi’s watermarked emblem repeated across each page.  
I focused on Ker Kwaro Acholi’s encounter with the World Bank’s NUSAF, particularly 
the CRCM component, to illustrate an example where images produced by Ker Kwaro 
Acholi were met with preconceived ideas of traditional authorities held within an 
international institution engaged in development. When NUSAF approached Ker Kwaro 
Acholi it is important to remember that there was little evidence Ker Kwaro Acholi 
could mobilise communities, influence their behaviour and identify the most 
appropriate people to become CRCM facilitators for subprojects. However, based on 
generalisations of ‘traditional’ or ‘informal’ institutions in Africa, NUSAF assumed Ker 
Kwaro Acholi had this potential, which was only perpetuated through the impressions 
Ker Kwaro Acholi gave through, for example, its Strategic Plan. 
The second Strategic Plan further built upon Ker Kwaro’s emerging reputation and 
image as an effective agent of development, and claimed the institution was already an 
effective facilitator of ex-combatants in their community, key in mobilising communities 
on development programmes such as education, and had empowered women through 
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reviving traditional agricultural practices. The establishment and bolstering of a Ker 
Kwaro secretariat, made possible through partnerships with donors, also increased Ker 
Kwaro’s capacity to more effectively carve its public image as a traditional cultural 
authority desirous to work together with local, national and international development 
organisations for the benefit of Acholi.  
In the final part of the thesis, to follow this chapter, I offer a reflective examination of a 
more complex picture of Ker Kwaro that is not contained in any of the three dominant 
images and ways of knowing Ker Kwaro that have been explored in part two, and 
through which Ker Kwaro has negotiated its revival. I focus on the less visible 
discourses that constitute Ker Kwaro and how they interact with the dominant 
discourses I have discussed thus far, primarily with reference to the dominant images 
within these discourses. Whilst wanting to avoid suggesting that what Ker Kwaro Acholi 
is or has come to be, is  somehow ‘unreal’ or just existing in people’s imaginations, 
which is of course not the case, I have sought up to now to emphasise the centrality of 
the role of imagery in making possible and shaping Ker Kwaro Acholi’s ‘revival’ and as 
the final part of the thesis will illustrate, there is a disjuncture between how Ker Kwaro 
is predominately known and imagined to be and how Ker Kwaro has emerged and 

















ALTERNATIVE IMAGES AND SUBJUGATED KNOWLEDGE 
 
In part two, chapter three, of the thesis I analysed how Ker Kwaro Acholi’s image as a 
traditional cultural authority was enabled and consolidated through discourses of 
cultural breakdown and conflict resolution in northern Uganda. In chapter four, I argued 
that Ker Kwaro Acholi’s image as a cultural institution with governance capabilities was 
produced in response to proposed political changes and government discourses on 
traditional authorities. And finally, in chapter five I examined how Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
image as key to sustainable development was produced at a time when donors were 
looking to partner with local actors in order to secure peace and improve the 
sustainability of development in northern Uganda.  
I have, thus far, shown that Ker Kwaro Acholi has been produced through multiple 
discourses, where dominant images of being a traditional authority, a government-
cultural institution and an agent of development have become significant images or 
discourses in an ‘economy of discourses’64 that have enabled Ker Kwaro to exercise 
varying measures of power and authority. Examining Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival only 
with reference to dominant discourses and images that have constituted Ker Kwaro 
gives an important insight into what has shaped the institution and how, but this only 
provides a partial story. It is, therefore, the aim of this final part of the thesis to explore 
a more complex picture of Ker Kwaro by examining the less visible discourses and every 
day practices that also constitute the institution, but that are often obscured by the 
dominant images with which Ker Kwaro has engaged and through which it has 
negotiated its ‘revival’.  I draw extensively on the  six months fieldwork I undertook in 
northern Uganda in 2010. 
                                                          
64 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. C. 
Gordon (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980), 93.  
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The chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section I draw on an interview with 
Rosalba Oywa, who has been closely involved in Ker Kwaro Acholi’s ‘revival’ and today 
continues to engage with the institution through giving talks on issues intended to 
educate and build the capacity of Rwodi. I have chosen to draw extensively on Oywa’s 
interview because she provides a narrative and picture of Ker Kwaro and its revival that 
sits in contrast to the dominant narrative produced by the institution that part two of 
the thesis has explored. This first section thus serves on one level as an introduction to 
the less visible discourses on Ker Kwaro that I subsequently discuss.  
The chapter is then written as a series of thematic critical reflections, organised into 
four sections; the Rwodi of Ker Kwaro Acholi, the Paramount Chief and Payira politics, 




I wanted to interview Rosalba Oywa, a successful Acholi woman in her mid 50s, because 
she worked at ACORD in the late 1990s and until 2003. At that time she had been an 
advocate of reviving traditional authority in Acholi, and still is, despite being author of 
research that pointed out there was widespread disagreements in Acholiland over who 
the real traditional leaders were during the research undertaken in the late 1990s65, as 
discussed in chapter three. Since 2004 Oywa has been working for Coalition for Peace in 
Africa, an NGO she started up with colleagues after taking a course on conflict resolution 
in the UK that was sponsored and facilitated by the British INGO, Responding to Conflict. 
During my fieldwork in 2010 I saw Oywa giving talks at meetings organised by Ker 
Kwaro Acholi, one of which was a workshop in Kitgum on training Rwodi how to be 
traditional leaders where Oywa gave a presentation on leadership. The following month 
she gave a presentation at a workshop for ‘the training of cultural leaders’ on ‘women 
and the traditional justice system’ based on the United Nations Security Council 
                                                          
65 R. Oywa and C. Dolan, "Key Findings from Research on the Role of Traditional and Modern 
Leadership Structures," in Background Papers Presented to the Conference on 'Peace Research 
and the Reconciliation Agenda', Gulu, Northern Uganda, September 1999, ed. ACORD, Cope 
Working Papers (London: ACORD, 2000), 2000.  
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Resolutions 1325 and 1820. She evidently had close dealings with Ker Kwaro Acholi, 
and claimed to have been in part responsible for Paramount Chief Acana’s sponsored 
trip to the UK in 2002. I was interested in hearing what she thought about Ker Kwaro 
today, how she would retell the story of its ‘revival’ and what she thought the future 
held for the institution. Oywa was happy to meet with me and during the ninety minute 
interview I was struck by the energy and emotion behind some of her opinions and the 
frustrations she voiced about Ker Kwaro Acholi, which, as I was already becoming 
aware by this point in my fieldwork, functioned behind a kind of facade or as I have 
talked about in this study, behind a series of images. For Oywa, Ker Kwaro Acholi was 
‘an amorphous’ entity that needed to come under critical scrutiny.66  
Thinking back over ten years ago Oywa remembered, almost with nostalgia, how she 
had been influenced and inspired by the traditional authority revivals in Somaliland, 
South Africa and Kenya, where traditional authorities were involved in creating new 
positions of power and recalled that she had been close to Dennis Pain during his 
research and how he encouraged her to become more interested in particular aspects of 
Acholi culture. The idea, she then emphasised, was that the revival of traditional 
authorities in the late 1990s was of ‘the whole traditional structure’, so they could play a 
critical role in resolving disputes at a critical time. Pain’s research, she said, confirmed 
that the revival of traditional authorities should go ahead and funding should be sought 
to facilitate it.  
I asked what she thought about Ker Kwaro Acholi developing into an institution that has 
a Prime Minster, cabinet of ministers, a secretariat, project officers and that is engaged 
in development programmes. I also asked  if she had ever thought this would be part of 
Ker Kwaro’s revival. Oywa responded with agitation saying, 
We never imaged that. We knew very well that the kingship in the south [of 
Uganda] had things like the prime minister, ministers and what, we knew 
that was the right one [for]...the kingship in Buganda, in Toro, in Bunyoro, 
but we never imagined that that would be our structure, because we were 
never existing in the formal kingdoms, but we were existing in the form of 
chiefdoms, and the simplest structure within the chiefdom was a chief where 
he would have a council of elders coming from different villages within his 
chiefdoms and then within that there would be the women...where the Rwot 
                                                          
66 Interview with R. Oywa, Gulu, 20 April 2010. 
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Okoro would be functioning and Rwot Okoro would be having a leader, then 
we would have a youth wing where the Rwodi Kweri are very important to 
organise agricultural production, where the women, the Rwot Okoro, has to 
do the weeding, the Rwodi kweri were to organise the cultivation and all that, 
and then we and the youth wing would be organising culture activities like 
dances, so that was what we were saying, and if that was revived then we 
could see harmony within a clan and then if there was any problem then the 
chiefs would deal with it very quickly, so that the subjects are peaceful, so 
that was what we were saying at that time. 
I asked if she thought it was problematic that Ker Kwaro seemed to function like an 
NGO, she replied: 
I just find it very confusing and I don’t even know how to deal with it, 
because right now the chiefs are now failing to play that role of providing 
clear leadership, all the time they talk of Ker kal Kwaro which is amorphous, 
to me it is so amorphous that it will not help anything... 
Land will be the real test...now you find when there are land disputes it is the 
Paramount Chief that should appoint who should be dealing with that, [but] 
then they go all over the place and attach to that so much financial support 
because when they go out, you have to give them, you have to facilitate them, 
which is right, but then we have to pay those allowances for that work and in 
a way the chiefs have become so materialistic, in fact... you know I had a 
different intention for their coming and normally when I talk to them I talk 
with a lot of emotion, and I keep on telling them this is not something I ever 
imagined would occur. I did not know this process would bring us to a level 
where the chiefs become so money minded, they are really money minded 
and when they organise their own meetings you have got to give them 
allowances, apart from giving them accommodation, feeding them, they just 
want allowances and I almost got pissed off especially when NUTI was now 
helping them to re-bury the dead. Culturally that is our responsibility, you 
don’t have an external agency taking you to identify those bones... so the 
whole thing has been commercialised and I think we have lost, we are 
regularly losing our cultural values which is something I never imagined. 
When talking about the houses being built for the Rwodi Oywa lamented that around the 
Rwodi 
there are people who cannot do anything and the chief is [also] not doing 
anything. So I think at the end of the day I don’t know what will become of 
these, we were very clear at that time, it was about peace making, first 
reconciliation...and all this but right now it has become something else. It has 
become a process to enrich people, to make people different, to make them 
powerful financially and that is making them run away from the real 
responsibilities and their own subjects don’t like that. So you find especially 
young people wanting to go overseas. 
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Oywa thought that the future of Ker Kwaro Acholi was under threat because of the 
enrichment of Rwodi and their lack of interest in ‘real responsibilities’. Being 
aware that references to Ker Kwaro Acholi are sometimes a reference to the Rwodi 
or the ‘traditionial’ structure, I asked Oywa what she meant by Ker Kwaro Acholi; 
was she referring to the Rwodi or did she conceptualise Ker Kwaro Acholi more 
broadly, to include the secretariat and the ministers? Oywa replied, 
I think it [Ker Kwaro] means the organisation, although for them when we 
talk about Ker Kwaro, they always want us to believe we are talking about 
chiefdoms...[but] I know there is a real distinction between the two, Ker 
Kwaro is a mobile structure which came from nowhere, it is more of 
borrowing things from Buganda, from the kingdoms and trying to make them 
here and it is another way of centralising people as if we want to become a 
kingdom, which will never happen.  
Then you talk to individual chiefs, they always say “we are all equal”, that is 
the irony, they believe they are all equal and nobody should be imposing 
anything on them, that is their belief. So [Ker Kwaro] itself is going to create 
this arrangement,...[but] it will create a lot of tensions among the chiefs and 
what is more, tribal rivalry from within the clans, because we are already 
seeing a situation where people are saying, “no, that is not the chief, we want 
this one to be our chief” and these two ones in Lamogi have changes chiefs.  
And I think it is starting from that background work, it [Ker Kwaro] has 
become a very useful business, where you gain social status, economically 
you have backup and now with the homes...The chief did not do it [build their 
new house] because of his capacity over others; that’s simply because they 
are being aided to do that. And the experts have their own subjects, so I think 
everything is turning upside down. 
Oywa recalls that during the revival ‘ACORD were really dynamic’ and that today ‘they 
should be turning up with another programme...to see that actually if what we 
envisioned at that time, at the clan level’ has taken place. I asked about ACORD’s 
involvement in the revival of traditional authorities since 2000 and Oywa said that since 
she left in 2003 she did not know what is happening. Oywa saw a potential problem in 
that the ‘dreamers’ who were at ACORD at that time have now all left and now those 
that work there are ‘young people who don’t even know what happened’ and ‘don’t 
even have the slightest idea apart from reading in the documents [about] how this 
process’ of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival occurred. Oywa thought that by 2006 all the staff 
she had known at ACORD had probably left, which she thought had probably changed 
the organisation.   
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‘Have we overdone something by creating it?’ Oywa reflected. ‘All of a sudden’ she 
continued, ‘we are reverting to a kingship...like in Buganda’. I asked if installing a 
Paramount Chief had contributed to creating, what she saw as, the problem of being a 
kingship like Buganda, at which Oywa replied that  
it wouldn’t have been a problem if they looked at him as a spokesperson...He 
[the Paramount Chief] should go on our behalf and say that this is what the 
Acholi have agreed on. That is the role we wanted, so it wouldn’t be his 
thinking, it would come from the people, people would have agreed on 
something and his role is just to say it out, and that is the role of a 
spokesperson. 
Oywa seemed to suggest that Paramount Chief Acana was not acting in this way, but 
was rather getting involved in controlling chiefs, which she believed could result in 
people rejecting Rwot Acana II as the Paramount Chief.  Oywa also observed that 
amongst her clan members, the Payira, people were changing their minds and wanting 
Rwot Acana II to stay in the post of Paramount Chief, rather than change after five years. 
She said she was asking people, ‘Why is he still there? Why is there no debate to have 
another Paramount Chief elected?’ At which she said that she had ‘heard from other 
chiefs that there is a lot of political influence meddling in those affairs;’ mentioning both 
the RDC of Gulu, Walter Ochora, and the RDC of Kitgum, who ‘both happened to be 
Payira’, Oywa added. Oywa saw that such key people wanting Acana to be in the 
Paramount Chief post, and not another person, was ‘very dangerous’, that put Acana ‘at 
risk’ and was ‘just drawing hatred from all other clans’. What will Payira become, she 
rhetorically asked, ‘in a situation where fifty three clans are combined’ against us?  
Yes, we are the dominant ethnic group, tribe, within Acholi clan because we 
are the majority, it is true, but we have not misused that number to subdue 
other people... I respect Acana as my cultural chief, yes he is the Paramount 
Chief, but I know that term should be temporary. 
Asking Oywa at the end of the interview if there was anything else she wanted to add, 
anything that might be useful, she said that research needed to be undertaken ‘to 
understand the impact of what has happened, the amorphous thing that has happened’. 







KAKA, KAL AND LOBONG  
 
As I introduced in chapter two, Acholi are related to one another through lineages 
known as kaka, which are usually of agnatic descent, but are sometimes a maternal line. 
At least since the mid-nineteenth century a number of kaka lineages have been 
recognised amongst Acholi as royal lineages acting as overseers and rulers of 
subordinate kaka who pay allegiance through tribute to the royal lineage head in return 
for protection from the threats of famine and warfare.67 Spatially these associations 
were constituted by villages (gang) that were either kal, consisting of households of the 
royal lineages, or lobong, consisting of households of the commoner lineages who paid 
allegiance and were subordinate to the royal lineage. Particular areas of surrounding 
land for agriculture and hunting was governed by the head of the royal lineage, and this 
land together with the kal and lobong villages formed an area that is most commonly 
referred to using the Anglo term ‘chiefdom’, as there was no specific Acholi name for 
this political group.68 The royal lineage head, who governed the chiefdom, was known as 
Rwot and the heads of the other kal and lobong villages within the chiefdom were 
known most commonly as ladit kaka (elder of the lineage; plural lodito kaka).69 
Although the initial vision in the late 1990s was to revive the whole of the traditional 
structure in Acholi, as Oywa recalled in our interview, the narrative that has been 
                                                          
67 Research undertaken by the History of Uganda project in the later 1960s and early 1970s, 
presented in Atkinson’s book R.R. Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of 
Uganda before 1800 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994)., dates the early 
formation of Acholi chiefdoms to a period between 1675 and 1725, which I discuss in chapter 
two.  
68 F.K. Girling, The Acholi of Uganda (London: HMSO, 1960), 8-9. Girling referred to this political 
grouping as a ‘domain’, preferring it over state, kingdom or principality after considering their 
high number in relation to the scale of the society.  
69 In addition to this generic term Atkinson has added that Ladit pa Rwot (elder of the Rwodi) 
was commonly used in Western Acholi and Lakwena (messenger) was reported in many Eastern 
Acholi texts, R.R. Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda before 
1800 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 86. Girling, however, used Rwot 
and Ladit interchangeably to refer to lineage heads of commoner villages, in F.K. Girling, The 
Acholi of Uganda (London: HMSO, 1960), 8-9. 
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pursued by Ker Kwaro during its emergence has focused primarily on reviving Rwodi, 
the royal lineage heads, on the basis that they used to play this role in pre-colonial 
Acholiland. However, the list of ‘Chiefs’ in the 2009 Strategic Plan shows that they are 
constituted by both royal and commoner lineage heads; by Rwodi and ludito kaka. The 
Strategic Plan indicates that at least seven ‘Chiefs’ are heads of lineages associated, and 
subordinate to, a royal lineage.70  
In the list, the royal lineage is bracketed next to the commoner lineage, suggesting that, 
contrary to the impression that all the ‘Chiefs’ of Ker Kwaro are equal, these distinctions 
remain important, at least to the leadership of Ker Kwaro Acholi. Paramount Chief 
Acana agreed that he also had in mind to create a clear distinction between Rwodi of a 
royal lineage and Rwodi of a commoner lineage.71 From Paramount Chief Acana’s 
perspective in 2011, the demand coming from ‘sub-clans’, seeking recognition from Ker 
Kwaro Acholi, was causing tension; people were ‘forgetting that this is a royal 
institution’.72 The problem in part, seems to stem from when commoner lineage heads 
were seeking to be revived and recognised by Ker Kwaro Acholi, and Paramount Chief 
Acana, as he recalled, did not want to cause conflict by rejecting those coming forward 
claiming to be Rwodi. Paramount Chief Acana told me, 
we allowed them to come out because of the situation that we were in...we 
said that “if you want to end the conflict then we don’t want to create more 
conflict within ourselves”, so if someone is coming up and saying “look I am 
also a Rwot, I want to be on board, or on this rescue mission”, fine let’s go 
with it. That is how we accepted them. 
Over more recent years Paramount Chief Acana has become frustrated with 
commoner lineage heads, or ‘sub-clan heads’ as he called them, seeking to claim an 
equal status with Rwodi. In a discussion about the increasing number of ‘Rwodi’ in 
Ker Kwaro, Paramount Chief Acana said, 
I keep on telling them, “no we are not equal”. I look at the twenty eight 
[Rwodi] and they can say “we are equal” but then I look at the sub ones and 
                                                          
70 The chiefs are listed as follows, with the royal lineage in brackets, following the commoner 
lineage of the chief: Ojuka Dison of Pajimo (Pagen), Omal Alfred of Madi Kiloc (Padibe), Joseph 
Oywak Ywakamoi of Koyo (Pajule), Samuel Anywar of Pagol (Pajule), Denoch Oweka Ajao of 
Paibwore (Pajule), Celestino Opobo of Ngekidi (Pajule), Edward Omal of Ogole (Pajule).  




yes let them be there...[but] me being Rwot of Payira I do not see under any 
circumstances a sub-clan chief is going to be my chairman, sitting up there 
and coordinating the meeting that I’m in, because I am the Rwot of Payira...so 
that is how it has to be always you know, so this is creating a lot of discomfort 
with the institution. People don’t want to talk about it openly.73 
Where Ker Kwaro Acholi draws the line with incorporating lineage heads into Ker 
Kwaro Acholi is unclear. In the current context of relative peace in Acholiland, where 
people are resettling according to village and lineage groupings, there is growing 
demand from lineage heads to be recognised and incorporated into the Council of 
Chiefs. Recognising them all would push the number of chiefs in Ker Kwaro into the 
hundreds.  
Another potential points of tension may be that, despite the dominant image, a number 
of royal lineage heads are not recognised by Ker Kwaro Acholi. In the case of the Bwobo 
lineage, thought to be one of the earliest royal lineages in Acholi, dating back to the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century,74 although it was recognised in 2005, was not 
recognised and listed in the 2009 Strategic Plan. I was told on a number of occasions 
that it is the Paramount Chief who ultimately decides on which Rwodi can become part 
of Ker Kwaro, although he would seek the guidance and advise of other Rwodi and 
elders around him. As the following two sections continue to illustrate, the image of Ker 
Kwaro as constituted by a homogenous group of chiefs or Rwodi, who were revived and 





Incorporated into the dominant image of Ker Kwaro Acholi as a traditional institutional 
authority is the presentation of the ‘chiefs’ or Rwodi as a homogenous group of equally 
placed traditional authorities who form the Council of Chiefs. However, such dominant 
images and understandings of Rwodi in Ker Kwaro Acholi flatten out and obscure 
current power relations between the various ‘traditional’ leaders in Ker Kwaro and in 
                                                          
73 Ibid.  
74 R.R. Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda before 1800 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 86. 
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Acholiland more generally. A comparison of the two Strategic Plans shows there was an 
increase in the number of ‘chiefs’ of Ker Kwaro Acholi between 2005 and 2009 from 
fifty to fifty four. No explanation or additional information is given about how or why 
the number of ‘chiefs’ increases, and at first glance seems to be a small increase due to a 
few more ‘chiefs’ identified or coming forward to be recognised by Ker Kwaro Acholi. 
However, a more labour intensive study of the Strategic Plans and interviews with 
twenty one Rwodi of Ker Kwaro Acholi in 2010, revealed a more complex picture, which 
is effectively hidden in dominant self-presentations of Ker Kwaro Acholi.  
It became clear that what seemed to be a small increase in the number of Rwodi at Ker 
Kwaro Acholi was not this at all. Rather, despite the number of Rwodi in Ker Kwaro only 
seeming to increase by four, I noted that in 2009 the Strategic Plan listed fifteen new 
‘chiefdoms’ and twelve new ‘chiefs.’ Breaking this down further it amounted to eleven 
new ‘chiefdoms’ with new chiefs;75 three new ‘chiefdoms’ related in a more complicated 
way to three chiefs, two of which were already recognised as members of Ker Kwaro76; 
and eight chiefs, along with their chiefdoms from the 2005 Strategic Plan, not listed in 
2009 at all.77  
It is also interesting to note that Ker Kwaro adopts the anglicised terminology of Chiefs 
and Chiefdoms in the second Strategic Plan to describe traditional authorities and their 
areas of jurisdiction, unlike the first plan, where the terms Rwodi and kaka were used. 
This may have been to increase Ker Kwaro’s legibility to those unfamiliar with 
                                                          
75 Baptist Latim of Pawel, Ojuka Dison of Pajimo, Omal Alfred of Madi Kiloc, Joseph Oywak 
Ywakamoi of Koyo, Samuel Anywar of Pagol, Orik Luromoi of Kal, Thomas Ocen Lakidi of Taa, 
George Owiny of Painata, Denoch Oweka Ajao of Paibwore,  Celestino Opobo of Ngekidi and 
Edward Omal of Ogole. 
76 One of these complications involved the inclusion of Lwo pa Omot as a ‘chiefdom’ (or kaka) in 
2009 and the appointment of Faustino Owor Kiwel as the ‘Chief’; although having previously 
been stated as Rwot of Adilang in 2005. Filling the newly created gap, Rwot Linus Odwar became 
Rwot of Adilang, having previously been listed as Rwot of Akwee in 2005. In 2009, a new chief, 
Richard Lamal, was appointed over Akwee.  
77 The eight chiefs listed in the 2005 Plan but not in 2009 were: Okello Vinancio of Bwobo, 
Owiny Angelo of Lapono, Lakoo of Omiya Pachwa, Logella Ario of Kal Puruma, Ocen Marino of 




Acholiland, but it also has the effect of further flattening out the diversity present 
amongst traditional authorities in Ker Kwaro.78 
Two other differences noted between the lists in the Strategic Plans, was that Jackson 
Okongo and Poppy Paul Arop were listed next to Paluga and Labongo, respectively, in 
2005, but next to Palagoya kal and Pagen in 2009. It seems that in the 2005 Plan some of 
the Rwodi were listed next to sub-counties, as in these cases, despite appearing under 
the heading of ‘Clan or Chiefdom’. In 2009, it seems that for these two cases the sub-
county was replaced by the chiefdoms that most likely share a similar area, as sub-
counties were more or less superimposed over chiefdoms in the colonial period.79  
John Odoki Obol is also listed next to a different chiefdom in 2009, but whereas the 
previous two seemed to be alterations from sub-counties to chiefdoms, in John Odoki 
Obol’s case he is reallocated from Pamot to Padibe, from the commoner lineage of 
Pamot to the royal lineage of Padibe.80  
Although these preliminary observations do not provide explanations for the 
fluctuations amongst chiefs and the areas they were said to hold authority by Ker 
Kwaro, they do flag up the underlying complexities constituting what is presented in 
dominant discourses of Ker Kwaro Acholi as a straight forward revival of Rwodi who are 
a fixed and known group, and who have undisputed authority throughout Acholiland.  
Besides the discrepancies evident between the lists of chiefs in Ker Kwaro, other 
complexities also shaped the process of reviving and installing traditional leaders in 
Acholi, which should come as no surprise considering historical accounts of how lineage 
heads have been appointed in the past. Ker Kwaro Acholi’s narrative of Rwodi revivals, 
                                                          
78 Where I refer to ‘Rwodi’ in this chapter, I do so because this is how they referred to 
themselves. I am not therefore, given the contestations between royal and commoner lineage 
heads and disputes over the ‘real’ traditional lineage heads, using the term in a normative 
capacity.  
79 Alternatively, in Jackson Okongo’s case, Paluga (or Paloga) is also the name of a chiefdom that 
formed in the eighteenth century and Palagoya could be a contemporary modification of the 
name Paluga.  
80 It is thought that in the eighteenth century Pamot was the strongest commoner lineage within 
the Padibe chiefdom, see R.R. Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of 
Uganda before 1800 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 86. Also, given the 
contentious past between Payira and Padibe it would be interesting to follow up on this change 
that goes almost unnoticed in dominant discourses of Ker Kwaro Acholi.  
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in contrast, suggest that no such complications exist and that reviving Rwodi has been a 
straight forward affair. The revival and anointing of Arop Paul, Rwot of Pagen, is one 
story that illustrates the sort of complexities surrounding traditional authority revival 
in Acholiland. 
When it comes to appointing a new Rwot it is thought ideal that this position is 
succeeded by the first son of the Rwot and his wife (daker) who he married as part of his 
anointing ceremony. However, if the eldest son of the Rwot and daker is unsuitable, for 
example, shows poor leadership qualities, then other male family members or even 
those in the wider clan, would be considered. The anointing of Arop Paul as Rwot of 
Pagen is one such contemporary example. 81 The Rwot before him, Ocen Valentino died 
in a motor accident but his son did not inherit the post because he was deaf. Rwot Arop 
Paul was the great nephew of Ocen Valentino and through a family discussion was 
asked to succeed. In the case of Joseph Oyenga the former Rwot of Palabek; he had 
returned from the bush with the LRA in 2000 and was reinstated as Rwot through 
ACORD funding in 2002. However, a brother had taken Rwot Oyenga’s wife as his own 
whilst Rwot Oyenga had been away from home with the LRA. In 2005 Rwot Oyenga 
murdered his brother when he was drunk and was subsequently arrested. The current 
Rwot of Palabek, Kinyera Vincent, brother of Joseph Oyenga, told me that this was when 
the elders sat down and decided that he should become Rwot. This decision was based 
on two things, firstly, that even though Oyenga has now returned to Palabek, the 
community has rejected him because as a Rwot it is thought he is not supposed to have 
blood on his hands, and secondly, Kinyera Vincent had been the secretary to his brother 
when he was Rwot and had shown desirable qualities for leadership. Rwot Kinyera 
Vincent awaits his installment and is currently seeking to raise the funds he estimates at 
UGX 1 million.82  
The discrepancies and complexities I have identified, which arouse the need for further 
analysis in this area, challenges a framing of rwotship often re-produced by Ker Kwaro, 
as a natural state, removed from the choice of the individual to claim, accept or reject 
the post. As a section later in this section of the chapter continues to confirm, the 
                                                          
81 Interview with R.P.P. Arop, Pagen, Kitgum, 17 July 2010. 
82 Interview with R.K. Vincent, Kitgum, 30 April 2010.   
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meaning and notion of Rwot is under increasing contestation in the current post-conflict 
context in Acholiland.  
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND IDENTIFYING RWODI 
  
The involvement of local politicians for mobilising support for the revival of Rwodi mo 
has been largely edited out of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s official account of the institutions 
‘revival’. As I discussed in chapter two the Acholi Parliamentary Group and particular 
politicians such as M.P Owiny Dollo, LCV of Kitgum Nahaman Ojwe, and RDC of Gulu 
Peter Odok, were enthusiastic about a ‘revival’ of Rwodi mo, and for Rwot Acana II to be 
recognised as the senior Rwot of Acholi.83 In chapter three, however, where I critiqued 
the emerging identity of Ker Kwaro Acholi as a traditional authority in Acholiland, there 
was little trace and acknowledgment of government involvement in the process.  
Interviews with Rwodi of Ker Kwaro Acholi revealed a different picture where two 
influential politicians in Acholiland, Mr John Bosco Oryem and Lt. Santo Okot Lapolo, 
were repeatedly mentioned. Between 2002 and 2006 Mr Oryem was the District 
Chairman of the Local Council (LCV) in Kitgum and Lt. Lapolo was the Resident District 
Commissioner in Kitgum.84 According to one Rwot from Kitgum district, LCV Oryem was 
involved in installing people claiming Rwotship despite their fathers not necessarily 
being Rwodi.85 One instance recounted to me by Rwot Dison of Pajimo was the creation 
of Rwot Lugwar, who appointed himself and created a clan in the 1990s,86 and was later 
recognised as a Rwot because of political involvement. Rwot Dison recounted that 
Lugwar had been a parish, claimed ‘clan status’ and ‘put a Rwot in place’. ‘The politicians 
recruited many,’ Rwot Dison recalled, ‘if your place was a parish then it might be made 
                                                          
83 D. Pain, "'The Bending of Spears': Producing Consensus for Peace and Development in 
Northern Uganda," (London: International Alert, in partnership with Kacoke Madit, 1997), 17-
18.   
84 Lapolo was moved to Pader as RDC in June 2006 and another RDC reshuffle moved Lt. Santo 
Lapolo back as RDC Kitgum, where he has since been accused of corruption and influencing 
presidential, parliamentary and LCV elections. D. Olaka, "Kitgum Councillors Want New Rdc 
Transferred," Uganda Radio Network, 2 March 2011. 
85 Interview with R.J. Obita, Kitgum, 30 April 2010.  
86 Interview with R.O. Dison, Kitgum, 17 June 2010.  
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into a clan...but according to history there was no Lugwar and no Rwot’. According to 
Rwot Dison, the community have not accepted the self-appointed Rwot Lugwor, even if 
Ker Kwaro Acholi have acknowledged him, and is currently also acting as treasurer to 
Rwot Dison.87 
LCV Oryem was accused by Rwot Arop of using intimidation, especially in Pader, 
because he wanted chiefs installed who were in support of him.88 Rwot Arop described 
LCV Oryem as one of the ones who was spearheading the search for the royal families, 
and that it ‘involved politics’. Although he thought that in Kitgum ‘they had tried to do it 
better’, he was sceptical about how the process had been conducted in Pader. 
Particularly because in Pader, Rwot Arop said, you can ‘find that in a Parish there are 
two cultural leaders, which is impossible...they have done something wrong there...some 
clans don’t know how to go about this cultural leadership and the rest of it, some don’t 
know who the traditional leaders are and some people are putting themselves forward 
because of the benefits that Rwodi are getting’.  
Rwot George Lugai, one of the deputies to Paramount Chief Acana II, and chairman of 
Rwodi in Pader district, and Rwot Celestino Opobo of Ngekidi also in Pader, confirm that 
indeed LCV Oryem had been influential in the process of identifying and installing 
Rwodi, particularly Rwot Opobo said, with regards to ‘cutting the numbers.’ Rwot Lugai 
recalled that some chiefs were left out in the initial revival and, problematically, are 
coming out now, one by one. Part of the problem for Rwot Lugai is that ‘originally’ there 
were only twenty eight Rwodi in 2000 and at ‘first kept quiet but now they are seeing 
the houses and are wanting to be chief’.89 
Rwot Celestino mentioned that the ‘district officials wanted their Rwodi moo to be 
empowered’, not only it seems to potentially gain political power but because there had 
been an announcement on the radio that the Rwodi were being promised new houses 
                                                          
87 It is thought that Lugwar was incorporated as a lobong lineage into Pajimo kal in the 
eighteenth century. R.R. Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda 
before 1800 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 192.  
88 Interview with R.P.P. Arop, Pagen, Kitgum, 17 July 2010. 
89 Interview with R.G. Lugai, Pader, 27 April 2010.  
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and to be paid UGX 4 million per month.90 The involvement of politicians has also been 
affecting, according to Rwot Obita, the installing ceremonies of some of the ‘genuine 
chiefs’. Whilst other Rwodi who have conducted their installing ceremonies are still 
awaiting money that they feel is owed to them to cover the costs of their instalments.91 
Rwot Arop, as well as Rwot Obita, wanted to reassure me in our interviews, however, 
that ‘here in Kitgum we are all the real Rwodi with no problems’, ‘we don’t have 
problems, we don’t have any chiefs now whose father was not a chief...those who were 
installed by the politicians have been removed, [although] some few are still causing 
problems, particularly like those in Lamogi.’92 In 2010 the Rwotship of Lamogi was 
under fierce debate and Rwot Martin Otto Yai had been ousted from his deputy 
Paramount Chief position. From Rwot Otto Yai’s perspective MP’s had been getting 
involved in the selection of Lamogi chiefs and siding with his uncle who is now vying to 
be Rwot, despite, as Rwot Otto Yai told me, his uncle having been the organising 
chairman of Rwot Otto Yai’s anointing ceremony in 2000. ‘How do politicians benefit?’, I 
asked, Rwot Otto Yai responded, ‘they know when I’m not around they will get a lot of 
votes, they are after votes...for me I am neutral, he [the uncle] is their agent, my uncle is 
moving together with the politicians, advocating for FDC’. Probing further I asked if this 
was a common problem. ‘Yes’ Rwot Otto Yai said, ‘I didn’t do anything, they are using 
politics on culture, but it cannot happen in Acholi because it’s the blood’. This statement 
refers to a previous remark Rwot Otto Yai made earlier in the interview, that ‘there 
could be no selection of cultural chiefs because it’s about blood’.93 
In contrast to the critical views held by Rwodi east of the river Aswa, three Rwodi from 
the west, from Amuru and Gulu districts, recalled that the involvement of local 
politicians was not direct, but was in the form of ‘making official’ the records that 
ACORD collected on the Rwodi; a process which according to Rwot Lawot of 
                                                          
90 Interview with R.C. Opobo, Pader, 6 May 2010. Although the Rwodi have been receiving the 
materials to build new brick houses from the Government, the stipend of UGX 5 million per 
month is only for the traditional and cultural heads, and not for all the revived traditional 
leaders under the head.  
 
91 Interview with R.J. Obita, Kitgum, 30 April 2010.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Interview with R.M.O. Yai, Gulu, 11 June 2010. 
161 
 
Bwobomanam did not change anything.94 The involvement of politicians such as Col. 
Walter Bosco LCV Gulu and LCV Oryem was, in contrast, regarded in a positive light, as a 
response to ‘central government wanting to unite people together’, as Rwot Akileo of 
Parabongo put it, or as Rwot Lagony of Koch said, they wanted the revival of Rwodi 
because they saw ‘a missing link’ and a lack of moral authority in Acholiland.95  
Even though the numbers of Rwodi in Ker Kwaro Acholi have fluctuated due to local 
complexities and political involvement, some Rwodi such as Rwot Jeremiah Muttu of 
Patiko insisted that those who are Rwodi are known by everyone in Acholi and that the 
ones that are in Ker Kwaro Acholi are the ones from the ‘big chiefdoms’. However, he 
also commented that ‘originally’ there were no more than thirty Rwodi from the ‘big 
chiefdoms’ in Acholi and so if the number of Rwodi in Ker Kwaro Acholi is to change 
then it should go down.96 It seems that whilst Rwot Muttu tried to maintain the integrity 
of the Council of Rwodi, as a council for Rwodi understood as royal lineage heads, he also 
acknowledged and was concerned about the inherent contradiction that the Council of 
Rwodi was in fact also constituted by non-royal lineage heads, who by being regarded as 
Rwodi hoped to gain equal status to those who hailed from royal families. 
According to one of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s project officers, Humphrey Ojok, the revival of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi was sabotaged by government as a way to ensure Ker Kwaro Acholi 
was not too strong, because if the revival had been done in the right way, for example, 
as an independent process with no government interference and with the ‘correct’ 
Rwodi being installed, then ‘Ker Kwaro would have been more powerful.’ He noted that 
the involvement of government officials weakened things by provoking people’s 
suspicions about motivations behind the revivals.  Rwot Acana II, Ojok told me, avoids 
the issue of disputes about correct Rwodi because ‘it brings up the issue about how Ker 
Kwaro isn’t a traditional institution’, but ‘if the Rwodi come together then you can hear 
people saying “you are not a chief.”’ Ojok then poignantly stated, ‘you can get Rwodi 
together to talk about gender based violence but not themselves’. They do not want to 
talk about themselves, Ojok, said, ‘because of donor money’, implying that funds from 
                                                          
94 Interview with R.M. Lawot, Gulu, 9 June 2010. 
95 Interview with R.O. Akileo, Gulu, 8 June 2010, Interview with R.F. Lagony, Kampala, 23 June 
2010.  
96 Interview with R.J. Muttu, Gulu, 7 June 2010. 
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donors would be at risk if donors became aware of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s disputable 
claims of being a traditional authority.  
RDC Lapolo recalled too that there had been problems with two people fighting over the 
Pajule Rwotship, which he thought remained unresolved.97 And RDC Ochora 
remembered that Pagak had also had some problems, where the person who was 
anointed died after three days in suspicious circumstances. Ochora recalled that this 




Ker Kwaro Acholi’s recognition as the traditional cultural institution is underpinned by 
an idea of the chiefs being a legitmate council of Rwodi. The legitimacy of Rwodi is 
presented as being dependent upon to being able to trace the line of authority to the 
pre-colonial period, which also distinguishes them from the appointed, and thus 
corrupted, Rwodi-kalam of the colonial period. As RDC Ochola made clear to me, during 
the process of identifying Rwodi in the late 1990s and since, he and the other facilitators 
of the re-installing ceremonies were only interested in reviving Rwodi mo, those who 
were from an inherited line and who had not been appointed by colonial authorities. 
Pain’s report in 1997 had also given great emphasis to the distinction between Rwodi-
mo and Rwodi-kalam, and similarly valorised a romantic idea that Rwodi had not been 
corrupted by virtue of being from a pre-colonial line of Rwodi-mo.  
The legitimacy of traditional, anointed, Rwodi-mo and the traditional roles as mediators 
of conflict they played in the past, have been used to anchor claims that Ker Kwaro 
Acholi is well placed to act in a governance capacity, at least in “cultural matters”,99 and 
be a central actors in the development of Acholi sub-region. However, whilst money has 
been sourced and donated towards rendering Ker Kwaro Acholi recognisable as a 
traditional cultural institution, with the effect also of centralising Ker Kwaro in Gulu, at 
                                                          
97 Interview with S. Lapolo, Pader, 28 April 2010.  
98 Interview with W. Ochora, Gulu, 23 April 2010.  
99 See chapter four. 
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the Palace of the Paramount Chief, relatively little funding has gone towards facilitating 
the empowerment of Rwodi beyond their anointing ceremonies.  
Being recognised and respected amongst ‘subjects’ was the most significant concern and 
frustration I heard Rwodi raise during interviews and at workshops/meetings I 
attended in 2010’;100 contrary to the dominant impression that, once revived, Rwodi 
would automatically receive local recognition and hold legitimacy. Although the 
weakened state of Rwodi has been emphasised in order to secure funding for their 
revivals, the extent that Rwodi have been struggling to garner respect is not evident in 
the dominant discourse of Ker Kwaro Acholi.  
At the Retreat for Capacity Building Rwodi, organised by the secretariat and attended by 
Paramount Chief Acana, Rwodi expressed frustrations about the lack of respect they felt 
they were accorded by the public. After a presentation given by one of the Ministers of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi on land issues where the Rwodi were informed their role was to get to 
know the Land Act and to ensure that the land system being used is in line with the 
customs of their various clans, Rwot Odong Lira made the point that ‘the most important 
thing that needs to be taken seriously before talking about land issues is the capacity 
building and empowerment of Rwodi...there is no difference between Rwodi and 
people...do you think the government is going to accept the things we are trying to 
say?’101  
Often when it was acknowledged that the Rwodi were struggling to garner respect and 
thus legitimacy from those who identified with their clan or chiefdom, the primary 
reasons given were threefold. Firstly, the lack of recognition and respect accorded to 
Rwodi was thought to be due to people’s ignorance of culture and tradition and the 
specific role of Rwodi in Acholi society, secondly, it was also thought that even if people 
knew of the Rwodi they could not distinguish them in the crowds because they looked 
like everyone else; there was no paraphernalia to mark them out. And finally it was 
shared that even if people knew the Rwodi and could recognise them, their lack of 
capacity and resources to assist their subjects would ultimately undermine their 
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legitimacy as Rwodi. The extent of the problem did not instigate a re-evaluation of the 
relevance of Rwodi, which remained taken as given, but rather discussions resulted in a 
series of solutions, such as sensitising the Acholi on the relevance, authority and roles of 
the Rwot, as if Rwodi legitimacy was something that lay dormant and needed to be 
reignited or revealed through shedding the scales of ignorance from the eyes of blind 
Acholi. According to one of the previous Programme Managers of Ker Kwaro Acholi, 
Mark Avola, Ker Kwaro Acholi needs to ‘bring back the people’s understanding of the 
value of chiefs and their roles’, because many people were brought up in IDP camps or 
lived outside of Acholi and thus ‘may not even know who the chiefs are’.102 The other 
proposed solution from amongst Rwodi was to empower the Rwodi in such a way that 
they could first of all be visually distinctive from ordinary people, and so be seen as men 
in authority who possessed wealth and resources.  
From most Rwodi perspectives, a lack of respect from the community was because of a 
lack of knowledge about Acholi tradition and the specific tradition of the Rwodi 
structure, brought about by the destruction of symbolic paraphernalia and cultural 
structures over recent decades. Although sometimes the drum and spear were referred 
to as practical objects to communicate with clan subjects and protect them from outside 
hostilities, they were largely regarded as symbols that identify the Rwot.  
According to Rwot Ajao bringing back some of the ‘traditional designs that got 
destroyed, like the skin of the lion and leopard’, is very important because these are ‘the 
sign[s] that you are the Rwot moo’.103 Rwot Lawot emphasised the drum as a crucial sign 
of being the Rwot of a royal family or ker lineage. In addition the tong ker (royal spear), 
kwot (shield), odor ker (royal walking stick or staff), mala ogul (braclet) and tok tok 
(stool)104 were identified by Rwot Lawot as symbols of a Rwotship. Rwot Lawot proudly 
told me he had these items, although only had one leopard skin when in his opinion he 
should have two; one on top of the stool and the other with the drum.  
Rwot Otto Yai used a reference to the drum, spear and chair of Lamogi being in his 
possession as something that legitimates his contested claim as Rwot of Lamogi. Rwot 
                                                          
102 Interview with M. Avola, Gulu, 15 April 2010.  
103 Interview with R.O. Ajao, Pader, 27 April 2010.  
104 Although this is how Rwot Lawot referred to stool in our interview, the common Luo word 
for the royal stool is kom ker. 
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Latim also had a story about his drum that had caused problems in the process of his 
coronation.105 ‘The royal equipment like the drum,...the stool and royal cloth’ at Padibe, 
Rwot Okidi told me, were given to his grandfather Rwot Ogwok by Queen Victoria and 
these paraphernalia, particularly the drum, are symbols that show visitors ‘the palace of 
the Rwot is of a certain clan and is powerful’.106 Possessing royal regalia also, according 
to Rwot Arop, determined not only that you were a royal Rwot, but also that you could 
be a Rwot of Ker Kwaro Acholi. 
Many of the Rwodi interviewed said they did not have their royal regalia or 
paraphernalia, which could be an indication they are not from a royal lineage, but the 
reasons cited were the abolition of traditional authorities in the late 1960s, the recent 
conflict and displacement. They also said they had not been able to restore or acquire 
such items because of the cost; ‘to buy a leopard skin’ Rwot Obita told me, ‘can cost 
about two million Ugandan shillings and we can’t afford it’. A Rwot also commented that 
there was a need to revive traditional clothing of Rwodi, remarking that if a visitor saw 
them in their meeting they would not realise it was a meeting of the Rwodi. Another 
type of clothing that can show you are someone big, the Rwot continued, would be 
something like a shawl, that you can put on and look smart.107  
Rwot Latyet had a different view when talking about Rwodi empowerment, which 
focused less on Rwodi possessing traditional symbols of power, and more on 
empowerment through financial resources: 
One of the things that is very important for Rwodi to have power is first of all 
capital, income, resources...but when they are still disempowered and lack 
those things, people just keep on insulting and say “this is a lousy Rwot”, so 
the most important thing is to be empowered financially with some 
resources...You need to have some resources or something that you can use 
to make people know that you really can help. For instance if you have a 
                                                          
105 Unfortunately the story is rather obscure, perhaps through translation, but this is what Rwot 
Latim said: ‘We have the drum which the chief from the other side used, but it got burnt in the 
house. The elders wanted the new drum to be a reflection of the other one, which means we 
must get soil from the other house that was burnt and put it into this drum so it is the same 
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house like this then someone else can point and say “that is the house of 
really somebody”...unless Rwodi are empowered they cannot reach the 
community and the community may not look at them, so the empowerment 
of the community first starts with the Rwodi and goes out. 108 
The houses that began to built for the Rwodi of Ker Kwaro Acholi have been the most 
significant material benefit they have received for being a ‘traditional authority’ and 
most Rwodi are hopeful these smart, red brick, four bed roomed houses will effectively 
distinguish them from ordinary people. Not all Rwodi, however, are content with the 
Government’s gesture and feel they are being bought-off. Those who are less sceptical 
prefer to frame the venture as something that Ker Kwaro Acholi, and more specifically 
Paramount Chief Acana, has attained through negotiation with the President of Uganda. 
Three explanations may account for the lack of respect Rwodi are experiencing. The first 
may be due to a collective social memory about the elders, particularly from Payira, 
giving a blessing to rebels in the late 1980s.109 Although there is great contestation over 
whether this ‘critical event’110 occurred, and those accused of taking part in the warfare 
blessing and curse deny involvement, the escalation of violence that followed was proof 
to many of Finnstrom’s informants ‘that some kind of fundamental imbalance has been 
haunting the Acholi surroundings of the living and the dead’ since. In addition, 
rumoured attempts of Payira elders to retract the blessing given to rebel groups after 
the Corner Kilak battles, without a rebel high commander present, are thought to have 
increased mistrust amongst rebels of elders as impartial mediators of peace and 
angered the rebel high command, and thus for many Acholi contributed to explaining 
the phenomenon of social unrest and gross violence.111 
Secondly, the lack of respect towards Rwodi can be understood as part of a broader 
disappointment, particularly amongst young people, with senior politicians and older 
generations ‘who encouraged young people to join the war against Museveni’. In 2000, 
                                                          
108 Interview with R. Latyet, Kilak Corner, Pader District, 27 April 2010.  
109 See S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 211-
219.  
110 Finnström draws on V. Das, Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on contemporary 
India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), to discuss the blessing and the curse as a ‘critical 
event’; as an event that forces people to rethink and reconceptualise life, relations, politics, and 
cultural belonging on a daily basis’.  
111 S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 217-218.  
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one of Finnstrom’s young informants from Gulu said that ‘elders capture power all the 
time and they make use of youth in many ways, but all the time not for positive aspects; 
all the time for something that causes friction in society, social friction in society’.112 
More recently, Branch has commented that ‘tensions between male lineage-based 
authorities and armed young men have been one of the roots of the wars that have 
plagued northern Uganda for over two decades’ and on this premise questions the 
possibility of elders and clan authorities as effective mediators in the reintegration 
process, particularly of ex-LRA.113 
Finally, an unpopularity towards revived traditional leadership, such as Rwodi, may be 
due to the disciplinary approach some are taking in attempts to ‘correct the corruption 
introduced in Acholi society during displacement’.114 ‘In the most extreme versions’, 
Branch has written, ‘elders explained how they saw themselves as taking a dominant 
and all-encompassing role in social regulation in the post-conflict period...through 
imposing discipline at the family and clan levels through warnings, fines, corporal 
punishment, and, if all else fails, expulsion from the clan and curses’.115 The concern, 
Branch emphasised, was that  
Independent or assertive women or youth, those with unclear ancestry, those 
with foreign connections or relations, or simply those deemed undesirable or 
vulnerable could be disciplined or excluded through accusations of 
contravening ‘Acholi tradition’ or ‘Acholi laws...Indeed, among men, the re-
establishment of ‘traditional authority’ was often framed explicitly in terms 
of undoing the power gained by women and youth in the camps and imposing 
the power of men and elders over these punitively formerly subservient 
groups.  
Prime Minister Oketta shared a similar view to those that Branch heard amongst the 
male elders he interviewed. Ker Kwaro Acholi has, Oketta told me, a disciplinary role to 
play, through questioning those who go outside of the ‘Acholi way of doing things’ and 
making sure that misdeeds and misbehaving is exposed in public meetings. Ker Kwaro 
Acholi is to ‘revive those traditions of Acholi which are good...we are there to say what is 
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the tradition of the Acholi, the one which is good’.116 The Programme Manager, Okema, 
also said in our interview that ‘Ker Kwaro is here to educate people to adjust to the 
norms and values of the Acholi people’.117 
 
KER KWARO PAYIRA 
 
A PAYIRA PARAMOUNT CHIEF 
 
The emergence of Ker Kwaro Acholi has been presented as the revival of an institution 
constituted by a Council of Chiefs and headed by a Paramount Chief, dating back to 
1400AD. As discussed in chapter two, the Payira seem to naturally occupy the position 
of Paramount Chief in Acholi. The silence in Ker Kwaro’s public narratives over the 
agreement made in the late 1990s amongst the Rwodi, that the post of Paramount Chief 
would rotate, perpetuates the impression that the Payira holding this post is 
traditionally accurate and a natural state of affairs in Acholiland. However, there are a 
variety of views on this subject, ranging from those who argue that Rwot Acana II is the 
rightful Paramount Chief because he has inherited the post from his grandfather, Rwot 
Awich, whose paramountcy in Acholi was recognised by the British in the late 
nineteenth century. Other views do not believe Payira can make a legitimate claim to 
traditionally holding a position of paramount chief, either because the Acholi have never 
had a paramount chief position, or because other chiefdoms make similar cases that 
their lineage has held this position in the past, and were too recognised by early 
explorers and colonial rulers. Most Rwodi, representing these different views, expect 
that once people have returned and resettled in their villages from the displacement 
camps, then an election amongst the Rwodi will take place for the paramount chief post. 
I asked Paramount Chief Acana, during an interview in 2011, if he felt that the position 
of a paramount chief was new in Acholi or whether he believed he was continuing a 
precedent. He replied, 
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This is not a new position as such, depending on what people call it. They call 
it a paramount chief, they call it the King, definitely it is a Rwot and if you 
translate Rwot, it’s not just the chief; Rwot is Lord, which is King and...in my 
case I take it back to the 1400. I know that it has been on for a long time and 
that is something that I am building on, just like the people before me and for 
Acholi, yes, I am also carrying on because my great grandfather, Rwot Awich 
was in that position. Although it was not officially declared, that is where 
almost the rest of Acholi used to turn to Payira for guidance [and] 
leadership,...[for] refuge during wars and famine, and assistance in war and 
all that. And that is why the explorers, Samuel Baker and other people, they 
called him the King of Acholi, because of the way he was being treated by the 
other Rwodi, and my father (Godfrey Acana), although he was not officially 
put in that place, he was also like the chairman of the Rwodi. 
Whilst stating that the Paramount Chief position is not new, Rwot Acana II 
acknowledged it is an ambiguous issue that can be viewed differently, depending on 
how people see the position and, as he says, what people call it. As far as Paramount 
Chief Acana was concerned, he was continuing a tradition of Payira leadership amongst 
the Rwodi that goes back to his great grandfather, Rwot Awich, in the late 19th century, 
and that was carried on by his father who was, as also mentioned in chapter three, the 
Chairman of the Rwodi-mo Councillors in the late 1990s. Although both Rwot Awich and 
Rwot Godfrey Acana, did hold positions of leadership amongst other Rwodi, it is unlikely 
the body of Rwodi incorporated Rwodi across today’s Acholiland. Rather, it is likely the 
support they received came from the numerous village lineages associated to Payira 
through the ancestral/kal line or as commoner/lobong lineages. As Girling wrote about 
the Rwot of Payira in 1960, he ‘could more accurately be described as the leading Acholi 
chief, than the chief of all the Acholi...[and] groups in the East and South of the Acholi 
area were least responsive to the authority of Payera’.118  
When I asked Paramount Chief Acana if he thought the paramount position should 
remain with Payira, he made reference to the Lawirwodi and Laloyo maber posts of the 
1950s and 1960s. He pointed to these positions as examples that heads of Acholi have 
come from other clans and therefore the position does not naturally belong to Payira. 
However, in contradiction to his previous response that Rwot Awich had been the first 
Paramount Chief of Acholi, Acana said 
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If you look at the first paramount chief or king of Acholi, [he] didn’t come 
from Payira, he came from somewhere in Kitgum, Padibe or, not Padibe, urm, 
urm, he is called Mateo Lamot, I forget where he comes from, but that was 
the first one and then there was Philip Adonga from Pajule...then after Philip 
Adonga it stayed on. But I would say that those positions were political, in 
that the government was involved. 
Whilst Paramount Chief Acana used these examples to seemingly suggest that other 
clans are able to, and in the past have, held the Paramount Chief position, he then 
dismisses these as political, which has the effect of framing Rwot Awich and Rwot 
Godfrey Acana, as the only non-political, and therefore the first and only ‘proper’ 
leading chiefs of Acholi. This narrative, however, ignored the fact that his grandfather 
Rwot Yona Odida, as discussed in chapter three, was at the centre of the fierce rivalry 
over the leadership positions in the 1950s and 1960s, and although missed out in the 
Lawirwodi and Laloyo Maber posts, was appointed chief judge (langolkop madit), and 
put in charge of the district courts.  
Returning to the question of whether the Paramount Chief position will rotate, Rwot 
Acana II said that it was ‘up to the people of Acholi’, but he was also clearly very 
sceptical of the idea, adding  
that this would depend on the kind of dignity they [Acholi] want for 
themselves, because with the kingship or royalty, the more you move it 
around the more it gathers dust of conflict and that is when it is likely to 
become political, if you don’t set the rules right, like the rules of succession. If 
it is open then people will start campaigning...an election would not be good, 
it would tend to take people into campaigning and it will become political.  
To mitigate against the risks of the Paramount Chief post becoming open to political 
interests, Rwot Acana II envisioned the best future for Ker Kwaro Acholi lay in the 
Paramount Chief position ‘coming from one clan, with the distributions of the other 
positions to the other clans.’ Any alternative to this would, Paramount Chief Acana 
thought, go against the nature of Ker Kwaro Acholi as a royal institution and be an 
‘insane’ pursuit.119 Oywa was also concerned about the politicisation of the Paramount 
Chief position, but unlike Paramount Chief, believed the most likely hope for avoiding 
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future conflict amongst clans and of power becoming too centralised with Payira, was to 
make sure the position did rotate.120  
Rwot John Odoki Obol of Padibe, grandson of the influential Rwot Ogwok, also thought 
and expected the post of Paramount Chief to rotate, so that ‘all the Rwodi remain at the 
same level’.121 Being eighty, Rwot Obol regarded himself too old for the post, but he 
hoped that his child would be Paramount Chief of Acholi one day and, although he sees 
it as the role of the community and elders to elect, he has a particular child in mind who 
is a grade five teacher and who he regards as a good candidate for the position. The only 
reason, he said, that Rwot Acana II has remained as Paramount Chief, is because of the 
insurgency; but, once people have resettled he expects there will be another election to 
decide who will be the next Paramount Chief. When asked if he thought district politics 
would influence an election for the Paramount Chief, as it had done in the late colonial 
period, he replied that at the moment, because of the situation of war, the election 
would not be affected by the issue of districts, but after people have settled then 
divisions could emerge, with district officials seeking to centralise power in their own 
districts.  
Rwot George Lugai of Pajule, son of Philip Adonga who had been the Laloyo Maber, had a 
different view towards the rotation of the Paramount Chief post, saying that, although 
there had been an agreement at first that the Paramount Chief post should rotate every 
five years, Paramount Chief Acana is now ‘the clear governor of the Acholi people’.122 
However, Rwot Lugai did not consider that Rwot Acana II had inherited the Paramount 
Chief post, but that ‘the chiefs of Acholi had put him there’. Despite Rwot Lugai’s positive 
view of Paramount Chief Acana, he also admitted that ‘people have mixed feelings’ 
towards Rwot Acana II as Paramount Chief, particularly because there are now fifty four 
Rwodi and so the post is likely not to remain within one lineage.  
It is interesting to note that the majority of new Rwodi in Ker Kwaro Acholi, as listed in 
2009, are heads of kaka attached to Rwot Lugai’s Pajule kal lineage, which may indicate 
that Rwot Lugai, together with influential government officials, have actively advocated 
                                                          
120 Interview with R. Oywa, Gulu, 20 April 2010. 
121 Interview with R.J. Obol, Kitgum, 30 April 2010.   
122 Interview with R.G. Lugai, Pader, 27 April 2010.  
172 
 
for more Pajule lineages located in Pader district to be recognised by Ker Kwaro Acholi, 
at least since 2005. This, it may be hoped, would have the effect of either balancing 
power against the majority of Payira lineage heads in the instance that the Paramountcy 
remains with Payira, or should an election occur, it increases the chances of Rwot Pajule 
becoming Paramount Chief Acholi.  
Kenneth Oketta, on the other hand, did not see that an election would challenge Payira’s 
occupancy of the Paramount Chief post because ‘more than half of the Rwodi are 
Payira’.123 Although Oketta claimed he did not think that the Paramountcy should de 
facto remain with Payira, he also said that it ‘has to be because of the number...If they 
[Rwodi] go for voting then they will be outnumbered.’124 I then asked Oketta: ‘so an 
election is always going to be in favour of Payira?’ Oketta replied: ‘Yeah...the Payira say 
this has been our throne.’ I followed up with asking if he thought rotation will ever 
happen and Oketta was clear when he state that ‘rotation will not happen’, and went on 
to cite reasons for why people are becoming ‘agitated’ about the rotation issue. As far as 
Oketta saw it, Rwodi were advocating for rotation because ‘there’s goodies, there’s 
status, there’s pounds’, but thought that by allowing the rotation of the post could result 
in chaos, ‘like Busoga’.125 Oketta’s position was that the paramount chief should serve 
until he passes away, and then an election should follow, ‘so that people [Rwodi] can be 
given a chance to elect’, but was confident the paramountcy would always be occupied 
by Payira.  
The ‘goodies, status and pounds’ that, as Oketta described it, have accompanied Rwot 
Acana II’s experience as the Paramount Chief, have unsurprisingly created an obvious 
wealth gap and inequality between Paramount Chief Acana and the other Rwodi. It is a 
gap predominantly created by the UGX 5 million Government stipend provided to all the 
recognised traditional/cultural authorities in Uganda, and perpetuated by his every day 
performance. For example at the workshop mentioned earlier, to build the capacity of 
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the Rwodi, he remained aloof from the other Rwodi; eating separately and staying in the 
most expensive hotel in town, whilst the other Rwodi stayed in more modest 
accommodation.  
Tensions and agitation over the question of whether the position will rotate is 
understandably of concern to a host of lineage heads who, like the majority of Acholi, 
have become impoverished over the past two decades of insecurity and violence in 
northern Uganda. Whilst there seemed to be a pride amongst the Rwodi that Acholi had 
a Government recognised Paramount Chief, and thus wanted the Paramount Chief to 
drive a smart car, dress well and represent Ker Kwaro and the Acholi in a favourable 
light in meetings with President Museveni and the other Kings and traditional leaders in 




Amongst the secretariat I also found that most employees were Payira, including the 
Programme Coordinator, Santo Okema, who was also Paramount Chief Acana’s brother. 
The Administrative Assistant, Soloman Maractho, was Paramount Chief Acana’s cousin, 
and the two drivers were also related to the Paramount Chief. The two project officers 
complained of being treated differently on the grounds that they were not Payira. In 
disputing that Ker Kwaro Acholi is upholding its ‘core value’ of ‘equality’, one Project 
Officer, Sarah Achiro, said, ‘I don’t see it, [equality], because we are not from the Payira 
clan...we are the ones, we the “strangers”... so they look at us like we are thieves, we are 
not part of them’.126 Achiro went on to say that the Administrative Assistant, Maractho, 
could arrive late or be absent for three days without explanation, and no one would 
complain, but if she or the other Project Officer, Mike Ocaka, was late or out of the office 
for just one day, then they would receive a warning letter. Ocaka, who seemed 
constantly frustrated working at Ker Kwaro Acholi, also complained that everyone in 
the secretariat ‘is related to one another’, and said that he felt ‘Acana’s family members 
were always checking up on him and acting as if they have the right to inspect his life’, 
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and that only Achiro and he had been employed on merit.127 Achiro also commented that 
Ker Kwaro Acholi do ‘not really employ people, they don’t advertise, they just pick the 
relatives’.  
One development practitioner of a large donor who had experience working with Ker 
Kwaro Acholi, and who I shall call Miller as they wanted to remain anonymous on 
particular views they gave in the interview, said that he had been encouraging Ker 
Kwaro Acholi to install policies and procedures for hiring as a way for Ker Kwaro to be 
more transparent, and so that it would not just be Paramount Chief Acana’s cousin or 
bother being employed just because they needed a job.  Miller had become particularly 
concerned about this nepotistic practice within Ker Kwaro Acholi’s secretariat because 
the appointment of the Programme Coordinator, thought to have been on the basis of 
his familial ties to the Paramount Chief, was hindering the success of the project they 
were working on. ‘Okema is just awful’, Miller lamented, unlike Mark Avola who had 
preceded Okema and was praised by various members of the secretariat, as well as 
Miller, for the experience he had working in development and in civil society and his 
efficiency at Ker Kwaro. 
According to Avola, it seemed inevitable that at the beginning, when Paramount Chief 
Acana and Prime Minster were trying to set up a secretariat without funding, there 
would be ‘hand-picking’, because people were needed to help our here and there. 128 
Today, he pointed out, there are a few people at Ker Kwaro Acholi who have been 
employed on merit and who are ‘total foreigners and not even from the royal blood.’ 
The professionalism of Ker Kwaro was something that Avola still felt Ker Kwaro needed 
to work on. The main problem he identified of employing relations was that they will be 
people ‘who you may not be able to reprimand’. ‘I worked for many years around the 
world’, Avola said, ‘and I’ve never looked at getting my own close relatives to work close 
to me; I’ve looked at competences of other people’.  
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THE SECRETARIAT  
 
LINING POCKETS AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS  
 
The establishment and ‘beefing up’ of the secretariat, as discussed in chapter five, was 
presented as a means to improve efficiency and lessen the involvement of the 
Paramount Chief and Rwodi from the everyday administrative workings of Ker Kwaro. 
However, Avola recalls that as the first programme Manager of Ker Kwaro, he was 
involved in bringing accountability to an institution that had its own way of doing things 
that were  
within the culture, that [did] not...match some of the [professional] 
requirements, to do things that warrant accountability...The chiefdoms were 
used to wanting, things would flow towards them that didn’t need any 
accountability, so they were not prepared to do accountability...It was 
something they were not acquainted to, they were not used to it, it was not in 
their pattern of ways of doing things.129  
The two Project Officers at Ker Kwaro in 2010, Ocaka and Achiro, spoke highly of Avola 
and always in relation to his high standards of transparency and demands for 
accountability from Ker Kwaro, but, Avola was not employed with Ker Kwaro for long, 
and whilst Achiro and Ocaka worked there, they found practices of unaccountability 
incredibly frustrating. Commenting on the Core Values Ker Kwaro sets out in its 2009 
Strategic Plan, Achiro said  
Transparency and accountability, no, they’re not transparent, they’re not 
accountable. Right now I am going through a crisis, I am just mad...You know 
they’re used to doing things and not accounting for it. They want to just use 
money for their personal interests.  
They were both implicated into practices of ‘eating money’, as they commonly phrased 
it. Although technically employed by Ker Kwaro, Achiro and Ocaka’s salaries were paid 
by the donor who was funding a particular project with Ker Kwaro, and it was the 
responsibility of Achiro and Ocaka to provide receipts of expenditure for the projects 
they coordinated. There were occasions, they recalled, when they were asked to fake 
receipts to cover up for money being siphoned off for personal use.  




Achiro went on to give me an example that had occurred in relation to the Gender Based 
Violence project she was coordinating on behalf of Ker Kwaro Acholi in partnership 
with, and employed by, UNIFEM. She recalled that after the launch of the project the 
employees at the Secretariat were called together and told that money ‘left over’ from 
the pilot project would be distributed to them for work well done. Achiro protested, as 
she ‘had planned everything according to the budget,’ and it would mean as the 
programme officer she would have to give permission for the release of the money. It 
was being proposed that the two project officers, the accountant, the programme 
coordinator and the prime minister would receive UGX 500,000 and the two drivers and 
the office assistant would receive UGX 300,000. The Paramount Chief was to receive 
UGX 1 million. In reply to Achiro’s protests she was simply told that ‘this is the culture,’ 
indeed she commented later that she felt like she was often ‘fighting the culture of the 
organisation’. After returning from a trip to Kampala a week later, she found that Okema 
or Oketta had by-passed her authority as the project officer for the UNIFEM project and 
ordered Richard Komakech, the accountant, to withdraw the money from the bank 
account. Although in the end, each received the reduced amount of UGX 140,000, and 
even less for the drivers and office assistant, with the exception of Paramount Chief 
Acana who supposedly still received UGX 1 million, Achiro was not able to receive her 
salary at the end of the month. Achiro did not seem to think, however, that Paramount 
Chief Acana was participating in ‘eating money’ in this way. Although she was not sure if 
Paramount Chief Acana was just effectively ‘trying to keep his image’ by showing 
surprise when money was not accounted for, or whether ‘these other guys are using his 
name to get funds’.130  
When Achiro told Okema that she was going to photocopy the bank slips she submitted 
to UNIFEM to ensure accountability, which would have exposed to UNIFEM Okema’s 
practice of ‘eating money’, he responded by telling Achiro to ‘create an activity, to show 
that maybe you’ve gone to the community and joined a women’s group’. Unsurprisingly, 
Achiro said that she would not work at Ker Kwaro Acholi after her contract finished and 
Ocaka too was finding the secretariat of Ker Kwaro Acholi a difficult place to work. ‘Ker 
Kwaro Acholi works in a crooked way’ he said, ‘I believe in transparency and have never 
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worked in such a place, this is going to tarnish me’.131 Both Achiro and Ocaka made 
reference to money received in December 2009 from the US Embassy for a ‘Cultural 
Preservation’ project, but said that these funds were being used for ‘private business’, 
with few activities actually being implemented. Achiro said, 
All you get is sitting allowances and travels of the Paramount Chief. They just 
sit and cook an activity. I’m telling you, that in a whole big file like this, 
there’s nothing. They have not gone to the cultural site, they have not done 
anything...and when you try and tell the truth, you’re fighting them, you’re 
being subordinated. 
According to Oketta, Ker Kwaro had finished identifying the cultural sites for 
preservation, and were entering data into databases. ‘Soon we shall get the next money 
for surveying’, he said, and then we will upload the images to google earth, ‘that is the 
aim of the project, so that the cultural side of Acholi can be associated through the 
web’.132 I asked if there were plans to renovate and repair any of the cultural sites, such 
as Patiko Fort, but Oketta said that their intention was to preserve cultural sites but not 
to carry out repairs.  
Avola, who was Programme Manager when Ker Kwaro secured the funding from the US 
Ambassador for the Cultural Preservation project, evaded answering my question about 
the success of the project - only agreeing that it had been successful at the beginning, in 
the initial stages when he was involved in the procurement of resources and had made 
an agreement with the Uganda Museum, but then seemed to say that after the initial 
stage the project had not continued to realise its objectives. According to Ocaka, ‘Ker 
Kwaro Acholi were supposed to carry out many projects, such as the restoration of 
Patiko Fort, but the money was eaten.’133 
As the project officer of the USAID funded SPRING project, Ocaka, similarly to Achiro, 
reported that he was pressurised to sign permission for money to be released from the 
SPRING budget, from both Okema, who at one time wanted the money to pay his own 
salary, and from Rwodi, which he said left him ‘with the burden of trying to account for 
it to the donors’.134 The USAID Director of the SPRING programme, Jessica Huber, was 
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aware of the unaccountability prevalent within Ker Kwaro Acholi, and although found 
this aspect of working with Ker Kwaro Acholi frustrating, took the view that Ker Kwaro 
Acholi simply needed support to ‘battle that kind of work...the corruption challenges.’135 
She thought that good leadership that is not voluntary, but paid, would have a positive 
impact on the way people worked in Ker Kwaro. Both Okema and Oketta were 
appointed with Ker Kwaro Acholi on a voluntary basis, although it seemed not without 
expectations they would be paid one way or another. Miller’s suggestion, although 
recognising that the ‘Prime Minister doesn’t practice what he preaches’, thought that 
Oketta should apply for a salary as a full time consultant at Ker Kwaro Acholi because 
‘this would get funding very quickly’.136 
Talking to Okema about the short term contracts and salaries at the Secretariat, and 
with specific reference to Achiro and Ocaka’s projects that were soon coming to an end, 
he was insistent that even when a project comes to an end and the salaries for the 
project officers stop, then they  
can [still] stay, sometimes on half salaries until another donor is got. We 
don’t lose staff anyhow, we are not going to lose our staff, even if there is no 
funding for a month or two you can stay and do the work. 
Okema’s commitment and expectations of working at Ker Kwaro Acholi were clearly 
different from Huber’s, who thought that working voluntarily was part of the root cause 
of corrupt practices. Achiro and Ocaka, also had different ideas and left Ker Kwaro after 
their contracts ended, uncomfortable continuing to stay on a ‘half salary’.  
 
RWODI – SECRETARIAT DISCONNECTION 
 
With the secretariat operating to the effect of lining the pockets of its Payira members, it 
comes as little surprise that many Rwodi had alternative views of Ker Kwaro Acholi, and 
the secretariat in particular, as less of a traditional structure with a ‘government’ to 
support their empowerment, but more as something increasingly disconnected from 
them. Although the 2009 Strategic Plan includes a Strategic Objective that all ‘chiefdom 
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bases should be functional’, and proposes to identify ‘various areas of investment...as a 
means and way of building up [a] resource base’, the Plan also proposes that ‘the local 
people’ should provide for each ‘Chiefdoms administration and houses for the Chiefs’, 
based on a vague reference to a cultural commitment people have towards their 
traditional institution. 137  
Given that the Secretariat was created on the premise of providing support to enable 
Rwodi to fulfil their ‘traditional’ duties I asked a number of Rwodi from across 
Acholiland whether they felt they were being supported by the Secretariat and 
leadership of Ker Kwaro Acholi. Where Rwodi felt they were being supported by the 
offices of Ker Kwaro Acholi in Gulu it was usually because they were happy to have 
received bicycles and houses, and believed that being part of Ker Kwaro Acholi was 
bettering their situations. However, there were also Rwodi who, although grateful for 
the benefits they had received through Ker Kwaro Acholi, such as the bicycles, were also 
aware that Ker Kwaro Acholi had received substantial financial assistance that had not 
filtered to them or assisted them. Some commented on feeling a sense of disconnection 
or distance from what is happening at Ker Kwaro Acholi, with one Rwot from Pader 
saying that he did not even know the people working at Ker Kwaro Acholi, they had not 
been introduced.138 Rwot Martin Otto Yai of Lamogi complained that  
Ker Kwaro has nothing to give Rwodi, money is only for projects and not for 
helping chiefs...Our people come for help and we can’t help them. It’s only a 
name, a cultural chief...Projects of Ker Kwaro are not about reviving chiefs. 
We got some [money] for burying bones, but the chiefs don’t get the money. 
There is no project concerned about assisting the chiefs. Development in the 
villages is why the projects come. 
Although the Rwotship of Martin Otto Yai was under debate in 2010, his view is 
representative of the concerns I heard from Rwodi across Acholiland. Rwot Baptist Latim 
of Pawel, an educated Rwot with his own ‘Plan for a Peaceful Community 2010-2011’, 
complained that Ker Kwaro Acholi’s approach to planning was wrong because they 
do it from their office and haven’t involved the Rwodi. There has been no 
meeting with Rwodi, only a few have been selected. They didn’t bring the 
planning for approval from Rwodi, only brought us in at the launch of the 
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plan 2009-2014. The Ker Kwaro institution is ignoring the Rwodi and relying 
on people in the Secretariat rather than using the Rwodi’.139 
As is evident here Rwot Latim also imagined Ker Kwaro Acholi as functioning in at least 
three separate parts, as an ‘the Ker Kwaro institution’, the Rwodi and the secretariat, 
and complains that ‘the institution’ are engaging with the secretariat more than they are 
with the Rwodi; particularly in processes of planning Ker Kwaro Acholi’s strategic 
objectives and the activities it proposes to implement over the coming years.  
Humphrey Ojok, a project officer at Ker Kwaro Acholi in 2009, had an optimistic view of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi’s potential as an institution to foster peace and reconciliation, as 
referred to in chapter five, but was also critical of how he saw Rwodi relating to the 
secretariat.140 Ojok wanted the Rwodi to fit into the ‘mainstream of Ker Kwaro the 
institution’ and so got the Rwodi ‘to look at themselves and how they fit into Ker Kwaro’, 
rather than thinking about how the institution can benefit them. The idea that the Rwodi 
do not ‘fit into’ Ker Kwaro, sits juxtaposed next to the dominant image of Ker Kwaro 
Acholi as the traditional cultural institution constituted by the 54 traditional leaders of 
Acholi. The following section, further illustrates the tensions and contradictions that 




Contrary to the dominant images produced by Ker Kwaro that the secretariat acts as 
administrative support to the traditional leaders of Ker Kwaro, the offices in Gulu where 
the secretariat is based operates as the central hub of Ker Kwaro, and is the primary 
interface for visitors and potential donors, with most Rwodi in the peripheral vision of 
those engaging with the institution. As the majority of work the secretariat is engaged 
with on an everyday basis relates to the partnerships it has or hopes to have with 
donors, and thus project reports, audits and project proposals, one might imagine Ker 
Kwaro Acholi seems more like a development NGO than a structure of traditional 
leaders.  
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Whilst Ker Kwaro Acholi’s image as a traditional authority, recognised by the 
Government, and with organisational capacity to partner on development initiatives, 
has been crucial for attracting and securing donor funding, Ker Kwaro’s engagement 
with donors has arguably shifted focus away from empowering Rwodi. Ker Kwaro’s 
everyday practices revolve, instead, around implementing development programmes.  
Huber, Director of the USAID funded SPRING project commented that ‘part of the 
growing pains’ of Ker Kwaro Acholi ‘is because it is expected to function like an NGO but 
is also expected to be its own governance structure.’141 She went on to say that Ker 
Kwaro Acholi would improve its response to the community if it shifts more towards 
being an NGO,’ although after a hesitation she qualified her statement, seemingly 
uncomfortable with the idea that Ker Kwaro Acholi might be viewed in such terms and 
said, ‘well I don’t know...I [just] think it would benefit from other structures of civil 
society organisations.’ Huber was not the only person I interviewed who was seemingly 
uncomfortable with likening Ker Kwaro Acholi to a development NGO, but like her 
others also admitted that Ker Kwaro Acholi does indeed look like an NGO. A project 
officer of Ker Kwaro Acholi, Ojok Humphrey, said it is 48% like an NGO, which he saw as 
problematic because, 
 
with an NGO people become a subject of study and you start to lump their 
problems together and start to act on it. Rather than people identifying a 
problem and then you advocate it. As an NGO you are writing proposals to 
sell, which is a different thing...Ker Kwaro’s role as the voice of the Acholi is 
being compromised by being an NGO.142 
 
A similar concern was expressed by a number of my Acholi informants, from University 
Students to Catholic Priests and Acholi development practitioners. Their concerns 
rested with an understanding that donors work through conditionality and, therefore, 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, will become bound to the agendas of development organisations and 
not act in the interests of their clans. There is a risk, they said, that if the Rwodi of Ker 
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Kwaro continue to work ever closer with donors, then this could threaten the 
relationship many Rwodi are seeking to restore with their clans.143  
 
One way many Rwodi thought Ker Kwaro Acholi could help, was by putting in place a 
constitution and set of policies that make clear the roles and responsibilities of those 
within Ker Kwaro. For Rwot Kinyera Vincent, the lack of a constitution was contributing 
to the difficulties Rwodi experienced in exercising authority. Other Rwodi said that 
having a constitution would help them to do their work in the community, particularly 
with regards to issues of justice and reconciliation. Some Rwodi contended that a 
constitution would enable Rwodi to make recommendations of compensation payments 
in the mato oput process, which could lead to their decision becoming legally binding. 
Rwot Lawot accused the District Council of hindering the process of producing an 
approved and official Ker Kwaro Acholi constitution.144   
 
Although the issue of producing a constitution for Ker Kwaro Acholi was an important 
matter for many Rwodi, Prime Minister Oketta did not share the same view, for a 
number of reasons.  One was that he thought a constitution meant Ker Kwaro Acholi 
would become a nationally registered cultural institution or NGO; it would make Ker 
Kwaro like the Langi, who have a constitution and ‘now it’s the Lango Cultural Trust’ 
and then there is the Teso Cultural Foundation, ‘but ours is unique’, Oketta said of Ker 
Kwaro.  A constitution would make Ker Kwaro Acholi ‘become like an NGO’ and then 
Government will ‘want to register us...and when you are registered, you are 
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regulated’.145 ‘Regulated by external auditors?’ I asked. ‘Not only auditors’, Oketta 
replied,  
 
but external government. They cancel your certificate. Now they cannot 
cancel our certificate. That is how you see Buganda is having problems with 
the Government...so we are also trying to reinvent ourselves in that aspect, so 
we remain relevant without conflicting with other government organs, like 
local government and central government. So, being relevant is like having 
something like this (Oketta holds up the Strategic Plans) and declaring 
them.146 
 
Ker Kwaro’s draft constitution, Oketta claimed, is just an ‘institutional document for 
operations...like an NGO constitution, based on [a] preamble and objectives and 
memorandum of associations, spelling out a few duties.’147  
A prominent elder of Ker Kwaro Acholi believed that Ker Kwaro Acholi did not have a 
constitution or policies in place because they would make Ker Kwaro accountable to 
government.148 An ex-Project Officer of the secretariat, Humphrey Ojok, recalled he had 
worked on a draft constitution for Ker Kwaro, which had been initially developed by a 
consultant, but said the document was never finalised or approved by the leadership of 
Ker Kwaro, because of a lack of will.149 The problem, as far as Ojok saw, was that ‘a 
constitution binds you to behave in a certain way and some people don’t want 
restrictions put on them’.150 Whilst the elder of Ker Kwaro, quoted above, saw the lack of 
a constitution, and therefore accountability to government as negative for Ker Kwaro, 
Oketta saw that without a constitution Ker Kwaro’s independence from central 
Government was ensured, and this was preferable for Ker Kwaro. With reference to the 
Buganda Kingdom, Oketta commented that Ker Kwaro should not become like them. 
However, despite Oketta here, and elsewhere, drawing up distinctions between the 
Buganda Kingdom and Ker Kwaro Acholi, there is also evidence that Ker Kwaro has 
been actively positioning itself to engage with Government in a way that will give Ker 
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Kwaro more governing powers in Acholi sub-region, as the final section of the chapter 
will continue to discuss.  
 




Re-structuring Ker Kwaro Acholi in 2006, to incorporate a government structure, as 
discussed in chapter four, was supposed to bring clarification on the roles and 
responsibilities of those in Ker Kwaro. However, as mentioned above, many Rwodi felt 
this had not taken place and requested Ker Kwaro Acholi to develop a constitution to 
clarify their roles and give their authority legal traction. But, Oketta was also sceptical 
about a constitution for Ker Kwaro because he did not want Acholi to respect the 
decisions of Rwodi because they were able to apply a constitution and enforce their 
decisions.151 Oketta wanted the Rwodi to ‘be unique, so in the mediation process they 
will accept the Rwodi decision. If someone wants legality’, he continued, ‘they can go to 
the LC courts’. With regards to the functioning of the Ker Kwaro, Oketta believed that 
‘legal rights will bring rivalry, people could interpret the constitution’. If a constitution 
was drafted, he said, it would need a ‘sincere group of people to administer [it], not 
chiefs themselves, otherwise the constitution can come to be in someone’s interest. 
Chiefs don’t understand those things’. Whilst Oketta’s concerns that a constitution could 
be potentially abused or written according to political interests may be well founded, I 
was struck by the problem Oketta identified in relation to demands for a constitution:  
We operate in a democratic and competitive environment and... people are 
demanding a constitution because they are thinking in terms of democracy 
and things. It is also people outside Ker Kwaro who are asking for a 
constitution, but it’s just because of the environment we are living in. People 
are even asking about the position of the Prime Minister, where did he come 
from and when is he ending? 
Oketta’s evident disapproval of democracy sits in tension with Ker Kwaro’s attempts to 
become an agent of development, aligned to national and international agendas, 
                                                          
151 Interview with K. Oketta, Gulu, 19 June 2010.  
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concepts and norms, as discussed in chapter five. While Oketta disapproved that 
democratic principles should be demanded and encouraged within Ker Kwaro; and 
indeed the Strategic Plans do not claim Ker Kwaro to be, or aspires to be, an institution 
underpinned by democratic principles; the second Plan does propose to promote 
democratic practices within Acholiland, to strengthen civil society, and hold 
Government to account. Its strategic objective for promoting ‘inclusive governance’ 
proposes to ‘raise awareness on the right[s] of people and the responsibilities of 
Government’, cooperate with ‘other organisations on rights issues at the local level’, and 
act as a ‘platform’ so that vulnerable people can become members of civil society and be 
involved in decision making.152 Should Ker Kwaro Acholi be incorporated more 
substantially into a Ugandan state structure in the future, such as a regional tier of 
government, it may find itself at the receiving end of the demands it seeks to inculcate 
amongst Acholi. As I will now discuss, Ker Kwaro does seem to be preparing for a more 
central role in the governance of Acholi sub-region.  
As discussed in chapter four, evidently Ker Kwaro Acholi saw that creating and 
incorporating a structure with expertise and presented as a government structure, 
would strengthen the institution in the context of the terms within which the NRM was 
proposing to incorporate traditional authorities into the state. However, although Ker 
Kwaro Acholi may have wished to look like and indeed become a strong institution 
through incorporating expert advisors into the cultural institution, in order to position 
itself more advantageously, this does not satisfactorily account for its use of explicitly 
governmental language and for presenting its experts as ministers of a government.  
In reference to the same developments the Buganda Kingdom were pursuing, following 
the failed debates over federalism in 1995, mentioned in chapter two, Englebert 
described the process as ‘essentially a strategy of relative disengagement from the state 
whose purpose is to become more autonomous, develop a record of public 
administration, and improve its bargaining position for a hypothetical new round of 
constitutional negotiations in the post-Museveni future’.153 In the event that a new 
political dispensation becomes open for negotiation in the future, ‘monarchists want to 
                                                          
152 Ker Kwaro Acholi, Strategic Plan, 2009-2014, (Gulu: Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2009), 10-11.  
153 P. Englebert, "Born Again Buganda and the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa," 
Journal of Modern African Studies 40, no. 3 (2002): 364.  
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be ready’, Englebert wrote, ‘to make a credible claim for autonomous local self-
government in a federal system’.  
There is little evidence to suggest that in 2006, and still today, Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
government structure is part of a greater vision of disengaging from the state in 
preparation for future local self-government.154 In fact, the public image they projected, 
examined in chapter four, was quite the opposite. In the government structure concept 
paper and in the second Strategic Plan, Ker Kwaro emphasised their wish to cooperate 
and work together in partnerships with local and central government. In conversations, 
Paramount Chief Acana and Prime Minister Oketta, also repeatedly sought to distance 
themselves from the Buganda Kingdom.  
Although at pains to give the impression Ker Kwaro Acholi was a neutral traditional 
authority, unlike Buganda, interested only in ‘cultural matters’, and making use of the 
vagueness attached to this term in government discourses, Paramount Chief Acana 
anticipated that Ker Kwaro may need to ‘deal with government’ on ‘really, really 
controversial issues’, which is why, he said, he had a vision to ‘make Ker Kwaro mighty’ 
and wanted to appoint experts with brains to be part of Ker Kwaro.155  
In a speech I heard at the launch of Ker Kwaro’s Gender Based Violence campaign in 
2010, Paramount Chief Acana addressed the other ‘kings’ affected by the insurgency and 
said that ‘if we work together we can form a big block from Teso to West Nile and we 
can do anything with it’.156 Campaigning together on development issues is a potential 
site for consolidating relationships and alliances with other cultural institutions in 
northern Uganda, which, as Acana said, might be used for a myriad of purposes and 
agendas. A few months later Paramount Chief Acana was reported to have suggested 
that ‘the kingdoms of West Nile, Acholi, Lango and Teso sub-regions should unite to 
demand operational funds from the central government’, adding that, ‘we have a forum 
of kings in Uganda, but we should also have a regional cooperation of the Alur, Acholi, 
                                                          
 154 Although not specifically related to Acholi, it was reported in 1994 there were ‘some areas of 
northern Uganda’ proposing ‘the formation of a state within the state of Uganda...in order to 
acquire a status comparable to that of Buganda when negotiating with central government’. 
New Vision, 14th January 1994, quoted in M. Doornbos, The Ankole Kingship Controversy: Regalia 
Galore Revisited (Kampala: Fountain, 2001), 94. 
155 Interview with D.O. Acana, Birmingham, 20 June 2011. 
156 Personal notes from Launch day of Gender Based Violence project between Ker Kwaro 
Acholi, UNIFEM and DFID. 15th March 2010.  
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Madi, Lango and Teso kingdoms to influence certain decisions that are desirable by our 
people’.157 
Similarly to Ker Kwaro Acholi, younger Buganda elite regarded Article 178 more 
favourably than the conservative members of Buganda, who had their eyes set on full 
federal status. Englebert observed that 
Buganda’s most educated elite and its civil servants were more favourable to 
the charter option, which would have better allowed them to continue 
straddling positions in both systems. So were younger Mengo officials for 
whom the purity of Buganda’s rebirth matters less than the opportunities it 
may provide them as political entrepreneurs.158 
Could similar aspirations be held by the ‘non-traditional’ members and counterparts of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi?  
Being incorporated into a regional tier of government may support Ker Kwaro’s efforts 
to gain an influential and legal position in matters of land: a highly controversial issue 
in Uganda and particularly in Acholiland as people resettle in villages. At least since 
2005, Ker Kwaro Acholi has been seeking an influential position in land matters in 
Acholi. For example, on behalf of Ker Kwaro Acholi Fabius Okumu-Alya, who was 
Attorney General of Ker Kwaro Acholi by 2010, wrote a concept paper for a 
consultative meeting of stakeholders on land in Acholi, which included a proposal to 
produce a policy document on land and an Acholi Central Land Registry, ‘under the 
direct supervision and authority of the Acholi Paramount Chief, which would ‘serve as 
trustees of customary land rights for all the people of Acholi’.159 The policy document 
that resulted was recently rejected legal status by the District Council on the grounds 
that the people of Acholi had not been consulted in the process.160  
Interestingly, Ker Kwaro only mentions land twice in its second strategic plan, and only 
to mention that part of the causes of poverty in Acholiland are land conflicts and that 
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159 F. Okumu-Alya, "Concept Paper, Stakeholders Consultative Meeting on Land in Acholi: 
An Initiative of Ker Kwaro Acholi, December 2005," (Gulu: Gulu District Archive, 2005).  
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one of its strategic objectives is to inform people on a number of issues, one of which is 
‘access to land’. Another of Ker Kwaro’s objectives is to  improve households income 
and food security and under this objective proposes to ‘provide support to vulnerable 
people in Acholi sub region as a means of strengthening their capacity to sustain 
themselves, including revitalization of its age-long Rwot Okoro and Rwot Kweri for 
effective communal work’.161 Under this objective Ker Kwaro proposes to pursue links 
with ‘District Community Development Services, Production Departments and other 
institutions interested in agricultural development as a delivery mechanism’. However, 
contrary to the public image it projects as a facilitator of accurate information on land 
and capacity builder of those wanting to organise communal work groups, it is clear 
Ker Kwaro Acholi seeks to  situate itself more centrally and with legal powers on land 
matters in Acholiland. 
Branch has noted that the manoeuvring of Ker Kwaro Acholi in relation to land issues 
has stirred criticism that there ‘are chiefs serving as the middlemen for unpopular large 
land purchases by investors’ and that ‘foreign sponsorship of traditional authority has 
provided supposed chiefs with the opportunity to grab land and enrich themselves with 
the protection of Ker Kwaro Acholi’.162 
 
MULTIPLE KER KWARO 
 
The emergence of Ker Kwaro has inspired other Rwodi to strengthen the structures of 
their particular clans in a similar way, which has the potential to counter balance an 
over-centralisation of power with Ker Kwaro Acholi and in the towns where Ker Kwaro 
has offices.163  
Three Rwodi told me how they were making progress in establishing their own Ker 
Kwaro’s (royal institutions). Rwot Arop of Pagen told me he had been encouraging 
Rwodi to, like him, create councils with ‘a strong cabinet’ and a ‘development 
                                                          
161 Ker Kwaro Acholi, Strategic Plan, 2009-2014, (Gulu: Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2009), 12. 
162 A. Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 159, 176.  
163 Gulu is the location of Ker Kwaro’s Palace and main offices, but there is also a Ker Kwaro 
Acholi office in Kitgum, although in 2010 it did not seem to function in any significant capacity.  
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association’ to ‘bring in money and resources to cater for development activities’, such a 
paying children’s school fees, funeral costs and strengthening the Rwot.164 Rwot Muttu of 
Patiko and Rwot Latim of Pawel both showed me their progress in attempting to 
strengthen their clan structures. Rwot Muttu produced a diagram of his ‘Administrative 
Structure of Ker Kwaro Patiko’, which included a Prime Minister (Katikiro), a Council of 
Elders as well as a Council of the Rwot, a Cabinet, and a Board of Trustees who play an 
‘advisory role on cultural/traditional issues’. Rwot Latim gave me a bound booklet 
detailing a ‘Plan for a Peaceful Community’ by ‘Ker Kal-Kwaro Pawel’. At the back were 
the contact details of the post already established: the Chairman of the K.K Pawel 
Council, a Prime Minister, an Administrative Secretary and a Minister of Finance. 
Interestingly Rwot Latim regards his cultural institution as mandated not only through 
the Ugandan constitution, but also by international agencies such as UNESCO.  No 
historical background of the Pawel clan or Rwodi lineage is offered in the booklet, but 
rather Rwot Latim seeks justification for empowering his cultural institution based on 
the mandates, real or perceived, from outside actors, before proceeding to set out, in 
much the same way as Ker Kwaro Acholi’s Strategic Plan’s, the problems Pawel clan face 
and the intentions of the cultural institution to find redress with the support from ‘well-
wishers’.  
Although I have framed these examples as something subversive to how Ker Kwaro 
Acholi is being imagined and instantiated by its leadership, they are also in line with 
Paramount Chief Acana’s vision for Ker Kwaro Acholi, where the Rwodi of Ker Kwaro 
Acholi and himself, he told me, resume more authentically their traditional roles as 
‘Kings’ who ‘always used to have people to do things before it reached the Rwot’.165 With 
reference to the office work Rwodi have been doing recently Paramount Chief Acana 
said that 
Those [Rwodi] who are working now are going against the rules, because 
[they] are kings. Who else does a King serve a cup of tea to? It doesn’t 
happen; the King has to be served in order to be able to serve other people in 
other ways. When you work you are being ordered here [and there] by your 
boss, to do this, do that, which is not really appropriate for a king. 
                                                          
164 Interview with R.P.P. Arop, Pagen, Kitgum, 17 July 2010.  
165 Interview with D.O. Acana, Birmingham, 20 June 2011.  
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There are people who should be doing those things, you know in the office, I 
don’t expect any Rwot to be sitting there from morning until evening, just 
waiting for people, they should be at their home...I am trying to empower 
them...uplifting them up to be on their own feet. 
I keep on telling them “get good people around you, one or two good people, 
they will advise you, they will support you in every way they can, those who 
are passionate about the institution, those who respect you, and respect the 
values...you don’t need to get the whole clan, just two or three people, work 
with them and then you drive the rest. 
Paramount Chief Acana’s advice echoes in an uncanny way the process he has 
experienced over the past decade, since he found himself as a young and shy man at the 
turn of the century being installed not only as Rwot of the largest lineage in Acholi, but 
also as the Paramount Chief of what was being envisioned by some as a newly emerging 
‘Acholi chiefdom’. As my study has been illustrating, Paramount Chief Acana has been, 
like his advice to other Rwodi reflects, at the centre of driving forward the emergence of 
an institution, built to uphold his authority as Rwot and Paramount Chief, with the help 




My analytical reflections in this chapter have drawn out less visible ways of knowing 
and thinking about Ker Kwaro Acholi, that were expressed, contrary to what one may 
expect, as much as from within the institution, as from without. The chapter has 
revealed, often stark, disjuncture’s between the dominant images explored in the 
previous chapters of the thesis, and the less visible discourses examined here. 
Following Oywa’s interview, I began the chapter with noting the fluctuations of the 
Rwodi who are recognised by the leadership of Ker Kwaro Acholi as part of the 
institution and drew attention to the diversity that exists within the Council of Rwodi, 
contrary to dominant images of Ker Kwaro Acholi as constituted by a homogenous 
council of Rwodi, each hailing unproblematically from a pre-colonial lineage. Part of the 
reason for the inconsistencies and fluctuations of Rwodi in Ker Kwaro Acholi, as I 
discussed, was attributed to the involvement of local government in the process of 
reviving Rwodi. Rather than a simple process of identifying and reviving known Rwodi 
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across Acholiland, the process was affected by political motivations to re-install Rwodi, 
who would potentially serve political interests. However, the interest and engagement 
of local politicians in the process of re-installing Rwodi of Ker Kwaro Acholi threatens 
the possibilities of Rwodi gaining local legitimacy if they are associated to the 
unfavourably viewed, NRM controlled, local government structure.  
The assumption that has underpinned and driven donor support for the revival of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi is that the Rwodi are a respected traditional authority in Acholiland with 
particular skills of dispute settlement and facilitating reconciliation rituals. However, as 
I illustrated in the chapter, many Rwodi of Ker Kwaro Acholi have been struggling to 
garner local support and respect. Contrary to dominant views within Ker Kwaro Acholi 
that the problem lays with the populations lack of knowledge on their traditional 
structure of governance; an inability to distinguish Rwodi from ordinary people; or in 
the lack of capacity Rwodi have to materially benefit their subjects, many Rwodi felt they 
struggled to garner respect because Ker Kwaro Acholi did not have a constitution to 
which they could refer. A constitution, some Rwodi said, would bolster their authority 
by making their decisions more binding. 
The third section of the chapter illustrated that Ker Kwaro Acholi seems to be 
functioning more as a Ker Kwaro Payira than a Ker Kwaro Acholi. The Paramount Chief 
post looks to remain with Rwot Acana II until he passes away, an election amongst 
Rwodi for the post looks likely to favour Payira, and at present the employees and 
ministers of Ker Kwaro are significantly pooled from Payira. Aspirations of holding the 
Paramount Chief post one day, or at least their sons, can be heard amongst Rwodi and 
thus this position carries the likely potential to fuel future clan rivalry.  
The secretariat of Ker Kwaro Acholi has undoubtedly cast the institution in a more 
favourable light for donors, who require administrative and technical capacity from the 
local organisations they partner with. Providing funds for the salaries of project officers 
who they engage with directly has brought experienced development practitioners to 
Ker Kwaro Acholi. However, with everyday practices of the secretariat, and by 
implication many of the Rwodi and the Paramount Chief, revolving around donor 
programmes and their agendas, Ker Kwaro Acholi seems to many people to function 
more in the likeness of a development NGO, which sparks concerns over the 
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possibilities for Ker Kwaro Acholi to be responsive to the needs of the clans and not be 
tied to the conditionalities and agendas of international donors.  
 
Amongst some of the Rwodi there were ambivalent feelings towards the secretariat. 
Although recognising the seeming necessity of a secretariat to secure financial support 
for their empowerment, many Rwodi felt disconnected and marginalised, and sceptical 
about where the considerable funds were being spent. With no substantial evidence that 
Ker Kwaro Acholi was achieving any of the strategic objectives it had set since 2005 and 
with reports of unaccountability and “eating money”, dominant images of Ker Kwaro as 
a vital agent of sustainable development in northern Uganda are undermined.  
Politically, Ker Kwaro Acholi reflects in many ways the path of revival undertaken by its 
significantly more powerful counterpart; the Buganda Kingdom, although Ker Kwaro 
seeks to avoid such a distinction being drawn.  And whilst the dominant image of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi as a government structure has been carefully and strategically tied to 
Government discourses that require traditional authorities to be purely cultural 
institutions, I argue that Ker Kwaro Acholi is seeking to position itself advantageously in 
response to current and anticipated power relations vis-a-vis the Ugandan state and vis-
a-vis other ‘cultural institutions’ across Uganda. The creation and strengthening of 
multiple Ker Kwaro’s across Acholiland may serve to limit Payira dominance, not only in 
Acholiland, but regionally in northern Uganda, although on the other hand they may 
seek to function independently and tap into lucrative sources directly, rather than 
feeding into Ker Kwaro Acholi.  
To summarise, my study of dominant and less visible images and discourses of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi has offered a different account of the institutions so-called revival. I have 
illustrated that what set out as a revival of Acholi traditional authorities, became a 
revival of Rwodi and the establishment of a Paramount Chief, which soon evolved into 
the emergence of an institution that, whilst projecting images of being a traditional 
institution, is actually a new form of power base in northern Uganda.  
I do not argue that there has a been a mastermind behind the way Ker Kwaro Acholi has 
emerged, but rather, whilst pointing to key actors and agents who have acted 
193 
 
strategically, Ker Kwaro is predominately the product of a series of multiple discourses 
and contingent events that combined to make it possible for a particular clan to set up 
as Paramount Chief of the whole of Acholiland and to tap into resources available at 
state and international levels.  
Further research is needed to gauge how Ker Kwaro Acholi is viewed by Acholi, because 
whilst there may exist support for the idea of reviving Rwodi, and whilst people may 
support the idea of a Paramount Chief able to act as spokesperson for Acholi, these 
views should not be taken to represent widespread support for Ker Kwaro Acholi. As 
two of Ker Kwaro’s ex-employees of the secretariat put it, ‘Ker Kwaro Acholi is far away 
from Acholi people recognising and feeling any kind of ownership towards the 
institution’, and ‘most people do not see the need to bring back Ker Kwaro institution, 
most don’t know about Ker Kwaro.’166 
It is striking that Oywa, one of the few people in Acholi who have been part of Ker 
Kwaro’s emergence since the 1990s and regularly engages with it today, should 
describe the institution as ‘amorphous’. And whilst I have sought to analyse Ker Kwaro’s 
revival, and offer insights that make sense of its complexities, I have also found the 
institution profoundly amorphous. However, I disagree with Oywa that Ker Kwaro’s 
amorphous nature renders the institution ‘unhelpful for anybody’. Rather, I would argue 
that it is the formless and nebulous nature of Ker Kwaro Acholi, functioning as it does 
through images as much as through its substance, that renders Ker Kwaro conveniently 
helpful for a multitude of actors, from donors to government officials, ‘traditional’ 






                                                          






‘If the chief remains the focal head and is not surrounded by people who can plan and 
interpret things of the time, then I can see many people being left behind’.   
Programme Manager, Ker Kwaro Acholi167 
 
In my thesis I have attempted to answer the question: What is Ker Kwaro Acholi? I have 
done this by analysing the process of Ker Kwaro’s emergence, and illustrated how Ker 
Kwaro Acholi cannot be reduced to being defined as a ‘Council of Chiefs’ or a ‘traditional 
authority’, but rather is constituted by multiple discourses and contingent events, and 
incorporates an array of actors from chiefs to ministers, and elders to project officers.  I 
argue that Ker Kwaro Acholi is, therefore, more a product of present day relations of 
power that constitutes a new form of power base in Acholiland, rather than the 
continuation of a pre-colonial traditional authority.  
A summary of my thesis will illustrate how I have come to draw such a conclusion about 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, and act as a reminder of both the points I have argued and questions I 
have further posed along the way.  
In part one, I discussed broader debates and literatures on traditional authority revivals 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and turned to the more specific contexts and literatures related 
to traditional authority in Uganda and Acholiland. In chapter one I examined literature 
on traditional authority revivals across sub-Saharan Africa, teasing out insights and 
potential conceptual frameworks, and exploring thinking about traditional authorities 
from the colonial era through to the era of ‘development’. The purpose of chapter one 
was not only to give an overview of the broader literature, to which my thesis 
contributes, but also to examine the question of the encounter between traditional 
authorities and various exogenous discourses over a longer time period and broader 
geographical range than my study of Ker Kwaro Acholi offers. I began by examining 
literature that has taken a primarily top-down and state-centric approach when 
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studying traditional authorities, and have held as a central research question: are 
traditional authorities compatible with effective state-building in Africa? I highlighted 
that within this literature moral arguments have been constructed for recognising and 
incorporating traditional authorities into state-building enterprises in Africa, firstly by 
framing their existence as a natural part of Africa rural society, and thus expected to 
exist by the rural population, and secondly by viewing ‘local mechanisms’ that prevent 
‘so-called pretenders holding office’168 as examples of an African form of democracy. 
I then examined discourses that seem to have enabled the recent revivals of traditional 
authorities in sub-Saharan Africa. I looked at how discourses such as democratisation 
have reconfigured power relations across the continent in ways that have opened space 
for aspiring representatives of groups of people who seek a return to traditional 
communities or wish to imagine new ones.169 Within this section I drew attention to the 
increasing interest international development organisations have shown towards 
working with traditional authorities and identified the emerging view that the 
encounter between development and traditional authorities is facilitating the rise in 
reviving traditional institutions.  
In the final section of chapter one I unpacked this view further by examining cases 
where discourses of development were shaping traditional authority revivals. I shed 
light on instances in Kwazulu Natal, the western province of Zambia, Malawi, and Ghana 
where discourses of development have been appropriated by traditional authorities, in 
attempts to attract development projects and donor funding, and, most interestingly, to 
reflect re-imagined conceptualisations of traditional authorities held within 
communities. The example I pointed to in Ghana, where the Okyenhene established a 
secretariat, which soon became furnished with office equipment, and became involved 
in sensitisation workshops and training programs to modernise the chieftaincy, reflects 
the way Ker Kwaro Acholi has revived, and of traditional authority revival more broadly 
across Uganda.  
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I explored the revivals of traditional authorities in Uganda in chapter two, and in 
particular ideas of traditional authority in Acholi, from precolonial, through colonial to 
postcolonial times, and up to the recent conflict. In the first section, I gave an account of 
how governing authorities are thought to have existed prior to colonialism, and wanted 
to draw attention to the contestation over Payira supremacy amongst the clans of 
Acholiland that existed in some of the earliest written accounts on Acholi. I then 
examined developments in the late colonial period in Acholiland where tensions 
amongst clans, including Payira, played out in the arena of emerging party politics, 
along a politicised religious cleavage and in the creation of a constitutional head for 
Acholi district. Whilst Acholi, and other similarly organised areas like Langi and Teso, 
sought to establish a ceremonial leader who, it was hoped, could act on an equal footing 
to the Kabaka, amongst the other Kingdoms and aspiring Kingdoms of Uganda there 
were desperate attempts to salvage declining monarchies, as in Ankole, or invent them, 
as in Busoga.  
My examination of traditional authorities in Uganda in the postcolonial period, in the 
final section of chapter two, began with a discussion of their abolition under President 
Milton Obote. I then drew attention to the pleas made to Idi Amin in 1971 from Baganda 
to restore the Monarchy, and the protest by elders in Kigezi and Ankole protesting 
against such a move. It was not until Museveni came into power, however, that the 
Buganda Kingdom, and thus traditional authority across Uganda, was restored to the 
constitution. As I began to argue in this chapter, and developed further throughout the 
thesis, state recognition of traditional authorities under Museveni’s government has 
been directly determined by the relationship between the Buganda Kingdom and NRM, 
and in particular through the Government’s relationship with the conservative, 
monarchist factions of the Buganda Kingdom.  
Having navigated through contemporary debates on traditional authority revivals in 
sub-Saharan Africa and given a summary examination of traditional authorities in 
Uganda and Acholiland over the long term, I turned to analyse Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
revival. I chose to delineate the process of how Ker Kwaro Acholi has revived into three 
phases, to reflect the production of three dominant images of the institution. In each 
chapter I sought to identify and illustrate links between the strategic practices of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi, sometimes pointing to the agency of particular actors within Ker Kwaro 
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Acholi, and the discourses that shaped these practices. In chapter three, I analysed the 
first phase of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s ‘revival’, whereby a dominant image emerged that cast 
Ker Kwaro Acholi as the traditional authority of a newly imagined Chiefdom of Acholi. I 
highlighted how the devastation wrought in Acholiland since the late 1980s became an 
enabling and supportive environment for ideas to revive Acholi traditional authorities; a 
project which became the foundation upon which Ker Kwaro Acholi has anchored itself. 
Drawing on contemporary literature on northern Uganda, I discussed dominant ways 
the conflict has been understood, and the dominant responses to the identified 
problems. In this section I highlighted the tendency to view the conflict in northern 
Uganda as an internal Acholi issue, where a real and perceived breakdown of moral and 
social norms was often regarded as both the effect of conflict and the cause of its 
prolongation. Within this milieu of discourses, a revival of Acholi traditional authorities 
was supported and advocated by government and international actors. Traditional 
authority was, however, being re-imagined almost solely in terms of their potential 
roles in ritual cleansing and as neutral brokers of peace in conflict resolution. 
I discussin in chapter three how at the dawn of the new century, a host of Rwodi were 
re-installed, a new post of Paramount Chief was created, and Rwot Payira appointed to 
fill the Paramountcy. Although the newly revived Rwodi received relatively little 
attention following the ceremony, Paramount Chief David Onen Acana received 
sponsorship to undertake courses in conflict resolution in the US and Europe. I 
illustrated in this chapter how, after Paramount Chief Acana’s return from his excursion 
in 2002, he actively seeks to increase Ker Kwaro Acholi’s visibility as a traditional 
authority, in the eyes of government officials and the numerous donors who were 
flooding the region.  Working together with his close associates; Kenneth Oketta and 
Francis Lagony; Paramount Chief Acana initiated a series of public events that rendered 
Ker Kwaro Acholi recognisable as a traditional authority to their target audience. As I 
detailed in the chapter, these consisted of a coronation ceremony for Paramount Chief 
Acana, an inauguration ceremony for the re-installed Rwodi, the writing of a Strategic 
Plan and its launch, which was accompanied by a handing over ceremony of a new 
house built for Paramount Chief Acana with funding from the EU. I argued that, in 
addition to the spectacle and parade of ‘tradition’ performed at the public ceremonies, 
the narrative of the Strategic Plan has been crucial for consolidating an image of Ker 
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Kwaro Acholi as a traditional authority. In my analysis of the Strategic Plan I drew 
attention to statements and that dated the institution to the fifteenth century, referred 
to Acholiland as a single chiefdom, and presented the chiefs of Ker Kwaro Acholi as 
neutral heirs of original chiefs, resuming the roles they would be playing had colonial 
and post-colonial rule not suppressed traditional authorities. I then pointed to how this 
invented past, written to cast Ker Kwaro as the traditional authority of Acholi, was 
taken up by organisations working in the field of traditional justice because, as Branch 
has identified, Acholi traditional leaders were being viewed as central for reviving the 
traditional justice mechanisms believed crucial for restoring war-torn relationships in 
Acholiland.170   
In chapter four I explored how Ker Kwaro Acholi was further imagined as a government 
structure, arguing that this phase of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival was shaped by central 
Government discourses on traditional authorities and a strategy within Ker Kwaro 
Acholi to position itself advantageously should traditional authorities be incorporated 
into the state structure more formally, through regional tier or a federal system. To 
support my argument I first closely examined a document written by Ker Kwaro Acholi 
for district authorities, which presented a proposal to set up a ‘government structure’ 
for Ker Kwaro. My analysis of this concept paper highlighted how Ker Kwaro Acholi was 
being re-imagined by central actors of the institution and how they wanted Ker Kwaro 
Acholi to be known by district level government. It was evident that Ker Kwaro Acholi 
wanted to make itself known as a traditional authority with technical, expert capacity to 
potentially form a cultural standing committee in a regional tier structure of 
government. Ker Kwaro did so by appropriating Government rhetoric for the new 
positions they were creating in the institution and by making explicit reference to 
Government proposed provisions for incorporating traditional authorities into the state 
structure. I then turned to examine national politics, pointing to the concentration of 
NRM power at the district level,171 despite decentralisation policies implemented by 
Museveni’s Government, and the politics associated with the creation of new districts. I 
gave attention to these political developments because they are, not least, reflections of 
                                                          
170 A. Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 154-178. 
171 E. Green, "Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda," Security and Development 8, no. 4 (2008).  
199 
 
Museveni’s struggle to gain control at the local level. Government discourses on 
traditional authorities are closely tied to Museveni’s struggle to hold onto power, and as 
I discussed in the chapter, are a direct response to its worsening relationship with the 
politically threatening Buganda Kingdom. At the core of Government discourses on 
traditional authorities in Uganda is the idea and constitutional requirement for Kings 
and clan heads alike  to exist as cultural institutions, concerned only with ‘cultural 
matters’ and thus as non-political actors. I finally discuss in the chapter how Ker Kwaro 
Acholi embraces and appropriates government rhetoric as a cultural institution, 
expresses intentions to partner with local and central government for the ‘holistic 
development’ of Acholi, and embeds the objectives of its second Strategic Plan within 
the Government’s Peace, Recovery and Development Programme.  
The dual projections from Ker Kwaro Acholi of what seem to be contradictory images; 
of the institution as a government structure and a non-political cultural institution: a 
potential contender to state power and a partner of Government, remains a paradox I 
do not attempt to completely resolve in the chapter. Instead, I aimed to highlight the 
duality and presence of an inherent contradiction that exists as a constituent part of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi.  
In chapter five, I examined the third phase of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival where the 
institution became known as an agent of sustainable development. I traced the way 
images of Ker Kwaro Acholi as a traditional cultural institution were utilised as a 
foundation for casting Ker Kwaro as a ‘vital supplement’ for development in an 
emerging post-conflict Acholiland. I returned once again to Ker Kwaro Acholi’s first 
Strategic Plan and analysed the way the form, language and concepts adopted within the 
text, echoed and reflected discourses of development and had the effect of aligning Ker 
Kwaro Acholi to international development agendas. At the same time as positioning 
Ker Kwaro Acholi as a like-minded institution to international institutions such as 
UNESCO, and with the potential to partner on development programmes, for example, 
to fight gender based violence, the authors of the Plan also sought to maintain Ker 
Kwaro’s credentials as a traditional authority. I then examined Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 
encounter with The World Bank’s Northern Uganda Social Action Fund to illustrate how 
preconceived ideas, assumptions and images of traditional authorities held by NUSAF, 
were met and bolstered by the images Ker Kwaro Acholi was projecting of itself. I 
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pointed out that NUSAF’s engagement with Ker Kwaro Acholi, with the effect of 
bolstering Ker Kwaro’s profile amongst NGOs and donors, was based on little evidence 
that Ker Kwaro could mobilise communities and identify the most appropriate people 
as facilitators of NUSAF sub-projects. In the final part of chapter five I argued that the 
establishment and bolstering of a Ker Kwaro Acholi secretariat and the writing and 
launch of the second Strategic Plan, all facilitated through donor support, served to 
significantly consolidate images of Ker Kwaro Acholi as an agent of development with 
the administrative and technical capacity to partner with NGOs and donors.  
In chapter six, part three of the thesis, I shifted from discussing Ker Kwaro Acholi in 
terms of the dominant images that have constituted the institutions revival and turned 
to examine a more complex picture of Ker Kwaro Acholi, which focused on less visible 
discourses. The main objective of this chapter was to draw attention to the disjuncture’s 
between how Ker Kwaro Acholi has predominantly come to be known and imagined to 
be (as discussed in part two), and how Ker Kwaro Acholi functions in practice and is 
also understood within less visible discourses. I began the chapter with recourse to my 
interview with Rosalba Oywa, who has worked closely with Ker Kwaro Acholi, yet 
struggled to pin down what Ker Kwaro Acholi has been evolving into, and called for 
further research to understand, in reference to Ker Kwaro Acholi, ‘the amorphous thing 
that has happened’. The portion of my interview with Oywa that I discussed in chapter 
six introduced ways of understanding Ker Kwaro Acholi that challenged and 
undermined the dominant ways Ker Kwaro has sought to be known. Having expressed 
surprise that Ker Kwaro was not developing as she had expected or imagined it to, 
Oywa went on to describe Ker Kwaro Acholi, with great concern, as a process that is 
creating tensions amongst the Rwodi and clans; that poses a danger of becoming a 
Payira dominated institution; that has become commercialised where social status has 
become more important than serving the community; and that is mimicking a kingship 
like Buganda.  
Drawing predominantly on interviews conducted in northern Uganda in 2010172, which 
ranged from interviews with Rwodi of Ker Kwaro Acholi, members of Ker Kwaro’s 
                                                          
172 N.B. I was unable to interview Paramount Chief Acana until 2011 when he was living in the 
U.K, studying at a university in Birmingham. I have also had email correspondence with 
Paramount Chief Acana, Prime Minister Oketta and Rwot Francis Lagony since my fieldwork.  
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secretariat and government structure, to development practitioners who had worked 
with Ker Kwaro and government officials (see Appendix A), the following sections of 
chapter six reflected and supported how Oywa had described Ker Kwaro. These less 
visible discourses on Ker Kwaro Acholi served to undermine the dominant images 
through which Ker Kwaro Acholi has negotiated its revival. The disjuncture between 
dominant images of Ker Kwaro Acholi and the alternative ways of seeing Ker Kwaro 
Acholi, the latter being more accurate reflections of how the institution functions in 
practice, provokes the important questions: Whose interests are being served by this 
disjuncture? And how does this effect reconfigurations of power within northern 
Uganda and Uganda more widely? While the remit of the thesis has not demanded these 
questions be directly addressed, I have drawn the conclusion that Ker Kwaro Acholi is a 
new form of power base in Acholiland, which has been borne from my primary 
argument that Ker Kwaro Acholi has emerged through the negotiation of dominant 
images that are significantly removed from the how the institution functions in practice.  
One of the lessons that could be drawn from my study of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s revival are 
that the development-traditional authority encounter is a complex one, with changing 
discursive economies on both sides and an encounter that is not one of domination but 
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Name Title/Job Date Place of 
Interview 
Geoffrey Ochora Parish Chief Okidi 02.03.10 Atiak 
James Benon  Lecturer Gulu University 05.04.10 Gulu 
Mike Ocaka Project Officer Ker Kwaro 
Acholi 
06.04.10 Gulu 
Santo Okema Programme Coordinator 06.04.10 Gulu 
Sarah Achiro Project Officer Ker Kwaro 
Acholi 
07.04.10 Gulu 
Mike Ocaka Project Officer Ker Kwaro 
Acholi 
10.04.10 Kampala 
Dr Wilfred Ochan Ass. Representative at UNPF 11.04.10 Kampala 
Kenneth Oketta Prime Minister Ker Kwaro 
Acholi 
12.04.10 Kampala 
Wade Snowdon  Information Research and 
Documentation Officer, ARLPI 
14.04.10 Gulu 
Mark Avola Former Programme Manager, 
Ker Kwaro Acholi  
15.04.10 Gulu 
Wilfred Opobo Director of Programmes, 
ACORD, Gulu 
16.04 10 Gulu 
Florence Okio Programme Officer, Gender 




Richard Komakech Accountant, Ker Kwaro Acholi 19.04.10 Gulu 
Rosalba Oywa Former Programme 
Coordinator, ACORD, Gulu 
20.04.10 Gulu 
Rosetta Lanyero Obon Head Teacher, St Mauritz, Gulu 20.04.10 Gulu 
Jessica Huber Director of the Peace and 
Justice Programme, SPRING, 
USAID 
21.04.10 Gulu 
Retired Col. Walter Ochora Resident District 
Commissioner, Gulu 
23.04.10 Gulu 
Santo Lapolo Resident District 
Commissioner, Pader 
26.04.10 Pader 
George Odong Coordinator, NGO Forum, 
Pader 
26.04.10 Pader 
George Lugai Rwot Pajule palwo 27.04.10 Pader 
Oyak Ywakamoi Rwot Kolo 27.04.10 Pader 
Ajao Oweka Denous Rwot Paibwore 27.04.10 Pader 
Okot Francis  Latyet Rwot Kabala 27.04.10 Kilak Corner 
Omony Ogaba Resident District 
Commissioner, Kitgum 
28.04.10 Kitgum 
Andrew Obol Branch Coordinator, Caritas, 
Kitgum 
28.04.10 Kitgum 
Esther Luk Elder 28.04.10 Kitgum 
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Owor Faustino Kiwel Rwot Lwo Pa Omot 29.04.10 Kitgum 
Odong Lira Rwot Lira Palwo Omor Acer 29.04.10 Kitgum 
Unknown  Rwot, from Pader District 29.04.10 Kitgum 
Kinyera Vincent Rwot Palabek 30.04.10 Kitgum 
Obol John Odoki Rwot Padibe 30.04.10 Kitgum 
Justo Obita Rwot Koch Kal, and Minister of 
Culture, Ker Kwaro Acholi 
30.04.10 Kitgum 
George Pele Coordinator, NGO Forum, 
Kitgum 
01.05.10 Gulu 
Mark Okot Bernard Project Officer in Social 
Services Department, Caritas, 
Pader 
01.05.10 Gulu 
Gladys Ocangora Coordinator, Kitgum Women's 
Peace Initiative 
05.05.10 Kitgum 
Carol Exile Apio Associate Programme 
Development Officer, NUTI, 
Kitgum 
05.05.10 Kitgum 
Stephen Komakech Legal Officer, Norwegian 
Refugee Council, Kitgum 
05.05.10 Kitgum 
Matthew Otto Minister for Gender, Youth and 
Special Interest Groups and 
Minister for Culture and Land 




Henry Komakech Project Assistant, Youth 
Association (YSA), Kitgum 
05.05.10 Kitgum 
Macleord Baker Ochola II Retired Bishop of Kitgum 
Diocese, Core member of 
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace 
Initiative, Chairman of Acholi 
Education Initiative 
06.05.10 Kitgum 
Jeremiah Muttu Rwot Patiko 07.06.10 Gulu 
Ojara Akileo Rwot Parabongo 08.06.10 Gulu 
Peter Lawot Rwot Bwobomanam 09.06.10 Gulu 
Q.B Kitara Mcmot Vice District Chairman, acting 
District Chairman at time of 
interview 
09.06.10 Gulu 
Martin Otinga Otto Yai Rwot Lamogi 11.06.10 Gulu 
Ojok Humphrey Project Officer, Ker Kwaro 
Acholi 
11.06.10 Gulu 
Lawrence Opio Project Officer, Ker Kwaro 
Acholi 
14.06.10 Gulu 
Ogigi Peter Rwot Alokolum and Deputy 
Paramount Chief, Ker Kwaro 
Acholi  
14.06.10 Gulu 
Garrison Latim Speaker, Ker Kwaro Acholi 14.06.10 Gulu 
Ochola Bosco Deputy Local District 
Councillor V, Kitgum 
17.06.10 Kitgum 
Ojok Dison Rwot Pajimo 17.06.10 Kitgum 
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Arop Poppy Paul Rwot Pagen 17.06.10 Kitgum 
Lino Owor Ogora Research and Advocacy Team 
Leader, Justice and 
Reconciliation Project 
18.06.10 Gulu 
Baptist Latim Rwot Pawel  19.06.10 Gulu 
Kenneth Oketta Prime Minister, Ker Kwaro 
Acholi. 
19.06.10 Gulu 
Randy Harris Development practitioner, 
USAID 
23.06.10 Kampala 
Francis Oryang Rwot Koch 23.06.10 Kampala 
Paul Lubana Project Officer in Social 
Services Department, Caritas, 
Gulu  
01.07.10 Gulu 
Janet Lakor Elder, Ker Kwaro Acholi 01.07.10 Gulu 
Rocky Menya Oyoo Manager for Gender Based 
Violence Capacity Building, 
American Refugee Council 
01.07.10 Gulu 
James Latigo Researcher 01.07.10 Gulu 
Joseph Okumu Catholic Priest, and Minister of 
Culture, Ker Kwaro Acholi 
06.07.10 Kampala 
David Onen Acana  Rwot Payira and Paramount 
Chief, Ker Kwaro Acholi 





















Paramount Chief’s House/Palace 
 




Council of Chiefs meeting place, Ker Kwaro Acholi, Gulu 
 
 














Invitation to the launch of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s Strategic Plan 2005-2007 and the 
hand over of the Paramount Chief’s House, 2005 
 




The photo of Paramount Chief Acana on the back cover of Ker Kwaro Acholi’s 




Comemoration of the Paramount Chief’s particpation at a launch organised by the 
International Organisation for Migration, 2009 
 
 
